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5Foreword
This report is one of three reports commissioned by Sida to an inde-
pendent team to review the development co-operation to countries 
in Asia (Laos, Sri Lanka and Vietnam), where Sweden has phased 
out support or is planning to phase out development co-operation 
and summarise the experiences and lessons learned. It was predated 
by an earlier, preparatory phase in 2009 that comprehensively docu-
mented and described this co-operation. It is also complemented by 
a synthesis report, which not only compiles the lessons and summa-
rises the three country reports, but also comparatively analyses the 
conclusions and lessons.
This evaluation provides an overview of the results and lessons of 
the bilateral development co-operation from 1974 until Sweden 
closed its embassy in 2011. Furthermore, it attempts an assessment of 
how and if this assistance contributed to reducing poverty in the 
country. Evaluating 38 years of co-operation between two countries 
is difficult, as was outlining the terms of reference for the assign-
ment. What also made this evaluation difficult was that it is simply 
difficult to neatly catch nearly forty years of events and much will be 
left out. On a note of self-critique, one could question the choice of 
case studies for this particular evaluation as not being the most rep-
resentative. However, this fault lies not with the evaluators, but with 
Sida and the challenge of defining and delineating such as task.  
Especially difficult to grasp in a written report are the relations that 
have been built up between individuals via all the contact points that 
development co-operation provided.
In 1974, near the end of the Second Indochinese War, Sweden 
initiated development co-operation with the Lao People’s Democrat-
ic Republic with USD 20,000 for a range of economic analyses that 
led to it becoming a program country in 1977. Support then went to 
the forestry, road and health sectors and, over time, was expanded to 
include research cooperation, legal education & reform, public 
administration, human rights, and major infrastructure projects. 
Major results identified from the selected case studies are in the are-
as of development of rural roads and reforms for institutional devel-
6opment for more effective roads development. Likewise in statistics 
there are major results in the building up of Lao’s first statistical 
institution. Sweden became a trusted long term partner and this laid 
the foundation for work with higher level of aid effectiveness, phas-
ing out of tied aid, alignment to government priorities and stronger 
coherence between the strategy and the support.
At the time of writing, Lao PDR still has the Least Developed 
Country status. However, the country has made substantial progress 
on a number of Millennium Development Goals, MDGs. It has low-
ered income poverty, reduced child mortality and increased primary 
school enrolment. Laos started off from extremely low levels, devas-
tated by a brutal war, which makes this all the more impressive. The 
authors conclude that poverty levels would have been higher in Laos 
if Sweden did not support strategic areas. Sweden learnt many useful 
lessons along the way on how to effectively and efficiently deliver aid. 
We worked with respect for ownership and had sustainability in 
mind. We improved our contextual analyses and in mainstreaming 
gender equality and environmental concerns. We developed support 
toward underlying causes to problems and moved into institutional 
development where we developed special knowledge. We built trust-
ful relations that enabled us to work on contentious issues.
Lessons learned need to be taken forward in the hopes that they 
will be of value and inform not only Swedish development co-opera-
tion in other countries but also that by other donors. We hope also 
that organically forged relationships from these 38 years will endure 
and prosper and lead to new opportunities in areas beyond develop-
ment co-operation.  
The views in the report are those of the independent evaluators 
and not the views of Sida.
Annika Nordin Jayawardena
Head of the Unit for Monitoring & Evaluation
Department for Organisational Development
Sida
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The overall goal of the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida) is to contribute to making it possible 
for poor people to improve their living conditions. 
In 2007 the Swedish Government decided to reduce the number 
of countries with which Sweden carried out development co-opera-
tion. This included cessation of development co-operation with 
Laos, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, and in accordance with Swedish 
development co-operation strategies, Sida and the embassies/ coun-
try teams of those three countries initiated an evaluation study to 
document the long periods of development co-operation and assess 
results and experiences. Part One of this exercise was documenta-
tion to provide an historical account of the development co-opera-
tion with Laos, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. This was undertaken in 
2009–2010.
In 2010, via an international competitive bidding process, Sida 
awarded a contract to GHD to undertake Part Two: an evaluation 
study of long-term development co-operation between Sweden and 
the three countries. This report covers the evaluation results for 
Laos, with separate reports being provided for Vietnam and Sri 
Lanka.
The Evaluation Team included the following key members:
• Prof. Mark McGillivray, Team Leader: Prof McGillivray is 
a well-recognised international development economist with 
experience as Chief Economist for the Australian International 
Development Assistance Agency (AusAID), as well as Deputy 
Director for the United Nations World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (WIDER).
• Dr David Carpenter, Deputy Team Leader: Dr Carpenter has 
evaluation and research experience across several countries while 
working with AusAID. He was manager of AusAID’s Australian 
Research Development Program and the ASEAN-Australian 
Development Cooperation Program.
• Mr Andrew Laing, Senior Evaluation Specialist: Mr Laing is an 
international development economist recognised for his work in 
Preface
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public financial management analysis and reporting for agencies 
such as the World Bank, DfID, AusAID and the UN.
• Mr Stewart Norup, M&E Advisor: Mr Norup has experience 
as M&E Advisor on international projects for Hassall & 
Associates International and then GHD for the last 10 years.
• Dr Sango Mahanty, Senior Research Specialist/Gender Adviser: 
Dr Mahanty has over 15 years of experience in development 
co-operation working as an academic, a consultant and an NGO 
coordinator. Dr Mahanty has extensive experience in social 
research and multidisciplinary research methodologies.
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Executive Summary
This report assesses the contribution Sweden has made to develop-
ment and poverty reduction in Laos over the 38 years of develop-
ment co-operation, from the inception of the program in 1974 to its 
end in 2011.
The overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide: 
1. An historical account of the development co-operation between 
Sweden and Laos by documenting and recording what has taken 
place and been achieved over the years; and
2. A summary of the experiences and lessons-learned from the co-
operation in order to guide the Government of Laos as well as 
other donors and international partners that may step in after 
Sida, regarding the possible continuation of the different projects 
or programs, but also future development co-operation per se.
The primary aim of this evaluation is to provide Sida with an under-
standing of how its development activities have supported poverty 
reduction in Laos over time. Specific objectives include analysing 
the background and development context for interventions, analys-
ing the reported results and impacts, and formulating conclusions 
and general lessons learned.
Evaluating 38 years of development co-operation is a complex 
task. An informative and rigorous methodological approach is 
required. This evaluation employs qualitative and quantitative 
methods in a complementary way to interrogate different types of 
evidence about the context, evolution and outcomes of Swedish 
development co-operation with Laos. This approach is grounded in 
the understanding that adopting different but complementary lines 
of enquiry invariably leads to more robust and credible research 
studies. In the spirit of complementarity this evaluation does not 
emphasise one line of enquiry over another but uses the insights aris-
ing from quantitative analysis to inform qualitative investigation and 
vice versa.
In accordance with contemporary international development 
thinking this evaluation adopts a multidimensional conceptualisa-
17
exeCuTIve SummAry
tion of poverty. This conceptualisation is based on the recognition 
that quality of life or well-being depends not only on income, but on 
levels of health, education, participation, personal security, political 
participation and many other factors. It is also based on the recogni-
tion that high levels of income do not necessarily always closely cor-
relate with high levels of health, education and other dimensions of 
well-being.
Such an evaluation also requires a comprehensive and rigorous 
evaluation framework. This evaluation relies heavily on an Aid 
Quality Evaluation Framework (AQEF). The AQEF is a conceptual 
tool that can be applied to almost any development aid activity. This 
framework is based on cutting edge knowledge of drivers of aid effec-
tiveness. Under this framework aid effectiveness is defined in terms 
of the impact of aid on multidimensional poverty reduction. The 
AQEF consists of five components, against which the quality of aid is 
assessed. They are: (1) absorptive capacity; (2) quality of public sector 
financial management; (3) consistency with Paris Declaration princi-
ples; (4) consistency of aid delivery with partner country sectoral pri-
orities; and (5) consistency of aid delivery with donor country pro-
gram strategies.
Consistent with the evaluation’s objective, the primary question 
addressed is as follows. 
• How, and to what extent, did Swedish development co-
operation contribute to poverty reduction in Laos? 
The reference to ‘contribution’ in the primary evaluation ques-
tion highlights the focus on exploring the plausible associations 
between Sida’s aid and changes in poverty, rather than supplying 
definitive proof of any causal relationship between the two. 
The evaluation also addresses four other (sub-) questions: 
(1) To what extent did Sida’s aid respond to pressing multidi-
mensional development needs in Laos? 
(2) To what extent has Sida’s development co-operation pro-
gram in Laos been effectively and efficiently delivered? 
(3) How and to what extent did Sida’s development co-opera-
tion nurture an enabling environment for poverty reduc-
tion in Laos? 
(4) What lessons can be learned from Sweden’s development 
co-operation with Laos to improve development effective-
ness in the future? Answering the fourth sub-question 
18
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draws together the analysis in sub-questions one to three to 
identify the most salient lessons for development co-opera-
tion programs. 
The report notes that Sweden has been a major donor of official 
development assistance (ODA) to Laos. Sweden provided $US714 
million dollars (in constant 2008 prices) in ODA to Laos during the 
period 1974 to 2008. Sweden was the largest OECD bilateral donor 
in terms of aid volume in each year from 1975 to 1993 and the sec-
ond largest during 1976 to 2008, providing 8.6 percent of its total 
ODA during this latter period. This equates to 3.9 percent of total 
aid, bilateral and multilateral, to Laos over this period. These num-
bers do not include aid from the Soviet Union and other former 
Eastern Bloc countries owing to a lack of comparable data. 
The report’s quantitative analysis found that:
• After finding itself in a desperately poor development situation 
in the mid-1970s, Laos has achieved strong multidimensional 
development and poverty outcomes since the 1990s, although 
still remains poor by developing country standards;
• Laos has received high levels of aid relative to population and 
GDP, and also relative to other foreign inflows;
• There have been reasonably steady year-on-year increases 
in aid receipts;
• The sectoral focus of development co-operation in Laos has 
been consistent with its pressing development needs;
• The level of aid to Laos has been such that it would be reason-
able to look for attribution between these inflows and national 
development outcomes in this country;
• The aid operating environment became increasingly crowded 
in Laos, owing to large increases in the number of donors in 
the country and the proliferation of aid supported activities; 
and
• The total volume of aid to Laos leads to questions regarding 
the ability of its economy to efficiently use these inflows for 
development purposes given international evidence on absorp-
tive capacity constraints.
The first four of these characteristics are pleasing from a develop-
ment perspective. While alone they clearly do not provide sufficient 
evidence that aid to Laos has been effective, they are consistent with 
development effectiveness principles. Added to these findings are the 
19
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results of a simple statistical analysis that pointed to positive associa-
tions between human development achievements in Laos and the 
total amounts of aid it has received from the international donor 
community. The last three characteristics are not consistent with 
effective aid, and suggest that one should be cautious in causally 
linking the improved multidimensional development outcomes in 
Laos to the aid it has received, these associations notwithstanding.
What might this imply for Swedish development co-operation? 
As mentioned, Sweden has been a major donor to Laos during the 
1980s when it was the largest bilateral donor, providing just under 
30 percent of total aid receipts. While this does not ensure that 
Swedish aid has had national level impacts in Laos, it does provide 
grounds for investigating whether such impacts have occurred, espe-
cially if it can be shown that Sweden supported highly strategic, piv-
otal activities that were efficiently delivered. 
This question, among others, was addressed in the case studies 
discussed in the report. The case studies were selected in consulta-
tion with Sida. The principal case selection criterion was the expect-
ed value of the case study in fulfilling the overall aim of the evalua-
tion and, in so doing, responding to the above questions. Also taken 
into account was the likely richness of information in to key time 
periods, people, and events. Judgement calls are unavoidable in 
selecting from a large number of potential case studies.
The case studies were examined in the context of key phases of 
the history of development co-operation between Sweden and Laos. 
These phases and the case studies are as follows:
Phase I: Economic Recovery and Reconstruction: 1974 to1985
Case Study 1: Assistance to the Transport and Communica-
tion Sector between 1977 and 1986
Phase  II: Building Institutions and Sharpening the Poverty Focus: 
1986 to1996
Case Study 2: Assistance to the Transport Sector
Case Study 3: Forestry Inventory Project
Phase  III: Supporting Reforms, Human Rights, and Developing 
Capacity: 1997 to 2010
Case Study 4: Governance and Public Administrative 
Reform in Luang Prabang 
Case Study 5: Developing Statistics Capacity within the 
 Government of Laos
Case Study 6: Support to the National University of Laos
20
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More than 70 key informants were interviewed for these case 
studies, both in Laos and Sweden.
Investigation of Phase I co-operation found that while it 
addressed an important development need and was aligned to Gov-
ernment of Laos priorities, its effectiveness was limited owing to 
a lack of co-ordination among donors and, in particular, limited 
local capacity. Assistance to the transport sector in Phase II was 
found to be effective development co-operation. The forestry inven-
tory project was less effective on the grounds that it did not achieve 
its intended results. Phase III co-operation was much more effective 
overall, developing statistical capacity within the Government of 
Laos in particular. One of the reasons for this co-operation being 
more successful was its focus on building local human capacity. 
Insufficient recognition of this constraint to effective development 
co-operation had been shown during early phases. Further details of 
the evaluation findings for these case studies are provided below.
Based on both the detailed investigation involved in the case 
studies and the quantitative analysis of the broader operating envi-
ronment, the responses to each evaluation question are provided in 
what follows. 
In answer to the first evaluation sub-question, there appears to be 
clear evidence that Sida responded to pressing multidimensional 
development needs in Laos. 
Laos faced many significant development challenges in 1975, 
with one of the most pressing being the need to rebuild infrastruc-
ture owing to the damage done during the War in Vietnam. The 
Sida focus on building transport and communications infrastructure 
in the 1970s and 1980s was a response to this need.
Given that Laos is predominantly a rural society, that poverty is 
more widespread in rural areas compared to urban areas and that 
roads provide access to markets and health services, Sida’s shift in 
the 1990s and beyond from the national road network towards pro-
vincial roads was also an appropriate response to a pressing need. 
It is one that seems to have had positive impacts on achievements 
in income and health, and lifted many Lao people out of income 
poverty.
Throughout the 1990s and beyond it became increasingly clear 
that a lack of capacity in management and governance were not only 
major constraints to growth and development in general but also to 
21
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aid effectiveness in Laos. In short, these constraints were increasing-
ly recognised as a pressing development need, one that had to be 
addressed by donors operating in Laos. The support for the better 
management of forestry resources from the mid-1980s and for gov-
ernance and public administration reform and greater statistics 
capacity from the mid-1990s is clearly consistent with this need. 
The extent of poverty is higher in Laos than in the developing 
country group as a whole. Income levels and achievements in health 
and education are lower, despite the impressive achievements of 
Laos since the early 1990s. Sida’s adoption in 1995 of poverty reduc-
tion as the overarching objective of its development co-operation 
program in Laos is consistent with these facts. So too was its ongoing 
support for forestry (given the importance of this sector for the liveli-
hood of Lao people and as an important driver of economic growth) 
and roads (for the reasons mentioned above), general support for the 
Government of Laos poverty initiatives and emphasis on human 
rights (given the link between the promotion of these rights and pov-
erty reduction) from the mid-2000s onwards. 
Regarding the second evaluation sub-question, the evidence of 
effective and efficient delivery of Swedish development co-operation 
in Laos is mixed. Evidence of effective and efficient aid delivery is 
scarcest during the first phase of development co-operation, between 
1974 and 1985. While it seems that Sida’s priorities were aligned 
with those of the Lao government, there is evidence of significant 
tying, of a lack of harmonisation among donors and, in particular, 
of very limited capacity to efficiently absorb aid inflows for develop-
ment purposes. 
Had Sweden ended its development co-operation with Laos in 
1985, then the inescapable conclusion would have been that on 
ba lance this co-operation would have been a failure on development 
effectiveness criteria. But of course it did not end in 1985, and it is in 
this context that co-operation during this first phase needs to be 
viewed. Consistent with the long-term approach and solidarity prin-
ciple evident in the delivery of Swedish development aid to Laos, it is 
reasonable to argue that had Sweden not been as active a donor as it 
was in the first phase, it would not have established an important 
prerequisite for effective development co-operation in Laos. That 
prerequisite is to be seen as a trusted, long-term development co-
operation partner.
22
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Evidence suggests that the second and third phases of develop-
ment co-operation between Sweden and Laos, between the years 
1986 and 1996 and 1996 and 2010, respectively, saw much more 
effectiveness and efficiency in aid delivery. Aid tying was phased out; 
there was strong alignment with Government of Laos priorities, 
clear and seemingly effective attempts at harmonisation of donor 
activities and consistency between activities on the ground and the 
Swedish country program. While there are questions about the 
appropriateness of the design of the Forest Inventory Project, the 
overall conclusion is that Swedish aid to Laos was delivered most 
effectively and efficiently from the mid-1980s onward.
In response to the third evaluation sub-question, there is clear 
evidence that after a slow start Sida’s development co-operation nur-
tured such an environment in Laos, or put differently provided the 
pre-conditions for sustained poverty reduction.
Key elements in nurturing an enabling environment are local 
government capacity and removing impediments to poor people act-
ing in a way that improves their living standards. Swedish support 
for governance and improved public administrative has been suc-
cessful, as has support for the National University of Laos and the 
State Statistical Centre. The benefits of this support are many and 
include better pro-poor service delivery, greater mobilisation of 
domestic revenues and a better evidence base for policy development 
and implementation. All of these benefits are conducive to greater 
poverty reduction and sustained development outcomes into the 
future. Support for provincial road construction has been important 
in enabling poor people to have better market and health services 
access, which is vital to improve their living conditions.
Overall, beginning from a very low level, capacity has been 
increased in Laos as much of this is as a result of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation.
With respect to the fourth evaluation sub-question, there are 
three main lessons learned from the evaluation of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation with Laos. The lessons learned, which if acted 
upon can improve future development effectiveness are: 
1. Adopt a long-term approach, developing a sound relationship 
with the partner government that facilitates frank and open 
dialogue; 
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2. Pursue an effective balance between principles and pragma-
tism; and 
3. Be flexible and learn while doing. 
These are generic lessons for aid delivery, applying to both bilat-
eral and multilateral co-operation. While they apply primary to 
donors, they also provide important insights for partner country gov-
ernments in their dealings with donors, in particular the first lesson.
The primary evaluation question – how, and to what extent, did 
Sida’s development assistance contribute to poverty reduction in 
Laos? – is rarely easy to answer for any development co-operation 
program. 
Aid levels to Laos are relatively high by international standards, 
and certainly large enough relative to its population and the size of 
its economy to expect some relationship between these inflows and 
development achievements. Donors have, it seems, responded to 
important national development needs within Laos and have provid-
ed relatively steady year-on-year aid levels. There also appears to 
have been co-ordination between donors, to the extent that a num-
ber of donors have harmonised their activities with those of Sweden. 
In addition, and fundamentally, there is clear evidence of solid gains 
in income poverty reduction, in health and education and in human 
development generally in Laos.
There is, however, evidence of poor donor practice in this aspect 
of Swedish aid delivery and there is no reason to believe that this has 
not also occurred with other donors. There is also evidence of a lack 
of local capacity to use aid efficiently, aid levels in excess of that 
which might be efficiently absorbed, and increasing proliferation of 
aid activities in Laos.
On balance, it is reasonable to posit that the overall development 
co-operation effort in Laos has contributed to poverty reduction in 
Laos: at very least poverty levels would be higher in Laos in the 
absence of such co-operation. 
Sweden’s effort needs to be judged in this context, but also against 
the evidence that on balance its aid has been delivered effectively 
and efficiently and has addressed important development needs. 
On these grounds it is entirely reasonable to conclude that Swed-
ish development co-operation has made a substantive contribution 
to poverty reduction in Laos. The extent of this contribution 
remains, however, a matter of speculation.
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Part One – Swedish Development 
Co-operation With Laos: 
Setting The Context
1. PurPOSE, SCOPE AnD METhOD OF EvALuATiOn
1.1 Introduction
Swedish development co-operation with Laos commenced in 1974. The 
mid-1970s was a particularly pivotal time in the history of Laos. The royalist 
government of Laos was overthrown by the Pathet Lao in 1975 and the coun-
try was officially re-named the Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic. Laos had 
been affected very badly during the Second Indo-Chinese War that ended in 
1975, having experienced heavier bombardment than that inflicted on Germa-
ny in World War II. The country faced enormous development challenges – 
severe poverty was widespread, infrastructure was in a poor state, internal con-
flicts were ongoing and government institutions were weak and ineffective.
Sweden allocated $US20,000 to its development co-operation program 
with Laos in 1974.1 From these very humble beginnings, Sweden’s program 
expanded in size. Following the suspension of aid from the United States in 
1976 and the winding back of aid from other OECD donor countries, Sweden 
quickly became a principal source of aid funds to Laos. From 1975 to 1993, 
Sweden provided more development aid to Laos than any other OECD coun-
try. It was the second largest donor, after Japan, over the period 1975 to 2008. 
Sweden provided, in 2008 prices, $US714 million in official development assis-
tance to Laos, which was seven percent of the OECD total during this period.2
1 This amount is in 1974 prices. In 2008 prices it equates to $US80,000.
2 Data presented here have been obtained from OECD DAC International Development 
Statistics On-line Database (OECD, 2010). Note that it has often been claimed that Sweden 
was the first Western country other than Japan to engage in development co-operation 
with the newly founded Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic (see, for example Nordic 
Consulting Group, 2010). This claim is not supported by information in the above da-
tabase. In each of the years 1975 to 1977 there were eight donors in addition to Sweden 
and Japan engaging in development co-operation with Laos. Sweden might have been 
the first Western country to be formally invited by the new Lao Peoples’ Democratic Re-
public government to engage in development co-operation, but it was clearly not the only 
donor active in Laos in 1977. Nordic Consulting Group (2010) also refers to disagree-
ment over when Swedish development co-operation with Laos commenced. The OECD 
database makes it clear this is in 1974.
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Swedish development co-operation with Laos has been character-
ised by long-term partnerships around key activities. The nature of 
these activities has changed over time, in part due to changes in inter-
national thinking on development assistance but also due to changing 
needs in Laos owing to its economic and social transition over time. In 
the early years Swedish development co-operation focused on the 
strengthening of physical infrastructure (roads and hydropower) and 
commercial forestry. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, the focus 
shifted toward support for institutional development and capacity 
building, and thereafter to public sector strengthening, human rights 
and governance (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010).
This report assesses the contribution Sweden has made to devel-
opment and poverty reduction in Laos over the 38 years of assis-
tance, from the inception of the development co-operation program 
in 1974 to its end in 2011. It is one of three evaluation reports com-
missioned by Sida in countries where it is, or has, phased out official 
development co-operation, the other two reports focus on Sri Lanka 
and Vietnam. This chapter outlines the purpose and scope of this 
evaluation and introduces the evaluation questions, as well as briefly 
discussing the methodological approach.
1.2 Purpose and Scope
The overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide: 
1. an historical account of the development co-operation 
between Sweden by documenting and recording what has tak-
en place and been achieved over the years; and
2. a summary of the experiences and lessons-learned from the co-
operation in order to guide the Government of Laos as well as 
other donors and international partners that may step in after 
Sida, regarding the possible continuation of the different projects 
or programs, but also future development co-operation per se.
The primary aim of this evaluation is to provide Sida with an 
understanding of how its development activities have supported pov-
erty reduction in Laos over time. Specific objectives include analys-
ing the background and development context for interventions, ana-
lysing the reported results and impacts, and formulating conclusions 
and general lessons-learned.
Efforts and achievements are assessed against the context prevail-
ing at the time when decisions were made, and the overall develop-
ment objective of poverty reduction as formulated in national devel-
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opment plans, poverty reduction strategies and Swedish development 
plans, policies and strategies.
With regard to impact, this evaluation does not seek to attribute 
in any quantitative way a causal link between Swedish development 
co-operation and poverty reduction, or other high level development 
outcomes in Laos. Such an exercise requires precise knowledge of 
development outcomes that would have arisen in the absence of 
Swedish development co-operation. This is an extremely complex 
and highly speculative task, and one that is beyond the scope of this 
evaluation. This evaluation does, however, point to various stylised 
facts or statistical associations between development co-operation 
and development outcomes in Laos. The report speculates about 
whether these associations might be causal, but goes no further than 
that. The evaluation uses a multidisciplinary, mixed method 
approach to assess the impact of Swedish aid, as discussed below. 
This report does not exhaustively document the full suite of 
development interventions funded by Sweden over the 38 year his-
tory of engagement as this task was undertaken as part of Phase 1 of 
this broader project (see Nordic Consulting Group, 2010). Instead 
this report uses a case study approach to discuss particular themes 
underlying Swedish aid in critical periods of Laos’ history, and situ-
ates that within the broader political and economic context existing 
at the time, with reference to key policy shifts in development co-
operation between Laos and Sweden. 
1.3 Evaluation Methods and Conceptual Framework
1.3.1 Methods
This study employs complementary qualitative and quantitative 
methods to interrogate different types of evidence about the context, 
evolution and outcomes of Swedish development co-operation with 
Laos. This approach was used in order: (i) to credibly and robustly 
address the evaluation questions outlined above; and (ii) to address 
data limitations that are inherent to this kind of longitudinal study. 
The research methodology employed and the principles underpinning 
the selected approach are discussed in further detail in Appendix A.
The quantitative analysis in this report is used to profile the broader 
development context in Laos and ODA allocation by Sweden and 
other donors over time. Quantitative data are used to track changes 
in quality of life – poverty in particular. Information is presented on 
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parameters such as per capita income, annual rates of growth, life 
expectancy, adult literacy, child and infant mortality, maternal mor-
tality and the percentage and absolute number of people living 
below the income poverty line. Changes over time in such variables 
are examined and inferences about aid effectiveness are made. 
A challenge for the analysis was data availability, especially in the 
early years of Swedish development co-operation. 
The historical nature of this evaluation, assessing Sida’s 38 year 
engagement in Laos, requires an assessment of the cumulative 
impact of many activities over several decades, which distinguishes  
it from a typical project or program evaluation. To address this 
requirement, the qualitative component of this evaluation drew on 
two types of case study. The first, a longitudinal case study, enabled 
a view of Sida’s long-term role in one sector, and to examine how 
bilateral relationships and approaches to aid delivery evolved over 
time. The second type of case study is thematic, selected to reflect 
particular approaches to aid delivery and important thematic issues 
underpinning Swedish aid during particular periods. 
All cases were selected in consultation with Sida at the inception 
stage from a large set of potential cases. In an ideal evaluation world 
all aid activities in the country program under consideration would 
be evaluated, be they projects, discrete components of projects or 
programs would be evaluation. Yet this is beyond the resources of 
practically all long term evaluations, including this evaluation. 
Choices and judgments must therefore be made. Recognising that it 
is rarely self-evident as to which cases are the most appropriate, clear 
and transparent general selection criteria need to be employed. 
These criteria are outlined in Appendix A. 
Case studies have been examined through semi-structured inter-
views, focus groups and a review of existing documentation. Over 70 
key informants were interviewed in Laos and Sweden (see Appendix 
B for more details). This qualitative information is used extensively 
when discussing the performance of particular interventions, rela-
tions between Sweden and the GoL, changes in Swedish policy, and 
the impact of these changes.
1.3.2 The Aid Quality Evaluation Framework
This evaluation is guided by the Aid Quality Evaluation Framework 
(AQEF) which was developed by the authors in response to the complexity 
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of this large scale, historical evaluation3. The AQEF is a conceptual tool 
that can be applied to almost any development aid activity. This frame-
work is based on cutting edge knowledge of those factors that drive aid 
effectiveness. Under this framework aid effectiveness is defined in terms 
of the impact of aid on multidimensional poverty reduction, either 
directly or via impacts on the drivers of poverty reduction. 
“The AQEF is comprised of five components. Assessments of aid 
quality can be made against each of these components using a mix 
of quantitative and qualitative data. The five components of the 
AQEF are: 1. absorptive capacity; 2. quality of public sector finan-
cial management; 3. consistency with Paris Declaration principles; 
4. consistency with partner country sectoral priorities; and 5. consist-
ency with donor country program strategies (or equivalents). The 
importance of the first two components is discussed further in Chap-
ter 2 and all components are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, with ref-
erence to the data presented in Chapters 2 through 5. Further details 
of the AQEF can be found in Appendix C. 
1.4 Evaluation Questions 
The primary question this evaluation addresses is:
How, and to what extent, did Sida’s development assistance contribute to 
poverty reduction in Laos? 
This question is directly drawn from the terms of reference and 
addresses the OECD DAC impact criterion. Poverty reduction (in 
various guises) has long been the overarching objective of Swedish 
aid, from that outlined in Proposition 1962:100 (the ‘bible of Swedish 
development co-operation’) through to the present day (Danielson 
and Wohlgemuth, 2003, p.3). As such, poverty reduction constitutes 
an appropriate yardstick for assessing the impact of Sida’s aid to 
Laos over the considerable time period covered by this evaluation. 
The reference to ‘contribution’ in the primary evaluation question 
highlights the focus on exploring the plausible associations between 
Sida’s aid and changes in poverty, rather than supplying definitive 
proof of any causal relationship between the two. This recognises 
that there are many determinants of poverty in partner countries 
and that isolating the precise contribution of any one is an extremely 
demanding task. It also recognises that many donor nations have 
3 For a detailed outline of the AQEF see Carpenter et al. (2011) 
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been active in Laos, and attributing the precise contribution to pov-
erty reduction of any one donor is even more demanding.
To the extent that poverty reduction has been the principal aim 
of Sweden’s country program in Laos, addressing this question 
involves the application of component 5 of the AQEF. Consideration 
of the broad enabling environment is also important for considering 
this question. This includes examining the absorptive capacity of the 
recipient country (component 1 of the AQEF) and the quality of 
public fiscal management (component 2of the AQEF). These are 
widely acknowledged to be important for the effective and efficient 
use of aid funds for development purposes. 
In accordance with contemporary international development think-
ing this evaluation adopts a multidimensional conception of poverty. It 
is widely accepted in policy and research circles that poverty is multidi-
mensional in nature. This is based on the recognition that quality of life 
or well-being depends not only on income, but on levels of health, edu-
cation, participation, personal security, political participation and 
many other factors. It is also based on the recognition that high levels of 
income do not necessarily always correlate with high levels of health, 
education and other dimensions of well-being. This means that an indi-
vidual might have an income level which is high enough for them not to 
live in poverty with respect to income, but might well be living in pov-
erty with respect to these other dimensions. The World Bank, the Unit-
ed Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other thought leading 
development agencies have long embraced this concept.
Sub-question 1: To what extent did Sida’s aid respond to pressing multi-
dimensional development needs in Laos?
Sub-question 1 is directed at the appropriateness and relevance of 
the sectoral and geographic allocation of Sida’s development co-
operation over time as well as the consistency of this with country 
strategies in Laos. This recognises that to be effective, aid must be 
targeted at the most pressing development needs of each recipient 
country at a particular point in time. Addressing this sub-question 
involves an analysis of components 4 and 5 of the AQEF.
Sub-question 2: To what extent has Sida’s development co-operation 
 program in Laos been effectively and efficiently delivered?
Aid may be allocated according to pressing needs, but it must be 
well delivered if it is to contribute to poverty reduction. This area of 
the evaluation explores the extent to which Sida’s development 
 co-operation exemplified internationally agreed principles of good aid 
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delivery practice, most recently articulated in the Paris Declaration 
(component 3 of the AQEF). This analysis demands the careful and 
nuanced application of these principles – see Appendix C for an expla-
nation of why it is valid to apply the Paris Principles retrospectively.
Woven into this analysis is an exploration of the different ways of 
working that Sida adopted throughout the period of development 
co-operation and how these may have evolved in response to multi-
dimensional needs. This includes an assessment of the choice of 
modalities, channels, partner organisations and the relative efficien-
cy of these arrangements as aid delivery mechanisms. The analysis 
under this sub-question directly addresses the OECD DAC criteria 
of efficiency and effectiveness.
In-depth case studies illustrate how these choices and strategies 
have worked in particular contexts and at particular points in time.
Sub question 3: How and to what extent did Sida’s development co-opera-
tion nurture an enabling environment for poverty reduction in Laos?
The third sub-question acknowledges that although aid may be 
well targeted and well delivered, it must also be undertaken in, and 
actively contribute to, a supportive enabling environment if it is to 
have a sustainable impact on poverty reduction. This analysis consid-
ers Sida’s approaches to influencing policy and building the capacity 
of the government, civil society and the capacity of individuals to 
improve their lives. The relative effectiveness of these more indirect 
forms of development co-operation is assessed to help understand 
which particular approaches worked well in influencing the enabling 
environment and the reasons why. This assists judgements about the 
sustainability of Sida’s long-term co-operation program.
Detailed case studies explore how these challenges were 
approached in particular instances and the degree to which they 
were able to influence aspects of the enabling environment. This 
question directly addresses the OECD DAC criteria of sustainability.
Sub question 4: What lessons can be learned from Sweden’s development 
co-operation with Laos to improve development effectiveness in the future?
The fourth sub-question draws together the analysis in sub-ques-
tions 1–3 to identify the most salient lessons for development co-
operation programs. 
1.5 Proceeding Chapters
This report consists of six additional chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the 
‘big picture’. That is, it provides the broader development context within 
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which development co-operation between Sweden and Laos can be 
understood and evaluated. This includes looking at the broad operating 
environment faced by donors in Laos, the development achievements of 
Laos over the 38-year period of co-operation, and Sweden’s actual aid 
allocation. In accordance with the application of the AQEF, this chapter 
also introduces data on consistency with the Paris Declaration principle 
of aid predictability, the quality of public sector fiscal management, and 
the capacity of Laos to effectively absorb aid. The chapter ends with 
some stylised facts regarding ODA and development achievements in 
Laos that are considered later in this report. 
Chapter 2 is a quantitative chapter. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are more 
qualitative in nature and discuss Sweden’s aid to Laos during three 
important historical periods. Chapter 3 covers the early period of 
Swedish aid from 1974 to 19854. This chapter includes a case study 
on Swedish support to the transport sector. Chapter 4 covers the 
10 year period from 1986 to 1996 and includes case studies on the 
transport sector (building on from the case study in the previous 
chapter), and the Forest Inventory Project, a sub project within the 
Laos-Swedish Forestry Co-operation Program. Chapter 5 focuses on 
the period up to the phase out of Swedish aid in 2010. Included there-
in are case studies of Sweden’s support to Governance and Public 
Administration Reform (GPAR), research capacity building of the 
National University of Laos (NUOL), and capacity building of the 
State Statistics Centre (SSC) and the Department of Statistics (DoS).
Chapters 6 and 7 present a synthesis of key issues. Chapter 6 dis-
cusses the main thematic issues that have been introduced over the 
previous four chapters and how they have shaped and constrained 
the effectiveness of Swedish aid over time. Chapter 7 answers the 
primary evaluation question and sub-questions and introduces 
a number of lessons-learned for Sida and other donors when deliver-
ing aid to other states facing similar development challenges to Laos.
4 For narrative purposes it was important to break up the long period of Sweden’s 
aid to Laos into discrete periods of time. With regard to the first period, the year 
1974 marks the time when Sweden first provided ODA to Laos, while the year 1985 
was chosen as an end point because it was the year before the important economic 
reform policies that reshaped the Lao economy. The second period (1986–1995) 
was chosen as it was the period of intense reforms and reflected Sweden’s focus on 
building institutional capacity and the sharpening of the poverty focus resulting 
from the 1995 Country Strategy. The final period (1997–2011) marks a transition to 
a focus on empowerment and governance and includes the phase out period. 
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2. LAOS nATiOnAL DEvELOPMEnT PrOFiLE
2.1 Economic Change in Laos since 1975 – A Concise History
The government of Laos faced an extraordinarily difficult set of 
development problems following the ascension of the Pathet Lao to 
power in 1975. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, severe pov-
erty was widespread in Laos, infrastructure was in a poor state, 
internal conflicts were ongoing, and government institutions lacked 
capacity. To further complicate matters the level of official develop-
ment assistance from Western donor countries in 1975 had been 
more than halved from that of the previous year. The communist 
Lao government’s response to these challenges was the imposition of 
a Soviet-style command economy system, replacing the private sec-
tor with state enterprises and co-operatives, centralising investment, 
production, trade, and pricing and creating barriers to internal and 
foreign trade. Data on economic performance in Laos for the mid-
1970s to early 1980s are scarce, but it is thought that the economy 
grew at modest rates of less than two to three percent.
Within a few years, the Lao Government questioned the efficacy 
of these economic policies, in particular the extent to which com-
mand economic approaches could address pressing development 
challenges. It was not until 1986 that the government introduced 
major changes to its economic policy. This year saw the announce-
ment of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which resulted in 
profound changes to the Lao economy. The NEM introduced 
a range of reforms designed to create conditions conducive to private 
sector activity. Prices were set by market forces, not by the govern-
ment, farmers were allowed to own land and sell crops on the open 
market, and state firms were given increased decision-making 
authority, while losing most of their subsidies. The government also 
set the exchange rate close to market levels, replaced import barriers 
with tariffs, and gave private sector firms direct access to imports 
and credit. In the early NEM years real GDP growth was negative, 
but jumped appreciably to 14 percent in 1989 (see Figure 2.1).
Pivotal for the Lao economy was the year 1989, as it marked the 
final demise of the Soviet Union, which had been the largest provider 
of aid to Laos since 1975. The Soviets announced a sharp reduction in 
aid in 1989 and in 1990 this flow was cut off completely The demise of 
the Soviet Union was accompanied by the rise of the World Bank and 
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International Monetary Fund in Laos. In 1989 the Lao government 
reached agreement with the World Bank and the Fund on a range of 
reforms in addition to those implemented under the NEM. These 
reforms included: the privatisation of state owned enterprises, the 
introduction of policies designed to increase private sector and foreign 
investment, the strengthening of the banking sector, the adoption of 
a floating exchange rate and the reduction of tariffs.
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Figure 2.1 Real GDP Growth, Laos, 1985 to 2007
Economic growth fell appreciably in both 1990 and 1991 (see Fig-
ure 2.1), as is often the case in the early years of substantial economic 
reforms. The Lao economy soon recovered, however, and has main-
tained a strong growth performance since 1992. Economic growth 
averaged an impressive 6.6 percent between 1992 and 2008. In com-
parison, the developing country group as a whole achieved an aver-
age rate of economic growth of five percent over the same period 
(World Bank, 2010). The lowest annual economic growth rate since 
1992 was in 1998, and was in large part due to impacts of the Asian 
Economic Crisis of 1997. Growth in 1998 fell to four percent, from 
seven percent in 1997.
Throughout its history the Lao economy has been dominated by 
the agriculture sector. This remains the case today. Subsistence agri-
culture accounts for half of GDP and provides 80 percent of employ-
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ment. Tourism is a rapidly growing sector and the Government of 
Laos is heavily promoting infrastructure development and foreign 
direct investment.
2.2 Multidimensional Development Achievements in Laos5
The Laos post 1975 development experience can be summarised 
in three sentences. First, it started from an incredibly low base, fac-
ing tremendously difficult development challenges. Second, after 
some period of mixed fortunes, from the early- to mid-1990s it has 
achieved impressive development progress to the present. Third, 
despite this progress Laos is still relatively poor and lags far behind 
the rest of the developing world in many poverty and human devel-
opment dimensions. These observations are evident from Figures 
2.2 to 2.7 below and from Figures D.1 to D.5 in Appendix D.
Laos’ achievements in human development have without excep-
tion improved from one year to the next, as evidenced from its 1970–
2008 Human Development Scores (HDI) – see Figure 2.2.6 These 
improvements have, however, been rather uneven, particularly from 
1970 to the late 1980s. Yearly increases in Lao HDI scores during 
this period varied from just under four percent in 1981 to 0.2 percent 
in 1984. From 1989 onwards Laos has achieved an average rate of 
increase in its HDI of just under two percent.
Achievements in health, education and income are shown in 
Appendix D, in Figures D.1 to D.5. Life expectancy and adult litera-
cy have increased continually since 1960, from extremely low levels. 
Life expectancy was as low as 42 and 46 years in 1960 and 1975, 
respectively. The increases in life expectancy have been experienced 
by both males and females, and based on Figure D.1 there appears 
to be no gender bias against females in this health indicator7. That 
these achievements have continually increased is common in devel-
oping countries, but as is shown below, Laos has performed better 
5 Data presented in this section unless otherwise indicated are taken from UNDP 
(2010) and from World Bank (2010). Gaps in yearly coverage and the first year of 
coverage ref lect data availability. Some data have been estimated using standard 
techniques. Further details are available from the authors of this report.
6 The HDI combines life expectancy, adult literacy, gross school enrolment and 
purchasing power parity GDP per capita into a single number or score.
7 It is well known that females live longer than males for purely biological reasons. 
The difference between female and male life expectancy in Laos is roughly what 
one would expect on these grounds, hence the conclusion that there appears to be 
no gender bias in this regard.
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than most other countries in these areas. School enrolment at all lev-
els of education increased reasonably sharply from the early- to mid-
1970s to 1980, but declined in a number of years thereafter. Overall, 
these rates are far higher in 2008, more than doubling from 24 to 59 
percent. Income per capita follows a broadly similar trend, and in 
2008 is more than twice its 1984 level despite substantial declines in 
the late 1980s. 
Figure 2.2 Human Development, Laos 1970 to 2008
Key indicators of achievement in the health dimension are infant 
and child mortality rates. In 1970, a staggering 141 out of every 
1,000 Lao children died prior to their first birthday and a further 70 
out of 1,000 died before reaching their fifth birthday (meaning that 
a total of 211 children out of every 1,000 children did not reach their 
fifth birthday). This is depicted in Figure 2.3. Progress in reducing 
these numbers has been very strong, with the number dying prior to 
their first birthday falling to 48 per 1,000 and the number dying pri-
or to their fifth birthday falling to 61 per 1,000. These rates fell most 
rapidly between 1990 and 2000.
It is informative to compare Laos’ multidimensional development 
achievements to those of all developing countries. Figure 2.4 provides 
comparisons based on the HDI, life expectancy, adult literacy, school 
enrolment and GDP per capita for the period 1970 to 2008. These 
comparisons are obtained by dividing Laos’ achievements in these 
variables by those for all low and middle income countries for which 
requisite data are available. If the resulting ratio is greater than one, 
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Laos has higher achievements than these countries, while the reverse 
is true if the ratio is less than one. Two points emerge from Figure 2.4. 
The first is the improvement in Laos’ level of achievement over time 
relative to all developing countries. This underscores how impressive 
its achievements have been. The second is that despite this progress it 
still lags behind the developing country group as a whole in all of the 
achievement variables shown. While its HDI is very close to that of 
all other developing countries, its GDP per capita is roughly one fifth 
that of all developing countries. This underscores the scale of the 
development challenge still facing the Government of Laos, especial-
ly given that achievement in income is a key driver of achievements in 
other dimensions of development and poverty.
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Figure 2.3 Infant and Child Mortality Rates, Laos, 1970 to 2008
Relative achievements in infant and child mortality are shown in 
Figure 2.5. The data shown in this figure are obtained by dividing 
the achievements of all low and middle income countries by those of 
Laos. This means that the data can be interpreted in the same was 
as those in Figure 2.4, with the ratio being an increasing function of 
Lao achievements relative to those of all middle and low income 
countries.. The information shown in this figure is striking. In 1970 
Laos lagged behind the developing world as a whole in terms of 
achievements in child health, and continually fell further behind 
until the mid-1980s. From the mid-1980s Laos started to close this 
gap, and in the mid-2000s actually surpassed its fellow developing 
countries by achieving lower child and infant mortality than the 
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developing world as a whole. This reinforces the comments made 
above regarding Laos’ performance in reducing child and infant 
mortality.8
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Figure 2.4 Relative Development Achievements, Laos, 1970 to 2008
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8  While not wishing to labour the point regarding child and infant health in Laos, 
a brief comparison with Vietnam is interesting. Laos’ child mortality rate was 48 in 
2008. That is only one percentage point higher than that of its neighbour, Vietnam, 
some 33 years earlier, in 1975. Vietnam’s child mortality rate in 2008 was 20.
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Statistical information on income poverty in Laos is very limited, 
with data on the proportion of the population living below absolute 
poverty lines available only from 1993 onward. Figure 2.6 provides 
information on five measures of income poverty. The most common-
ly used measure – the percentage of people living below the extreme 
poverty line of $1.25 per day – records falls in poverty in Laos 
between 1993 and 2003, the latest year for which data on this indica-
tor are available. The proportion of Laos’ population living on less 
than two dollars per day has declined over the same period, falling 
from 85 percent to 77 percent in 2003. This is much higher than the 
proportion of the population living on less than two dollars per day 
in the East Asian region as a whole in 2002, which was 52 percent9. 
The equivalent number for the world in this year was 53 percent 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2008). Income poverty in Laos by regional 
and world standards would appear, therefore, to be very high. The 
proportion of the rural population living below the national poverty 
line fell between 1993 and 2008, from 45 to 28 percent. The propor-
tion of the urban population living below the urban poverty line rose 
between 1998 and 2003, but then fell from 2003 to 2008. Rural pov-
erty, after falling between 1993 and 2003, rose between 2003 and 
2008, to 32 percent of the rural population. The overall message 
9 World Bank regional definitions are used in reporting poverty data. According to this 
definition, Southeast Asia, in which Laos is located, is part of the broader East Asia.
Figure 2.6 Income Poverty, Laos, 1993 to 2008
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from Figure 2.6 is that income poverty is declining but remains high 
by international standards. 
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Figure 2.7 Income Inequality, Laos, 1992 to 2002
Empirical Information on income inequality is also limited in 
Laos, only being available from 1992; these data are shown in  Figure 
2.7. Measured by the incomes of the richest 10 and 20 percent of the 
population relative to those of the poorest 10 and 20 percent, income 
inequality rose between 1992 and 1997, but has fallen between the 
second of these years and 2002, the latest year for which requisite 
data are available. The ratio of the incomes of the richest 20 and 
poorest 20 percent of the Lao population follows the same trend. 
Another measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient. The 
most recent Gini coefficient for Laos is for 2002, which had a value of 
32.63. The world average Gini coefficient for 2002 was 40.4, suggest-
ing that income inequality in Laos is low by world standards. 
2.3 Development Co-operation with Laos10
2.3.1 Official Development Assistance Levels
Development co-operation between donor nations and Laos com-
menced soon after the latter’s independence in 1954. As was noted in 
Chapter 1, Swedish development co-operation with Laos commenced 
in 1974. Total official development assistance (ODA) increased in vol-
ume rapidly during the early 1960s, reaching $560 million in 1966, 
10 Data presented in this section are taken from the OECD DAC (OECD, 2010). The 
earliest aid data published by the OECD are for the year 1960, hence the coverage 
of this section. The unit of currency referred to is the United States dollar. All aid 
dollar amounts are in constant 2008 prices. Aid from the former Soviet Union is 
not included in OECD ODA data, and is not therefore included in the statistics 
presented in the charts and tables of this chapter.
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the highest annual volume of ODA ever received by Laos. Ninety 
percent of all ODA during 1960 to 1966 came from the United 
States. As is shown in Figure 2.8, ODA fell substantially from 1966, 
owing almost entirely to the scaling-down of support from the United 
States. Support from the United States was eventually withdrawn in 
1976. ODA to Laos reached its lowest post-1960 level in 1983, when it 
fell to $30 million. From the mid-1980s total ODA to Laos gradually 
rose, reaching $500 million in 2008. Much of the upward trend is 
due to support from bilateral DAC donors, although multilateral sup-
port also follows an upward trend; however, there were large declines 
in ODA volume from these agencies between 1998 and 2000.
Swedish ODA to Laos grew rapidly from a very small base in 
1974, when $80,000 (in 2008 prices) was allocated to the country pro-
gram, to $32 million in 1979, the second highest annual level of sup-
port for Laos from Sweden. Swedish ODA to Laos trended upward 
until the late 1980s, reaching its highest annual level of $32.1 million 
in 1988. It subsequently followed a much flatter trend and was $20.8 
million in 2008. This information is shown in  Figure 2.8.
Laos has received bilateral ODA from all but one of the current 
DAC member countries. As shown in Table 2.1, the top three donors in 
terms of ODA volume since 1960 have been the United States, Japan 
and France. These donors have provided more than 70 percent of Laos’ 
bilateral ODA since 1960. The United States has been by far the largest 
donor, providing close to half of all bilateral ODA to Laos, owing large-
ly to its dominance as a donor in the 1960s. During this decade the 
United States provided 85 percent of all bilateral ODA to Laos. 
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Figure 2.8 Official Development Assistance to Laos, 1960 to 2008
41
PArT one – SweDISh DeveLoPmenT Co‑oPerATIon wITh LAoS: SeTTIng The ConTexT
Ta
bl
e 
2.
1 
OD
A 
fr
om
 D
AC
 D
on
or
 C
ou
nt
ri
es
, L
ao
s,
 1
96
0 
to
 2
00
8
D
on
or
19
60
 to
 1
96
9
19
70
 to
 1
97
9
19
80
 to
 1
98
9
19
90
 to
 1
99
9
20
00
 to
 2
00
8
19
60
 to
 2
00
8
19
76
 to
 2
00
8
%
 S
ha
re
r
an
k
%
 S
ha
re
r
an
k
%
 S
ha
re
r
an
k
%
 S
ha
re
r
an
k
%
 S
ha
re
r
an
k
%
 S
ha
re
r
an
k
%
 S
ha
re
r
an
k
Au
st
ra
lia
 
1.
09
5
3.
51
6
12
.2
0
3
7.
78
5
6.
77
5
4.
39
6
7.
58
5
Au
st
ri
a 
0.
00
10
0.
00
16
0.
02
15
0.
05
20
0.
01
23
0.
01
21
0.
03
21
B
el
gi
um
 
0.
01
8
0.
11
14
0.
10
11
0.
91
11
2.
05
11
0.
60
15
1.
30
13
Ca
na
da
 
0.
45
7
0.
67
9
0.
03
13
0.
50
13
1.
04
15
0.
60
14
0.
83
14
D
en
m
ar
k 
0.
00
10
0.
11
15
-0
.0
1
23
0.
44
14
1.
21
13
0.
34
16
0.
77
15
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
0.
00
10
0.
40
10
2.
74
5
5.
95
6
4.
86
6
2.
19
8
4.
86
6
Fi
nl
an
d 
0.
00
10
0.
00
18
0.
02
14
0.
57
12
1.
13
14
0.
33
17
0.
73
16
Fr
an
ce
 
5.
11
2
7.
72
3
2.
25
6
8.
28
4
9.
82
2
7.
04
3
8.
08
4
G
er
m
an
y 
0.
90
6
4.
47
4
-2
.5
9
24
9.
49
3
8.
45
4
4.
49
5
8.
42
3
Gr
ee
ce
 
0.
00
10
0.
00
18
0.
00
16
0.
00
23
0.
00
24
0.
00
24
0.
00
24
Ir
el
an
d 
0.
00
10
0.
00
18
0.
00
16
0.
09
19
0.
42
19
0.
10
19
0.
22
19
Ita
ly
 
0.
00
10
0.
00
17
0.
12
10
0.
05
21
0.
16
20
0.
05
20
0.
11
20
Ja
pa
n 
3.
08
4
11
.3
6
2
27
.5
8
2
45
.1
0
1
39
.5
2
1
20
.3
8
2
38
.9
8
1
Ko
re
a,
 R
ep
ub
lic
0.
00
10
0.
00
18
0.
00
16
0.
14
18
3.
12
8
0.
66
13
1.
48
12
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g 
0.
00
10
0.
00
18
0.
00
16
0.
29
16
3.
69
7
0.
81
12
1.
79
10
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
0.
00
10
2.
68
8
9.
72
4
1.
28
10
0.
76
16
1.
39
9
3.
09
7
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
 
0.
00
10
0.
17
12
0.
04
12
0.
28
17
0.
70
17
0.
23
18
0.
46
18
N
or
w
ay
 
0.
00
10
0.
17
13
0.
28
8
3.
12
7
2.
60
9
1.
10
10
2.
44
8
Po
rt
ug
al
 
0.
00
10
0.
00
18
0.
00
16
0.
00
23
0.
01
21
0.
00
22
0.
01
22
Sp
ai
n 
0.
00
10
0.
00
18
0.
00
16
0.
00
22
0.
01
22
0.
00
23
0.
00
23
Sw
ed
en
 
0.
00
10
4.
33
5
45
.9
5
1
11
.2
6
2
9.1
0
3
6.
74
4
14
.8
3
2
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
 
0.
00
9
0.
34
11
1.
35
7
2.
40
8
1.
69
12
0.
88
11
1.
80
9
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
4.
68
3
3.
09
7
0.
20
9
0.
43
15
0.
44
18
2.
56
7
0.
51
17
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
84
.6
7
1
60
.8
6
1
0.
00
16
1.
60
9
2.
42
10
45
.11
1
1.
69
11
42
PArT one – SweDISh DeveLoPmenT Co‑oPerATIon wITh LAoS: SeTTIng The ConTexT
Sweden has been a major donor to Laos, as is evident from Table 
2.1. It was the largest donor during the 1980s providing almost half 
of all bilateral aid, and 28 per cent of total aid receipts during this 
period. It was the number two and three ranked donor by volume in 
the periods 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008, respectively. Over the 
entire period 1960 to 2008 it is the fourth largest ODA donor by vol-
ume of the 24 donors listed in Table 2.1, providing 6.74 percent of 
Laos’ bilateral ODA since 1960. This equates to 5.4 percent of total 
aid, bilateral and multilateral, to Laos. More pertinent to this evalu-
ation are ODA levels since 1976, after the end of the Indo-Chinese 
War and the withdrawal of the United States. During the period 
1976 to 2008, Sweden is the second largest provider of bilateral aid 
to Laos, providing 14.83 percent of total such flows. This equates to 
8.5 percent of total ODA flows for this period. This is shown in the 
last two columns of Table 2.1. By far the largest donor over this peri-
od has been Japan, which has provided just under 40 percent of total 
bilateral aid to Laos, and as much as 45 percent of total bilateral aid 
to Laos during the 1990s.The data shown in Figure 2.8 and Table 1 
are for OECD donors only. No account is taken of support from 
Eastern Bloc countries, the Soviet Union in particular. Aid data for 
these donors are very scarce, and will almost certainly not be direct-
ly comparable to OECD ODA data. It has, however, been estimated 
that the Soviet Union was the principal provider of aid, broadly 
defined, to Laos between 1975 and 1989. If correct, this would mean 
that the Soviet Union provided at least $US320 million (in constant 
2008 prices) in aid to Laos during 1975 to 1989, or around 13 per-
cent of total aid to this county. These numbers should be taken as 
very rough approximations, but do give some idea of the level of sup-
port from the Soviet Union.
The level of ODA to a developing country is important in its own 
right from various perspectives, but what matters from a development 
impact perspective is its level relative to various national aggregates of 
the recipient country, including GDP and population size. 11ODA rela-
tive to these aggregates for Laos is shown in Figure 2.9. Putting aside 
the huge United States-driven declines in aid levels from the mid-
1960s to mid-1970s, the main message coming from this figure is that, 
11  ODA relative to partner government revenues and expenditure is also important, 
but unfortunately data unavailability does not permit these comparisons in the 
case of Laos.
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relative to these aggregates, ODA volumes to Laos were very large by 
international standards. In the case of GDP, developing countries typ-
ically receive ODA levels that are between one and two percent of 
their GDPs and no more than $50 per capita.12 Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the past few years has received around $40. ODA relative to GDP 
received by Laos averaged 13 percent of GDP between 1984 and 
2008, and ODA per capita from 1976 (when United States ODA fell to 
zero) to 2008 averaged $53. Not only are these flows large by interna-
tional standards, they are of a level that one could reasonably expect 
to observe some relationship with national development outcomes, 
good or bad depending on the quality of the ODA.
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Figure 2.9 ODA Relative to Key National Aggregates,  
Laos, 1960 to 2008
Developing countries, including Laos, receive foreign inflows 
from a variety of sources. Inflows other than ODA can potentially 
complement aid in a way that enhances its development impact. 
Laos’ ODA receipts, along with inflows of other official financing 
(OOF) and total private inflows are shown in Figure 2.10. OOF is 
other developmental flows from foreign governments and multilat-
eral organisations that are not sufficiently concessional to be defined 
as ODA. Total private inflows include foreign direct investment, pri-
vate lending and remittances. Each has the potential to have pro-
development impacts, augmenting ODA. A key message from 
 Figure 2.10 is that Laos has been highly reliant on ODA relative to 
other foreign inflows and, purely on the basis of volumes, that poten-
12 Note that small island developing countries can receive per capita amounts into 
the many hundreds of dollars, but these countries are non-typical cases.
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tial for the above mentioned complementarity is limited. Also evi-
dent from Figure 2.10 is the huge one-off spike in private foreign 
inflows in 200613. Whether these flows become more important 
quantitatively in future years remains to be seen.
Figure 2.10 ODA and other Foreign Financial Inflows, Laos,  
1960 to 2008
2.3.2 ODA Composition by Sector
The sectoral composition of all donor and Swedish ODA to Laos 
are respectively shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.14 The sectors are those 
defined by the OECD-.DAC. Economic Infrastructure and Services 
has been by far the most supported sector by all donors combined. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing is the second most supported 
 sector by all donors combined, and the most heavily supported sec-
tor by Sweden since 1995. The second and third most supported sec-
tors by Sweden are Economic Infrastructure and Services and Gov-
13 According to OECD DAC (2010), the spike in 2006 was due to huge increases in 
non-bank export credits and private bank lending to Laos. The total level of for-
eign f lows (in 2008 prices) in 2006 was $US1.18 billion. Non-bank export credits 
were $US608 million and private bank lending was $US564 million in this year. 
In 2005, these inf lows were $US-0.24 and $US-1.46 million, respectively. OECD 
(2010) does not report the country or countries from which these f lows originate.
14 Data on the composition of ODA by sector for years prior to 1995 are not pub-
lished by the OECD DAC. The data shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 relate to ODA 
commitments. Disbursement data are only available from 2002 onwards.
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ernment and Civil Society, respectively. Recalling that Laos has 
been characterised as a country that has been challenged in terms of 
physical infrastructure and public sector governance, that has 
a large agricultural sector and traditionally high poverty in rural 
areas, the sectoral focus of Sweden’s development co-operation is 
consistent with what appear to be the country’s pressing develop-
ment needs. The same comments can be made of the combined 
donor effort in Laos given the information shown in Table 2.2. 
A list of the activities implemented under the development co-
operation program between Sweden and Laos was prepared under 
part one of the evaluation process and is provided in Appendix E.
2.3.3 Aid Supported Activities
Aid can be examined not only in dollar amounts but also in terms 
of the number of activities that donors support.15 This can be impor-
tant for a number of reasons. For example, donors might support 
activities that are too large, thereby encountering a diminishing mar-
gin of impact, or they might also spread their aid too thinly, support-
ing too many small activities with potentially negligible impacts. Rec-
ognising that most activities impose some burden on partner coun-
tries and that all countries have capacity constraints, funding large 
numbers of activities can have adverse development consequences. 
While each of these concerns has been expressed by the international 
development community, it is the last that has been uppermost in the 
minds of donors in recent years, particularly considering the prolifer-
ation of donor financed activities in the last 10 or so years.
15 An aid activity is defined by the OECD DAC as a discrete entity or exercise that 
can take many forms, such as a project or a program or a component thereof, 
a cash transfer or delivery of goods, a training course, a research project, a debt 
relief operation or a contribution to a non-governmental organisation (OECD, 
2011). Each activity will have its own budget, is assigned a DAC purpose code and 
reported by agencies to the OECD DAC. Care needs to be assigned when reading 
activities data, especially regarding comparisons across donors owing to differ-
ent reporting practices. Some donors (such as the EU) can report a number of 
activities as a single activity or vice versa, breaking up a program or project into 
numerous individual activities.
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Figure 2.11 Aid Supported Activities, Laos, 1977 to 2008
Table 2.2 Sectoral Composition of Total ODA to Laos, 1995 to 2008
Sector Percentage of Total oDA
1995 
to 2000
2001 
to 2005
2006 
to 2008
1995 
to 2008
Education 6.12 9.50 10.10 8.36
Health 5.86 7.08 10.16 7.35
Population & Reproductive 
Health
0.13 1.56 1.96 1.11
Water & Sanitation 4.07 1.69 7.45 3.96
Government & Civil Society 3.46 7.20 12.49 7.03
Other Social Infrastructure 
& Services
1.27 4.41 3.05 2.90
Economic Infrastructure 
& Services
42.01 32.62 17.82 32.67
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing
10.11 12.63 16.92 12.69
Industry, Mining  
& Construction
0.12 0.81 2.05 0.84
Trade Policies & Regulation 0.05 0.14 1.43 0.41
Multisector/Cross Cutting 11.55 12.97 7.58 11.15
Of which: General 
 Environment Protection
1.43 2.21 1.08 1.65
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Sector Percentage of Total oDA
1995 
to 2000
2001 
to 2005
2006 
to 2008
1995 
to 2008
Commodity Aid/General  
Program Assistance
8.51 5.52 5.07 6.55
Debt Action 3.46 0.73 0.05 1.61
Humanitarian Aid 2.60 0.86 0.95 1.54
Donor Administrative Costs 0.03 0.17 0.47 0.19
NGO Support 0.06 0.30 1.26 0.43
Refugees 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Sectors Not Specified 0.58 0.96 0.79 0.77
Table 2.3 Sectoral Composition of Swedish ODA to Laos,  
1995 to 2008
Sector Percentage of Total Swedish oDA
1995 to 
2000
2001 to 
2005
2006 to 
2008
1995 
to 2008
Education 0.65 17.73 0.00 7.78
Health 3.07 1.26 2.86 2.27
Population & Reproductive 
Health
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01
Water & Sanitation 8.33 0.00 0.00 3.47
Government & Civil Society 8.99 17.02 10.17 12.58
Other Social Infrastructure  
& Services
0.41 2.44 0.02 1.21
Economic Infrastructure & 
Services
19.76 41.50 0.02 25.80
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing
53.88 4.56 66.33 35.00
Industry, Mining & 
 Construction
0.00 0.00 17.29 2.77
Trade Policies & Regulation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multisector/Cross Cutting 2.89 15.22 1.35 7.86
Of which: General 
 Environment Protection
2.57 11.44 1.25 6.11
Commodity Aid/General 
 Program Assistance
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Sector Percentage of Total Swedish oDA
1995 to 
2000
2001 to 
2005
2006 to 
2008
1995 
to 2008
Debt Action 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Humanitarian Aid 1.56 0.00 1.52 0.89
Donor Administrative Costs 0.25 0.02 0.29 0.16
NGO Support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Refugees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sectors Not Specified 0.20 0.24 0.09 0.20
Data on the number of aid supported activities in Laos are shown in 
Figures 2.12 and 2.13. The first of these figures provides information 
on the number of aid supported activities since 1977.16 The yearly 
average between 1977 and 2008 has been 23 activities. The number 
of all donor supported activities has proliferated significantly during 
the same period. It has risen from 17 in 1977 to 1,117 in 2007, and 
was 962 in 2008.17 The number of donors active in Laos has risen 
from five in 1977 to 29 in 2007, falling back to 24 in 2008. As is evi-
dent from the reasonably stable average number of donor supported 
activities in Laos, it is primarily the increase in the number of donors 
in the country that has driven proliferation. Irrespective of what 
drove the proliferation, it certainly raises questions regarding the 
effectiveness of aid to Laos.18 This is not a criticism of Swedish aid to 
Laos, but of the overall donor effort in this country.
16  OECD (2010) only provides information at the activity level for 1995 onwards. 
Earlier versions of OECD (2010) did report such data for earlier years. The data 
shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12 and Figure A2.6 for 1977 to 1994 were obtained 
from these earlier versions some years ago for a previous study in which one of the 
authors of this report was involved.
17 The level of Swedish supported activities reported by Sida to the OECD DAC in 
Laos ranged from three in 1977 to 84 in 2008. Note that Sida staff involved in the 
Laos country program do not consider the latter statistic to be an accurate depic-
tion of the program in that year.
18  It should be acknowledged that it is not necessarily the case that all these activi-
ties will necessarily have been delivered in Laos. Some may have been delivered 
in donor countries but allocated to their Lao country programs. These activities 
are likely to represent only a tiny proportion of total activities. It should also be 
acknowledged that part of the observed increase in aid activities could be due 
more comprehensive reporting. Yet even if this is accounted for, it would be 
unlikely in the extreme to alter the conclusion that there has been significantly 
increased proliferation of activities in Laos.
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2.3.4 ODA Predictability
Important pre-requisites for maximising aid effectiveness are the 
predictability and stability of aid over time. Aid predictability is an 
indicator of the Paris Declaration principle of alignment, and an 
important element of AQEF component 3. There are many ways aid 
stability and predictability can be measured, but a widely used and 
easily interpreted measure is the coefficient of variation in aid dis-
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bursed to the recipient country.19 There is no threshold level of sta-
bility that deems aid especially effective nor any agreed benchmark 
for donors to reach. Sweden’s aid to Laos over the period 1960 to 
2008 has been more stable statistically than aid from all donors to 
this country, although less stable than total aid to all developing 
countries. It is also evident that there is greater instability in total (all 
donor) aid to Laos than aid to all other developing countries during 
1960 to 2008. While this is obviously in large part due to huge varia-
tions in aid to Laos during the 1970s, during the 1980s and 1990s 
total aid to this country is substantially more unstable than to the 
developing world as a whole. Aid levels change over time for many 
reasons and are often driven by changing development conditions 
within and among countries. Changes from one year to the next do 
not necessarily mean that they were unanticipated by the recipient. 
These points notwithstanding, the relatively large variation in the 
combined donor effort in Laos does suggest that its effectiveness 
might have been less than would otherwise have been the case. 
2.4 The ODA Enabling Environment in Laos
The ability of aid to achieve sustained development results depends 
on many factors. Two especially important factors are the capacity 
of the partner government to efficiently absorb aid for development 
purposes and the quality a government’s public sector fiscal manage-
ment. As mentioned, these factors are components 1 and 2, respec-
tively of the AQEF.
The capacity of the partner country to efficiently absorb aid is 
assessed against the amount of inflows it receives relative to the size of 
its economy as measured by GDP. International research has found 
that the incremental impact of aid on partner country growth follows 
19  See, for example, Gemmell and McGillivray, 1998 and Bulíř and Hamann, 2001. 
The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of aid divided by its mean, 
each for the time period in question. The measure of aid used was Gross ODA 
Disbursements at constant 2008 prices. Disbursements are used, as opposed 
to commitments, on the grounds that they represent the actual amount of aid 
received by the partner country, which is what matters most for aid effective-
ness. Commitments tend to be more stable and predictable over time than 
disbursements given that they result from conscious programming decisions.The 
measure of predictability preferred by the OECD DAC in monitoring progress un-
der the Paris Declaration is the proportion of aid disbursed within the fiscal year 
for which it was scheduled. This measure is not currently used mainly because it 
is not possible to get historical information on scheduled aid. 
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an inverted U-shaped relationship. That is, this impact initially rises 
with increases in aid relative to GDP, reaches a maximum and then 
commences to fall (Feeny and McGillivray, 2011). The fall is attribut-
ed to absorptive capacity constraints within the partner country. 
These arise for a number of reasons, including the ability of the part-
ner country government to administer aid inflows and work effective-
ly with donors, and the economic policy stance of these governments.
Feeny and McGillivray (2009) find that the incremental impact of 
aid on growth in countries with especially weak institutions, and policies 
that are not growth and development efficient (i.e. those with a World 
Bank Country Policy and Institution Performance (CPIA) score in the 
bottom quintile of country scores) falls when it reaches a maximum at 14 
percent of GDP, and continues to decline at all higher levels of aid. Laos 
falls into this group for most years since 1977, when CPIA scores were 
first allocated. The Feeny and McGillivray finding applies to the typical 
country in the bottom CPIA quintile, on average among these coun-
tries. For this reason it is used as a rough rule of thumb for aid allocation 
decisions. If aid to a particular bottom CPIA country substantially 
exceeds this number, then donors need to look very carefully at the 
country to ensure it has the capacity to absorb such an inflow. 
In the case of Laos, aid from all donors combined exceeded 14 
percent of GDP 11 times between 1984 and 2008 and was as high as 
21.5% in 1998.20 This does raise questions regarding the capacity of 
the Lao economy to efficiently absorb ODA during this period, and 
therefore of the development effectiveness of these inflows. This is not 
to say that these inflows were ineffective. Nor does it say anything of 
the effectiveness of Swedish ODA to Laos. But combined with the 
large increase in the number of aid supported activities and the num-
bers of donors operating in Laos, it does suggest that the broader ena-
bling environment was not as conducive to growth, and related multi-
dimensional outcomes, than otherwise may have been the case.
The AQEF identifies four key drivers of absorptive capacity. The 
first is concessional borrowing capacity. If a country is close to what 
is considered the limit to what it can efficiently borrow, then its 
capacity to absorb aid is limited and vice versa. The second is human 
capacity, as proxied by the HDI. High human capacity indicates 
a high capacity to efficiently use aid and vice versa. The third driver 
20 GDP data are not available prior to 1984, so assessments for earlier years cannot be 
undertaken with (the former year being the first for which GDP data are available).
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is private sector capacity, as proxied by World Bank IFC doing busi-
ness indicators. This represents the ability of the private sector to 
take advantage of the many opportunities, direct and indirect, of 
aid. The fourth driver is the quality of public sector financial man-
agement (PFM), as proxied by World Bank’s Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability and CPIA ratings.
AQEF component 2 – the quality of PFM – has already been 
partly addressed through the investigation of the drivers of absorp-
tive capacity. A more thorough analysis of this issue involves assess-
ments regarding the extent to which economic policies are effectively 
built into the government budget, the accuracy of recurrent budget 
expenditure and revenue forecasts, transparency of budgets, accura-
cy of reporting of foreign and domestic debt and the extent of on-
budget reporting of donor assistance. Owing to very limited data it is 
not possible to undertake robust and comprehensive analysis of this 
issue. This analysis points to an overall upward trend in PFM qual-
ity from the early 1990s after sharp declines in the mid- to late-
1980s.
2.5 Effectiveness of Aid to Laos: Some Stylized Facts
What does the preceding overview suggest about the donor effort 
in Laos since the mid-1970s, and in particular of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation with this country? The following characteristics 
were observed:
• After finding itself in a desperately poor development situation in 
the mid-1970s, Laos has achieved strong multidimensional devel-
opment and poverty outcomes since the 1990s, although still 
remains poor by developing country standards;
• Laos has received high levels of aid relative to population and 
GDP, and also relative to other foreign inflows;
• There have been reasonably steady year-on-year increases in aid 
receipts since the mid ‘80s;
• The sectoral focus of development co-operation in Laos has been 
consistent with its pressing development needs;
• The level of aid to Laos has been such that it would be reasonable 
to look for attribution between these inflows and national devel-
opment outcomes in this country;
• The aid operating environment became increasingly crowded in 
Laos, owing to large increases in the number of donors in the 
country and the proliferation of aid supported activities; and
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• The total volume of aid to Laos leads to questions regarding the 
ability of its economy to efficiently use these inflows for develop-
ment purposes given international evidence on absorptive capac-
ity constraints.
The first four of these characteristics are pleasing from a develop-
ment perspective. While alone they clearly do not provide sufficient 
evidence that aid to Laos has been effective, they are consistent with 
development effectiveness principles. The last three characteristics 
are not consistent with effective aid, and suggest that one should be 
cautious in causally linking the improved multidimensional out-
comes in Laos to the aid it has received.
What might this imply for Swedish development co-operation? 
Recall that Sweden has been a major donor to Laos. This was espe-
cially so during the 1980s when it was the largest bilateral donor, 
providing just under 30 percent of total aid receipts. While this does 
not ensure that Swedish aid has had national level impacts in Laos, 
it does provide grounds for investigating whether such impacts have 
occurred, especially if it can be shown that Sweden supported highly 
strategic, pivotal activities that were efficiently delivered. The discus-
sion and analysis that follows in succeeding chapters focuses on this 
issue.
Against this backdrop it is useful to examine more closely the 
association between ODA to Laos and its multidimensional achieve-
ments in human development, health, education and income. 
A number of associations, in the form of scatter plots, were exam-
ined. These scatter plots map the association between ODA and the 
HDI, ODA and life expectancy, ODA and adult literacy, ODA and 
school enrolment, ODA and GDP per capita and ODA and growth 
in GDP per capita growth. These development achievement varia-
bles have been used quite extensively in the research literature on aid 
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effectiveness and per capita GDP growth in particular.21 The scatter 
plots show what can be considered to be stylised facts, in the sense 
that they show simplified observations of empirical associations. 
They do not necessarily imply causality between the variables in 
question, but they can point to a particular association that is at the 
core of the evaluation questions being considered and therefore they 
are deserving of further scrutiny.
ODA to Laos is strongly associated with higher human develop-
ment, as is made clear by Figure 2.14. More precisely, the scatter plot 
tells us that 62.6 percent of the variation in Laos’s HDI over the 
period 1980 to 2008 is predicted by its ODA per capita receipts over 
the same period. Similar predictions were obtained by comparing 
ODA per capita with life expectancy, literacy and schooling, but not 
for income per capita. That for income per capita is much lower, 
indicating a weak statistical association. The association with the 
HDI and the education and health indicators is obviously good news 
from a multidimensional development perspective. It is also associ-
ated with higher incomes, although these associations, unlike those 
for the above outcomes, are very weak statistically, not being signifi-
cant in this sense based on standard statistical tests. As mentioned 
above, these associations should in no way be taken as evidence of 
casual relationships for a variety of methodological reasons. There 
is, in particular, no attempt to control for other determinants of the 
development achievement variables or to allow for endogeniety, in 
which aid both influences and is influenced by these variables. The 
21 Scatter plots using other measures of aid, including aid relative to GDP, were also 
produced. Various time lags were also assigned to the aid variables on the grounds 
that the impact of aid on development achievements can take time to observe, es-
pecially in the case of health and education outcomes. Virtually the same picture 
emerges from these scatter plots. There are many different criteria that can be used 
to determine the type of regression line fitted that is fitted to the data. It can be 
a straight line, ref lecting a linear relationship between the two variables in ques-
tion. Alternatively it can be curved, ref lecting a logarithmic, exponential or other 
non-linear functional relationship between these variables. A  common criterion 
is to select the regression line that provides was chosen on the basis of that which 
provided the highest R2, which is the percentage of variation in the variable on 
the vertical axis that is predicated by the variable on the horizontal axis. For this 
report we restrict ourselves to lines of best fit that correspond to either a linear or 
logarithmic relationship. Not only are these functional forms easy to interpret and 
make intuitive sense, but are consistent with relationships found in more complex 
and empirically rigorous aid effectiveness research. It was also the case, coincident-
ly, that these functional forms usually provided higher R2s than other alternatives. 
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scatter plots do, however, point to stylised facts about simple associa-
tions between aid and development achievements in Laos that are 
consistent with effective development co-operation. This does not 
necessarily mean that Swedish aid was effective but reinforces the 
contention that knowledge of this broader context should inform the 
interpretation of the evaluation results that follow in this report. The 
information conveyed by these scatter plots is returned to in Chapter 
7 of this report, when the evaluation questions are addressed.
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Figure 2.14 ODA and Human Development, Laos, 1980 to 2008
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Part Two – Swedish Development 
Co-operation with Laos 
3. ECOnOMiC rECOvEry AnD 
rECOnSTruCTiOn: 1974 TO 1985
3.1 Political and Economic Synopsis
Laos emerged from the conflict of the 1960s and 1970s confronting 
a series of political, social and economic challenges. Politically, the 
country had experienced considerable upheaval during the revolution 
of 1975, which ended in the overthrow of the Royalists and victory for 
the socialist Pathet Lao. The resultant Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR) was a single-party state modelled on the Soviet 
Union and characterised by a high degree of control over daily life. 
The previous constitution was abolished and a new version was not 
developed for nearly two decades. A pact was signed granting Vietnam 
the right to station a considerable numbers of troops and government 
advisers in Lao PDR. An armed insurgency by elements of the Hmong 
ethnic minority opposed to the new Government flared in central areas 
of the country and resulted in sporadic outbreaks of violence.
Physically Laos had sustained widespread damage in the conflicts 
that dogged the region over the 1960s and 1970s. Much of the east-
ern part of the country had been subjected to an intensive bombing 
campaign by the United States, which had been intent on targeting 
the Ho Chi Minh trail to cut North Vietnam supply lines during the 
conflict. The result was the destruction of transport and communi-
cation infrastructure and considerable loss of life, especially among 
the ethnic minorities who dwelt in upland areas.
Economically, the period between 1975 and 1984 was characterised 
by Government attempts to establish socialist relations of production in 
the mould of neighbouring Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Early exper-
iments during the mid-late 1970s, notably the collectivisation of agricul-
ture, proved extremely unpopular and fuelled widespread resentment. 
They also contributed to shortages of food, basic commodities, and the 
general economic hardship experienced by Laotians during this period.
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A major shift occurred in 1979 when the Government announced 
the abandonment of previous attempts to turn Laos into a socialist 
economy through policies such as collectivisation. The Government 
initiated the first five-year medium-term development plan in 1981, 
which brought a measure of much needed coherence to the develop-
ment agenda. The Government’s efforts were hampered, however, 
by an acute shortage of trained personnel, resulting from the mas-
sive exodus of the educated classes between 1975 and 1978, and also 
from the loss of assistance from the US following 1975.
3.2 Summary of Swedish Aid during this Period
Sweden’s initial involvement in Lao PDR must be understood 
against the background of the Second Indo-Chinese War and strong 
public sentiment in Sweden. Laos became a program country for 
SIDA in 1977, just as the nation was emerging from decades of war, 
including the 1975 revolution that established the Lao PDR.22 Glob-
ally Sweden’s development co-operation during this time was driven 
by the ‘solidarity principle’ (Wohlgemuth and Danielson, 2003). 
Swedish aid had always been directed at poverty reduction (referred 
to as “raising living standards” during this time), but it was consid-
ered particularly important to demonstrate solidarity with various 
post-colonial struggles across the globe. This policy was applied to 
the new state of Lao PDR, along with the then Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam, the liberalisation movement in Southern Africa, and the 
developing world in general (Wohlgemuth and Danielson, 2003).
Between 1977 and 1985 Swedish ODA to Laos totalled $190 mil-
lion23, almost 20 percent of all development assistance from OECD 
DAC member countries.24 The first Swedish funded OECD DAC 
recorded development co-operation expenditure in Lao PDR are 
early economic analyses undertaken in 1974, precursors to the provi-
sion of broader program support. An agreement to provide co-oper-
ation up to $35 million was signed by both governments for the 
 period 1977–1978, which included import support financing 
22 Note that this report uses the acronym SIDA when discussing the Swedish 
International Development Authority between its inception in 1965 and before 
its transformation to Sida in 1995 – the Swedish International Development Co-
operation Agency
23 United States dollars at constant 2008 prices.
24 Calculated using figures from the OECD DAC database, US dollars at constant 
2008 prices.
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 (up to $30 million) and the provision of funds for consultancy 
 services (up to $5 million).
Development co-operation with Laos was programmed thereaf-
ter on an annual basis until 1980 when the first two-year govern-
ment-to-government agreements were entered into. The 1979–1980 
agreement provided up to $45 million in areas such as import sup-
port, forestry equipment, and consultancy services. Development co-
operation during this period was not guided by any longer-term 
strategy, a situation that persisted until 1995. Sweden was an impor-
tant donor during this period, not least because of the symbolism 
associated with being the one of the few Western nations to support 
the fledgling socialist republic. The 1975 Revolution and subsequent 
withdrawal of the US were accompanied by an increase in assistance 
from the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Reliable estimates of the quan-
tum of assistance that Laos received from these sources are difficult 
to find, but it is widely believed to be significant. Sweden was by far 
the largest DAC donor, with a small number of other DAC members 
providing small amounts of aid during this period. 
A clear priority in the 1970s and 1980s was the physical recon-
struction of transport and communication infrastructure in the wake 
of the damage sustained during previous conflicts. Responding to 
this Sweden’s assistance in this early period was capital intensive in 
nature. A major portion of development co-operation was devoted to 
‘import support’ – grants for purchasing goods. The supply of trans-
port equipment and assistance for road construction accounted for 
approximately 130 MSEK of Sweden’s development co-operation 
between 1977 and 1987.
A second pillar of Swedish assistance during this period was 
directed at a further challenge facing the new Government – the 
shortage of foreign exchange with which to finance imports of key 
goods and services. In the 1970s the country’s forest resources were 
considered to be a potential source. Sweden allocated 130 MSEK 
between 1977 and 1987 to establish state forestry enterprises in two 
locations – Muong Mai and Tha Bok. A major objective of this assis-
tance was the creation of forestry industries that, in the long run, 
could result in a secure source of foreign exchange.
The evolution of Swedish assistance to the transport sector since 
this early period has been described as a “familiar pattern” from 
capital intensive development to an increasing focus on institutional 
development (SHER Consultants, 2010). The remainder of this 
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chapter explores this early assistance between 1977 and the mid-
1980s, discussing the emergence of this pattern. The further evolu-
tion of Swedish support in this area beyond the mid-1980s is dis-
cussed in a subsequent case study in Chapter 4.
3.3 Case Study 1 – ‘From Volvos to Organisations’: Swedish Assis-
tance to the Transport and Communication Sector between 1977 
and 1986
In the early stages of co-operation, Sweden’s assistance responded 
primarily to the need to rebuild transport and communication infra-
structure after the prolonged and damaging conflict. This was clear-
ly reflected in the priorities of the Government of Laos, which had 
allocated over 30 percent of revenue and 27 percent of external assis-
tance towards the transport sector in the first five-year plan (1981–
1985). The maintenance of this equipment and the associated organ-
isational and institutional issues were largely secondary considera-
tions. This may have also reflected prevailing thinking in the 1960s 
and ‘70s, which tended to view development as largely a technical 
endeavour involving the transfer of capital and skills to fill gaps 
(Wohlgemuth and Danielson, 2003). 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Swedish assistance to the 
transport and communication sector was focused on two areas – the 
provision of ‘Bailey Bridges’ through import support and the supply 
of heavy vehicles to assist various line Ministries to meet their trans-
port needs. The latter created an imperative to provide servicing 
and mechanical parts for the vehicles supplied. This led to SIDA 
funding the establishment in 1981 of a workshop at KM 14 – an area 
to the north of Vientiane – managed by Swedish vehicle manufac-
turer Volvo. The ‘KM 14 Workshop’ as it became known, was 
staffed by a mix of Swedes in managerial roles and Laotians in 
administrative and technical positions. The provision of prefabricat-
ed Bailey Bridges was a comparatively simpler enterprise, involving 
the import and transport of components to the required location. 
The overall objectives of these various components of support are 
mostly unstated in documentation, although a major evaluation in 
1989 refers to reducing transport costs as an aim of Swedish support.
There were few other donors in the transport sector in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Russia had been the largest donor since the 
1975 revolution, having established several workshops across the 
country. The Government of Australia through the Snowy Moun-
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tains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) had also established one 
workshop. However, by 1981 the large network of workshops previ-
ously established by the US Government was a “graveyard beyond 
economic repair” (SIDA, 1982).
The organisation of the transport sector was chaotic during these 
early years. Each ministry pursued the establishment of their own 
fleet of transportation vehicles while the possibility of centralised 
maintenance arrangements was ignored. The result was a prolifera-
tion of vehicle makes, each used by a different government ministry 
and serviced by a different workshop, usually supported by a different 
foreign country. Not surprisingly coordination was haphazard. The 
diversity of makes and technical requirements had the further effect 
of exacerbating shortages of skilled technical staff. A review of Swed-
ish assistance in 1982 noted that the KM 14 Workshop could only 
perform repair and maintenance tasks on Volvo vehicles, thereby fur-
ther contributing to the segmentation of the sector (SIDA, 1982).
Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs and the results of Sweden’s 
initial support was increasingly evident by the early 1980s. A review of 
Swedish assistance to the transport sector in 1984 was unequivocal:
“The key problem behind the present situation within the communications 
sector seems to be the staffing situation. There is a shortage of qualified and 
experienced staff on all levels, mechanics, drivers, operators as well as foremen, 
supervisors, and engineers.” (Granberg, 1984)
The 1984 review argued that these issues explained the limited 
success of previous Swedish assistance. It further recommended that 
the highest priority be accorded to training rather than procurement 
of equipment. This insight became the catalyst for a prolonged process 
of refocusing Sweden’s assistance on staffing and organisational issues.
The problems were understood as a shortage of staff and an absence 
of skills, the solution for which was to train greater numbers of individ-
ual staff. The assumption underlying this strategy was that training 
provided to individuals in technical, administrative, and managerial 
issues would be applied once learnt and spill over into, or be demanded 
by, the rest of the organization once its benefits had been demonstrated. 
This “natural extension” would in turn render the ministry in question 
more efficient and successful in fulfilling its mandate (Rafiqui, 2003).
The 1984 review was also significant for precipitating the first 
large scale Swedish support to road construction. Earlier that year 
the GoL had submitted a request for Swedish assistance to the con-
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struction of national Road 13 South – the major trunk route south 
from Vientiane. The review endorsed Swedish assistance and recom-
mended a study be commissioned to advise on the technical aspects 
of the construction. The review also recommended further equip-
ment and training for units of the GoL involved in road maintenance.
By 1986, a package of Swedish support to the construction of 
National Road 13 between Vientiane and the town of Pak Kading had 
begun to take shape. There was a discernible shift in SIDA’s approach 
by this stage. Prior to the full project starting, an interim package of 
support commenced in 1986 to allow the Ministry of Transport and 
Post (MTP) to proceed with limited construction activities. The inter-
im support was directed towards three objectives that all specify capac-
ity building and training as key elements. The links between road con-
struction, equipment maintenance, and organisational issues were 
again highlighted in 1987 discussions, when the progress of the interim 
support was reviewed. These discussions noted that
“…the objective [of the interim support] has not been entirely fulfilled main-
ly due to the organisational problems within the road enterprise and breakdowns 
of the equipment due to lack of daily maintenance.” (SIDA, 1987)
By 1989, organisational issues and their bearing on other techni-
cal elements of assistance in the transport sector were embedded in 
the discourse of Lao-Swedish co-operation in the road sector. The 
1989 review of road sector assistance noted that
“The technical assistance has been less than effective in assisting MCTP-
CA [Ministry of Construction, Transport, Post, Communication and Aviation] 
in creating an effective organisation for road management and administration, 
which is major objective of Swedish support.” (Eliasson et al, 1989)
Recognition that an effective organisation was needed, not just 
trained individuals was significant because it implied a much deeper 
engagement with the Government of Laos over the long-term. It 
would no longer suffice to construct a road and train individual staff 
directly associated with maintaining that road. Other more complex 
questions would need to be answered jointly. For example, how 
would the roles and responsibilities of the restructured MCTPCA 
change as a contracting organisation, rather than one that carried 
out construction and maintenance activities itself?
The challenges experienced by the KM 14 workshop during the 
late 1980s further highlighted the importance of considering wider 
institutional questions. The workshop had been the recipient of sig-
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nificant Swedish assistance since 1980. However, changes in the 
political and economic context in Laos – notably the adoption of the 
New Economic Mechanism in 1986 – created a difficult operating 
environment for the organisation. Faced with reduced subsidies from 
the Government and increasing competition from the private sector, 
the organisation struggled to respond decisively, despite much 
prompting from Sida. Swedish assistance was eventually phased out 
in 1990, but a retrospective assessment in 1994 found that a number 
of constraints could have been avoided had Sida employed a cultural 
and political analysis of institutions (Hedlund, 1994). 
There is some evidence that Sida heeded these lessons, commission-
ing a major analysis of institutional change in the road sector between 
1975 and 1994 (Sida, 1995). Furthermore, institutional development 
and capacity building received special mention in the very first country 
program strategy for Laos adopted by Sida in 1995. The first compre-
hensive program of assistance to the road sector, the Lao-Sweden road 
sector co-operation program, was specifically designed with twin 
objectives of road construction and institutional development.
By the mid-1980s, the intended effects and impacts of Swedish 
support to the transport and communication sector were yet to 
emerge. The KM 14 workshop continued to experience difficulties 
and initial support to National Road 13 South had been plagued by 
maintenance problems associated with organisational capacity. The 
provision of Bailey Bridges however was seen to be more successful. 
The 1984 review hints at this, suggesting that “[t]he general opinion 
is that the Bailey Bridge program, which contained some 100 bridg-
es, is efficient and successful”. A comprehensive evaluation in 1990 
echoed this view, pointing to the important role of Bailey Bridges in 
providing access to the seaport of Da Nang in Vietnam and in main-
taining the connectedness of the wider road network (SIDA, 1990).
3.4 Significance for this Evaluation
This case study illustrates how, during the 8-year period between 
1977 and 1984, Sweden responded to key challenges facing the newly 
emerging nation of Lao PDR. A significant proportion of Sweden’s 
support was directed at the transport and communication problems 
that were clear and expressed priorities of the GoL. In this respect, 
this case study is an example of relevant and timely targeting of devel-
opment co-operation – an important precondition for effective aid.
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It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, overall, aid to Lao PDR 
during this period was not as effective as it could have been. Reviews 
in 1982 and 1984 point to the difficulties of supporting the emergence 
of a cohesive well organised transport sector in an environment char-
acterised by poor donor coordination and severe shortages of skilled 
and trained personnel. The case study illustrates that absorptive 
capacity was clearly low during this period, with the consequence that 
the GoL was not well positioned to use aid efficiently and effectively.
Swedish aid was tied during this period, a point highlighted by 
the Volvo workshop at KM 14. While this reflected widespread 
donor practice during this period, this also hampered the effective-
ness of development co-operation. In the case of transport work-
shops this practice had the consequence of encouraging the prolifer-
ation of vehicle makes, since ministries that received support were 
required to purchase vehicles from the donor. At the same time, this 
actively discouraged a more coordinated approach to maintenance 
by the GoL since each vehicle make required the importation of 
parts from a respective donor. Weak coordination among donors 
further exacerbated the segmentation of the transport and commu-
nication sector during this period.
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4. BuiLDing inSTiTuTiOnS AnD 
ShArPEning ThE POvErTy FOCuS: 
1986–1996
4.1 Political and Economic Synopsis 
The year 1986 was significant in the economic and political 
development of Lao PDR. The leadership of the GoL introduced the 
‘New Economic Mechanism’ (NEM), effectively signalling the aban-
donment of state control and ownership over the economy that had 
been in place since 1975. The state bureaucracy was reduced in size, 
state subsidies were abolished, property rights were returned to 
farmers and a range of economic reforms were instituted to establish 
the foundations of a market economy. The short term effects of these 
changes were painful for many Laotians. In particular, the abolition 
of state subsidies and price regulation contributed to increased 
unemployment and rising prices.
The weakening and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s had important implications for the 
position of Laos internationally (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010). 
Symbolically, the end of the USSR was further confirmation that 
the move toward a market economy instituted by the leadership of 
the GoL was the correct course of action. Practically however, it 
meant a sharp reduction in the amount of external support that Laos 
could expect from its former mentor. By one estimate, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union led to reduction in the income received by Lao 
PDR by two thirds and a consequent reduction in Government 
spending from 32 percent of GDP in 1988 to 18 per cent in 
1992/930 (NSC et al, 2003, p. 3). Facing a severe shortage of 
resources, the GoL turned to France and Japan for emergency assis-
tance. Further support was also sought from international financing 
institutions – chiefly the World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Much of the 
assistance provided through these channels was conditional upon 
the structural adjustment of the Laos economy, providing further 
impetus to the direction of the reforms initiated by the NEM. In 
1989, Laos also normalised relations with the People’s Republic of 
China. The cumulative result of these shifts was a surge in the num-
ber of donors providing assistance to Laos.
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Building on these developments, the 1990s saw Laos drawn 
increasingly into the global and regional economy. As noted in 
Chapter 2, the country began to benefit from booming economic 
growth in the Southeast Asian region, especially in neighbouring 
Thailand. Economic growth began to contribute to progress in mul-
tidimensional poverty, including improvements in child health, edu-
cation and incomes.
The early 1990s witnessed increasing attention to administrative 
change within the GoL, spurred on by the economic reform process. 
A new constitution was promulgated in 1991, the first time since 
1975, changing the focus of government rule from issuance of 
decrees to laws and regulations (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010). 
The decentralisation of fiscal and planning authority from the cen-
tral to sub national levels of government emerged as a major influ-
ence. The GoL had first attempted decentralisation to the provinces 
in 1986, ‘recentralising’ in 1991 when capacity and legislative con-
straints had proved insurmountable (Chagnon et al, 2003). Decen-
tralisation did not end at that stage however, re-emerging as a major 
priority during the late 1990s.
4.2 A Summary of Swedish Aid during this Period
Total aid to Laos during the 10 year period between 1986 and 
1996 amounted to approximately $2.47 billion. Of this Sweden pro-
vided $236 million – or some 9 percent of all development assistance 
recorded in OECD DAC statistics. Relatively speaking, the size of 
Sweden’s financial contribution was much less in comparison with 
the earlier period in the development co-operation relationship. In 
absolute terms however, development co-operation between Sweden 
and Laos continued to increase, averaging $21 million per year over 
this period (US$ at constant 2008 prices).25
Until 1995, development co-operation continued to be pro-
grammed on the basis of consultations every 2 years with little for-
malised strategic coherence. Nineteen ninety five marked a signifi-
cant evolution however when the first country strategy for develop-
ment co-operation with Laos was developed. The strategy con-
firmed the central place of poverty reduction in Sweden’s aid while 
25 These amounts are recorded by the DAC and therefore exclude aid from former 
eastern bloc countries as well as private sector f lows.
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also placing a strong emphasis on institutional development and 
education as a primary means of achieving this objective.
Efforts to better articulate the strategic direction of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation were already evident by the late 1980s. A mid-
term review of the 1986–88 development co-operation agreement in 
1987 is notable as one of the first recorded occasions when Swedish 
officials comprehensively explained the long-term philosophy under-
pinning Swedish aid to GoL counterparts (see Sida, 1987a). These 
key pillars were described as being: the promotion of economic 
growth, economic and social equality, democracy and politico-eco-
nomic independence, and human rights. The review pointed out that 
the Swedish Parliament was attaching greater importance to ques-
tions of human rights and democracy, and that violations of human 
rights were taken into account when determining the volume and 
content of future assistance. This stance was congruent with other 
statements from Sweden in international forums such as United 
Nations Roundtable discussions on Laos, and was likely to have been 
influenced both by international charters to which Sweden is a signa-
tory and the Swedish Parliament’s enactment of human rights legisla-
tion. The 1987 mid-term review also introduced a fifth primary 
objective – protection of the environment – arising from World Con-
ference on Environment and Development (WCED) discussions 
which took place earlier in the same year. 
In response to these new directions, the bilateral agreement 
between 1988 and 1990 widened the scope of development co-opera-
tion to encompass several new sectors. Support for the development of 
the Xeset hydropower station represented a particularly large commit-
ment in a new area, pursued in parallel with financing from the ADB. 
Other new sectors included health, water supply and sanitation, statis-
tics, and the ‘rule of law’. The latter stemmed from the opportunities 
presented by the promulgation of the new constitution and Sida’s 
emergent focus on human rights. This initial involvement in the legal 
sector was also significant since Sweden was the first donor to be invit-
ed by GoL to assist in this area. There were other signs that the rela-
tionship between Sweden and Laos had begun to mature and deepen, 
resulting in the emergence of new modes of exchange and dialogue. 
During 1988 consultations between SIDA and GoL, the head of the 
Swedish delegation, Carl Tham (the then Director General of SIDA), 
invited Lao officials to visit Sweden to “study the economic, social and 
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political life of the country” (SIDA, 1988). The consultations also 
made reference to a recent visit by Swedish Undersecretary of State 
Säve Söderbergh who had discussed widening co-operation with Laos 
in the following areas: commercial co-operation, cultural co-operation 
and exchange of groups and individuals.
As previously discussed, developments on the international stage 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s had encouraged Laos to seek 
assistance from a broad range of donors. The increase in international 
co-operation partners had important implications for the way in 
which Sweden worked. The Roundtable Conferences – regular events 
facilitated by the UNDP – on Laos gained new importance as a forum 
for communication and coordination among donors. As highlighted 
in Chapter 2 of this report, OECD DAC data illustrate a jump in the 
number of development activities from 40 in 1989 to 89 in 1991. Swe-
den was responsible for a large proportion of this increase, the portfo-
lio having grown from 40 to 63 activities over these two years. The 
3rd Roundtable Conference held in Geneva in 1989 brought donor 
concerns about coordination and low levels of utilisation of external 
assistance to the fore for the first time. These concerns became 
a theme in subsequent discussions in 1991 and 1994. Sweden became 
a strong advocate of a more active GoL role, speaking out strongly in 
collective forums such as the Roundtable Conferences while also voic-
ing concern directly to the Ministries concerned.26
These broad developments in Swedish development co-operation 
with Laos are explored in more depth through two case studies. The 
first continues to trace the evolution of Sweden’s long running sup-
port to the transport sector, focusing on key shifts during the 1990s 
while the second focuses on one of the projects under the Lao-Swed-
ish Forestry Co-operation Program. In sectoral terms, transport and 
forestry represent two significant and long running pillars of Swed-
ish aid to Laos and both cases expose a range of key issues that influ-
enced development co-operation during this period.
26 For example, two letters were sent by SIDA’s Development Cooperation Office 
to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in 1991 and 1992 urging 
greater attention to donor coordination.
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4.3 Case Study 2 – ‘From the National to the Local’: Swedish As-
sistance to the Transport Sector during the 1990s and Beyond
4.3.1 Key Shifts in Lao-Swedish Co-operation in the Transport Sector
Sida’s approach to the transport sector in Laos evolved significantly 
during the 1990s, moving away from a focus on central level ministries 
and the national road network towards provincial and community 
roads. Broadly speaking, the trajectory of Sweden’s assistance to the 
road sector continued in this direction until the phase out of Swedish 
development co-operation with Laos commenced in 2007. Alongside 
this, Sida continued to grapple with the complexities of institutional 
development, discussed in case study 1 in the previous chapter. 
The completion of National Road 13 South in 1996 was an 
opportunity for Sida and the GoL to refocus Swedish assistance. 
A coalescence of four factors had a decisive influence in the shape of 
the forward program.
Firstly, there was growing consensus among international part-
ners in the early to mid-1990s that the rural road network, not just 
major trunk routes, needed attention. Most donors had stated an 
interest in supporting the country’s intention to develop the rural 
road network at the Donor Coordination Meeting in Vientiane in 
February 1996 (ILO, 1996). A detailed Public Expenditure Review 
by the World Bank in 1994 reflected on existing patterns of assis-
tance suggesting that “the emphasis should shift from the construc-
tion of national roads towards rural roads so as to allow subsistence 
farmers to market their surplus products (World Bank 1994, cited in 
ILO, 1996). ADB, also a major multilateral donor in the roads sec-
tor, had also indicated that their previous focus on trunk routes 
would be reduced between 1996 and 1999. This shift in donor atti-
tudes is likely to have influenced Sida thinking.
Secondly, by the mid-1990s a greater number of donors had 
become involved in the road sector. Sweden had been a “pace setter” 
during the 1980s, but the ADB, World Bank, and Japan had begun 
to commit substantial loan and grant funds to road rehabilitation 
and construction towards the late 1980s. Donor coordination and 
harmonisation was to play an increasingly influential role on Swe-
den’s strategy in the road sector from the mid-1990s to the phase out 
period between 2007 and 2010. One effect of the increase in donor 
activity was that it allowed for Sida to become more focused in its 
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approach to the sector. At the same time, donor coordination 
became a pressing concern.
A third factor related to the introduction of Sida country strate-
gies in 1995 and the renewal of poverty reduction as a core focus 
across all development co-operation. Swedish development co-oper-
ation (including in the road sector) had until this point been estab-
lished on a project-by-project basis resulting in a variety of goals and 
objectives across the portfolio. The overarching objective enshrined 
in the 1995 country strategy was “to contribute to alleviation of pov-
erty in the villages”. For the first time, all Sida-financed projects 
would be explicitly oriented towards this single objective, an 
approach which implied attention to rural roads.
Fourthly, changes in GoL policy played a significant role in focus-
ing Sweden’s attention towards roads at the provincial and district 
levels. Decentralisation of government functions in Laos has been 
a prolonged and uneven process since the mid-1980s. Decree 163, 
issued in October 1994, signalled the GoL’s intent in this regard. 
The Decree implied the transfer of executive power from the centre 
to the provinces, with considerable impacts for the organisation of 
the road sector. The respective Provincial Governor and Director of 
the Provincial Department of Communication, Transport, Post, and 
Construction (DCTPC) would now have responsibility for the prior-
itization of funds for road works, within the framework established 
by the Ministry of Communication, Transport, Post, and Construc-
tion (MCTPC) (Sida, 1996). Sida was officially informed of these 
particular changes in policy and their implications for the road sec-
tor during annual discussions in 1996. These changes further 
emphasized the importance of working at the sub national level.
It was in the context of these factors that a new road sector co-
operation program emerged in 1997. The objective of the first phase 
of the new Lao-Swedish Road Sector Program (LSRP I), was “to 
ease poverty through increasing access and decreasing transport 
costs” (Sida, 1997) – a direct reflection of the new country strategy. 
This differed slightly from that of the earlier Lao-Sweden road co-
operation program which had focused on construction of national 
road 13 as a means to facilitate economic growth. LSRP I also 
marked the first time Sida had focused on roads at a sub national 
level, working in Oudomxay and Luang Prabang provinces in the 
north and Khammouane in central Laos. Improving access for rural 
70
PArT Two – SweDISh DeveLoPmenT Co‑oPerATIon wITh LAoS 
populations and the strengthening of provincial road administration 
were major themes. In line with this focus, the new program provid-
ed for funding to UNDP for an Integrated Rural Access Planning 
(IRAP) component to introduce a “systematic bottom-up process to 
planning” to provincial administration (Sida, 1997). LSRP I there-
fore marked a decisive shift in Swedish assistance towards a sharper 
focus on poverty reduction through rural roads.
Poor maintenance practices, and their deeper institutional caus-
es, remained a problem. An evaluation of LSRP I in 2000 was posi-
tive about the physical progress achieved but also found that routine 
maintenance had been neglected, placing the entire investment in 
jeopardy (cited in SHER Consultants, 2010). Recognition of the 
need for maintenance was found to be low among provincial admin-
istration, and inaction was compounded by the difficulty of financ-
ing maintenance from provincial budgets. A review of the work of 
LSRP I on community roads during the same year found that insti-
tutions established for road maintenance at the village level were not 
functioning (Bokeberg et al, 2000). These lessons highlighted that 
Sida’s approach to institutional development required more work.
Successive phases of LSRP between 2001 and 2010 took up these 
challenges, continuing to refine the approach to institutional devel-
opment. A major achievement at the provincial level was the devel-
opment of the Provincial Roads Maintenance Management System 
(PRoMMS). PRoMMS has been hugely influential for provincial 
and district road management, a point strongly emphasized in inter-
views with officials in Champassak, Luang Prabang, and Oudomx-
ay as part of the present study. PRoMMS has now been adopted 
nationally, including by other donors in the sector. Building on the 
IRAP of LSRP I and II, LSRP III introduced a Basic Access Com-
ponent (BAC) which included Participatory Rural Transport Plan-
ning (PRTP) – a methodology for involving communities closely in 
the construction and ongoing maintenance of roads.
4.3.2 The Impacts of Sweden’s Assistance to the Transport Sector
Interviews conducted as part of the present study suggest that the 
institutions established through this assistance at various levels remain 
viable. Village level interviewees involved in local maintenance com-
mittees reported that these were generally continuing to function. As 
levels of income have increased some villages (e.g. Pak Ou in Luang 
Prabang) have been able to employ contractors for maintenance in 
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place of their own labour. However, some officials in Oudomxay and 
Luang Prabang expressed the view that more training on mainte-
nance could have been provided to villagers and that knowledge was 
still concentrated in relatively few people. Systems introduced by Sida 
in the district and provincial roads administration attracted favoura-
ble comment from key informants interviewed in Luang Prabang, 
Oudomxay, and Champassak. PRoMMS has been institutionalised 
although problems persist, including shortages of trained staff and dif-
ficulties in undertaking regular data collection to keep the system 
updated. However, the problem most frequently raised relates to the 
budgetary resources to address the road maintenance that PRoMMS 
identifies. Accordingly, in recent years Sida and other donors have 
directed considerable effort towards a Road Maintenance Fund 
(RMF) to help address these ongoing budgetary issues. Successful sys-
tems such as PRoMMS will remain a partial, albeit critical, solution 
to sound road maintenance until the RMF is able to transfer sufficient 
funds to provincial road maintenance agencies.
There is no doubt that the shift towards local roads and greater 
focus on poverty reduction has resulted in real positive changes in the 
lives of people across the target provinces. Improved access to nearby 
centres and associated positive impacts on livelihoods was a major 
theme derived from interviews conducted for the present study. For 
example, one interviewee in Pak Ou village, Luang Prabang province, 
described how the costs of transporting her goods to the nearby mar-
ket had been significantly reduced after the road had been built link-
ing her village to a nearby district town as part of LSRP I. Another 
village-based informant in Nong Sano village, Champassak province 
explained how a community road built with Sida assistance enabled 
him to sell rice at the market in a nearby town. This in turn had ena-
bled him to purchase a tractor and a motorbike, which he had used to 
sell a greater quantity of rice, leading to a material improvement in his 
family’s living situation. A large proportion of interviewees in Luang 
Prabang, Oudomxay, and Champassak provinces remarked favour-
ably upon access to health services, describing dramatically reduced 
travel times. Importantly, these improvements were thought to have 
a strong positive impact on women and children.
The interviews also highlighted other issues that hint at the com-
plexity of the relationship between road access and poverty reduc-
tion. For instance, one woman from Pak Ou village, Luang Prabang, 
a diabetic, described the difficulty of getting to the hospital for her 
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medication during the wet season when the unsealed road (construct-
ed during LSRP II) was less passable. Another informant from Nam 
Lien village in Houn District, Oudomxay, lamented the difficulties 
(and high cost) of inducing rice traders to come to the village because 
of the poor condition of the road. LSRP III had improved a nearby 
local road but access to this from the village involved negotiating 
a heavily degraded track that was not passable during the wet season.
Many of these personal accounts of change explored through the 
qualitative component of this study reflect the considerable body of 
statistical evidence on impact collected during phase III of LSRP. 
A study by Warr in 2005 found that 13 percent of the decrease in rural 
poverty between 1997/98 and 2002/03 could be attributed to 
improved road access alone. In the three financial years 2005/6 to 
2008/9 a total of 1,067 km of basic access roads was constructed to 
provide 386 villages with access to the main road network. This repre-
sents an 18 percent reduction in the 2,225 villages identified as lacking 
access in the National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy 
(SHER Consultants, 2010). An analysis of baseline (2006) and impact 
(2010) studies was conducted in one of district in each of the eight 
provinces associated with LSRP II and III. This analysis highlighted, 
inter alia, a doubling of average household income, although this 
masked some variation between provinces (SHER Consultants, 2010). 
On balance, the evidence available suggests that the poverty impacts 
of Sida’s assistance to the roads sector have been significantly positive. 
4.4 Case Study 3 – The Forestry Inventory Project:  
a Missed Opportunity?
4.4.1 Changes in the Policy Context
The agriculture and forestry sector has consistently been a major 
part of the Government of Laos’ national development agenda. For-
ests play an important role in the Lao PDR economy and the liveli-
hood of Lao people. During the 1990s, the contribution of forests to 
GDP was estimated at 15 percent, accounting for approximately 40 
percent of export earnings (Cameron et al, 1995). 
In the late 1970s and 1980s the forestry sector was approached 
primarily as potential source of foreign exchange, a major priority 
for the GoL to finance the reconstruction and economic develop-
ment process. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number 
of important developments took place that had implications for for-
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est management practices. Internationally, there was a growing 
emphasis on sustainable management of forestry resources. The 
Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) embodied this emerging per-
spective. The TFAP was launched by four international organiza-
tions – the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute in 1985 in 
response to growing global concern with the rate of deforestation.
The changing tenor of international discussions on forests exerted 
an influence on GoL policy at the time. A major turning point was the 
First National Forestry Conference in 1989 which highlighted deforest-
ation as a serious issue and created the foundation for a new approach 
to national forestry policy. The new forest policy called for preservation 
and conservation of biological diversity by improving management sys-
tems as well as the use of forests for the country’s economic develop-
ment. A Tropical Forestry Action Plan for Laos was developed in 1990 
and adopted one year later as part of an effort to implement the new 
policy direction (Manivong and Sophatilath, 2007). In short, the 
imperatives driving the formulation of forest policy in Laos evolved 
considerably over the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
4.4.2 What was Intended? The Objectives of the Forestry Inventory 
Project
Sweden had been a major contributor to the development of 
a nascent forestry industry since 1977, and had supported the estab-
lishment of two State Forestry Enterprises (SFEs) at Tha Bok and 
Muong Mai from 1980. Swedish involvement in the area of forestry 
inventory commenced as early as 1980 in connection with the estab-
lishment of the SFEs. Much of this early assistance focused on the 
provision of equipment to enable the new enterprises to manage 
commercial logging operations and generate foreign exchange. This 
initial support was continued under the first and second phases of 
the Lao-Swedish Forestry Co-operation Program (LSFCP I and II).
The Forest Inventory Project was positioned as one of six ‘sub-pro-
grams’ under the aegis of the third phase of the Lao-Swedish Forestry 
Co-operation Programme (LSFCP III) implemented between 1991 
and 199527. As such, the overall objectives to which it was expected to 
27 The Forestry Inventory project had another component, which was to periodi-
cally update forest cover statistics. The comments that follow do not apply to this 
component.
74
PArT Two – SweDISh DeveLoPmenT Co‑oPerATIon wITh LAoS 
contribute were those of the broader program. These can be broadly 
summarised as: promoting the long-term sustainable use of forest land 
and resources in balance with rural economic development; instituting 
participatory approaches; and developing the capacity of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) to play the strategic policy-making 
role required of it. The emphasis on sustainable development and par-
ticipatory approaches reflects the imperatives prevalent at the time. 
The new policy directions that emerged from the TFAP and National 
Forestry Conference, as well as the changing role of the Department 
of Forestry post-NEM, were all highly current and extremely relevant 
to the GoL and Sweden, a long standing donor in the sector, was 
a natural choice as development partner. Minutes from the 1991 semi-
annual discussions between SIDA and MAF disclose that the GoL 
explicitly requested that Sweden take account of the emerging policy 
priorities in the design of LSFCP III.
The Forestry Inventory Project was to play a key role in this forward 
agenda. The objective to which the project addressed itself was to build 
the capacity of the National Office of Forest Inventory and Planning 
(NOFIP) within MAF so as “...to provide the Lao Government with 
the information required to improve and formulate regional policies 
and strategies”.28 Over the short-term, the project was to define the role 
of NOFIP with respect to range of operational functions including 
operational inventories, training, forestry research, and land use map-
ping. Other short-term objectives focused on execution of a range of 
technical functions, including mapping surveys and land use planning 
models. These objectives were clearly appropriate and relevant at the 
time, given the role of NOFIP in broader forestry policy development 
and the lack of capacity that continued to hinder its operation.
4.4.3 What was Done? Implementation
Implementation commenced in 1991 when SIDA engaged Swedfor-
est as consultants to manage the third phase of LSFCP. The budget for 
the overall program was 120 MSEK, with the Forestry Inventory Pro-
ject accounting for 13.1 MSEK, or just under 11 percent of the total.
Delivery of the project was focused in eight areas associated with 
various technical functions of the NOFIP. In addition to defining the 
organisation’s role in a comprehensive document, the consulting 
28 As outlined in the 1994 evaluation of the Forest Inventory Project, see Nilsson 
1994.
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team worked with NOFIP to complete the National Reconnaissance 
Survey (NRS), the results of which were contained in a National 
Inventory Report published in 1992. A major area of activity during 
implementation was the development of a national inventory process 
and associated capacities, including a field team for data collection 
and units for the requisite data processing and production. The eval-
uation of the project in 1994 describes considerable progress in all 
these areas, with the important exception of the production and 
communication of the results. Personnel that had been initially 
assigned to this task were engaged in other areas making progress in 
this area difficult. The development of a system for communicating 
results was originally intended but had not occurred by the comple-
tion of the project in 1995. Despite these difficulties, implementation 
of the project proceeded largely according schedule. 
4.4.4 What did the Project Achieve? Results 
The 1994 evaluation found that the Forestry Inventory Project 
had been well implemented and had been instrumental in develop-
ing improved technical functionality within NOFIP. Seen from 
a long-term perspective, the project put in place systems and process-
es that underpinned GoL policy and donor strategy in the area.
The completion of the NRS in 1995 was an especially important 
result in this regard. As the evaluation noted, “the NRS constituted the first 
well organised study of the forest resources of Laos and has therefore already served the 
purpose of giving a broad picture of the forestry situation” (Nilsson, 1994). The 
NRS highlighted for the first time, the loss of forest that had occurred 
in Laos between 1982 and 1989. This information was critical in the 
ongoing development of new forest and land use policies that were 
emerging during the 1990s. The development of a process for compil-
ing the National Forest Inventory (NFI), a major intended result of the 
project, was also completed to a high standard. Ongoing updates and 
revision notwithstanding, the NFI process formed the basis for ongoing 
monitoring of the changes in the state of the nation’s forests for subse-
quent years. The importance of the forestry inventory function within 
current discussions between GoL and potential donors on REDD con-
firms the ongoing relevance of Sida’s work in this area. 29
29 For instance, the centrality of the Forest Inventory and Planning Division (for-
merly NOFIP) in the set-up of a national REDD system is described in an annual 
review of REDD conducted in 2010 by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAF, 2010). 
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Nevertheless, from a strategic perspective, the areas in which the 
project struggled were arguably the most significant. The problems 
experienced developing capacity for data processing, analysis, and 
communicating the results, undermined the impact of the project on 
policy. For example, the NRS had been completed to a high stand-
ard, had highlighted issues of apparent policy relevance, but had not 
been utilised to any great extent. As the 1994 evaluation comments,
“in the development objectives of the Forest Inventory Project it has been 
envisaged that NOFIP should provide the Lao Government with 
the information to improve and formulate (national poli-
cies,) regional policies, plans and strategies. It is obvious that 
this formulation does not correspond to the fact that NOFIP is mainly an opera-
tional unit with no direct links to the policy development and planning level 
which is in the Prime Minister’s office.” (emphasis from original)
As a result, the Forest Inventory Project was largely ineffective in 
achieving its most important long term objective of contributing to 
policy development.
4.5 Significance for this Evaluation
The two case studies explored in this chapter highlight how, dur-
ing the 10 year period between 1986 and 1996, Swedish develop-
ment co-operation with Laos evolved, broadening in scope and 
increasing in financial size. Changes in the context, especially the 
entry of more bilateral and multilateral donors to Laos, significantly 
altered the environment in which Sida operated and there is signifi-
cant evidence that the agency was acutely aware of this reality and 
sought to improve coordination. Sweden had also, however, contrib-
uted to the proliferation of development activities during this period.
Case study 2, when considered with the case study in the previous 
chapter, merits a number of observations about Sweden’s assistance 
to the transport sector. These observations have implications for our 
assessment of the effectiveness of Swedish aid to Laos, which are tak-
en up further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Firstly, Sweden’s assistance to the transport sector, especially the 
increasing focus on rural roads, has been important to addressing pov-
erty. As noted in Chapter 2, high levels of rural poverty have been 
(and remain) a significant development challenge for Laos. Secondly, 
the evolution of Swedish assistance to transport – from national to 
rural roads and towards an increasing focus on institutional capacity 
– highlight strong alignment with GoL policies (especially decentrali-
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sation, as it occurred at that time) and a prolonged attempt to address 
absorptive capacity constraints. However, the latter challenge remains 
an unfinished agenda. As a result, the sustainability of these gains 
remains far from assured. Overall however, these observations suggest 
that Swedish assistance to the transport sector was effective in contrib-
uting to the multidimensional poverty gains noted in Chapter 2. 
The Forestry Inventory Project highlights Swedish alignment 
with GoL priorities, an important precondition of effective aid. 
However, the project failed to achieve its intended policy impact, in 
large part due to its approach to developing institutional capacity. 
The survey work completed through the project was an important 
foundation for later work in the forestry sector. Assessed on its own 
however, it is difficult to view the Forest Inventory Project as an 
example of effective development co-operation.
As these two case studies illustrate, Sweden attempted to address 
absorptive capacity, but met with significant challenges during this 
period. The approaches employed were reflective of the state of 
thinking on institutional development during the 1990s. A retrospec-
tive study in institutional development in LSFCP III (and its succes-
sor, LSCFP IV) noted that it tended to focus on organisational devel-
opment and competence building rather than addressing formal and 
informal behaviour constraints – ‘institutions’ in a wider sense 
(Rafiqui, 2003). An approach that was more cognisant of these fac-
tors may have, for example, identified the range of incentives that 
drive policy influence in the Lao context. This perspective was miss-
ing during that particular period, with the result that Sweden’s assis-
tance may not have been as effective as it might have been. 
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5. SuPPOrTing rEFOrMS, huMAn righTS, 
AnD DEvELOPing CAPACiTy: 1997–2010
5.1 Political and Economic Synopsis
The Lao economy experienced consistently high growth rates during the 
1990s, with real per capita GDP increasing 4.6 percent between 1993 and 
1998. The Asian Financial Crisis limited GDP growth between 1997 and 
2000, and the associated devaluation of the Lao Kip led to increases in the 
prices of imported commodities. By late 2000 the recovery was considered to 
be well underway (Vadnjal et al, 2002). The Lao economy once again dis-
played strong growth during the first decade of the 21st Century. As we have 
noted in Chapter 2, this was accompanied by further improvements in health 
and education achievement and human development generally. Despite this, 
GDP per capita remained low by developing country standards.
Alongside this growth Laos made significant progress in poverty reduc-
tion. As noted in Chapter 2, the percentage of the population living below 
the poverty line fell from 38.6 percent in 1998 to 27.6 percent in 2007. Nev-
ertheless, there was growing awareness within the GoL of the unevenness 
of these gains. This picture grew more refined in the late 1990s as succes-
sive surveys were carried out to understand the characteristics of poverty. 
These highlighted a number of disparities. Firstly, the most pronounced 
reductions were occurring among lowland-dwelling groups, while those in 
the upland areas, appeared to benefitting the least from economic growth. 
There were ethnic and geographic overlays to this pattern, with the major-
ity ethnic Lao (or ‘Lao Lum’) inhabiting the less poor lowland areas, and 
ethnic minorities populating the poorer less accessible mountainous areas, 
mostly in the northern provinces (NSC et al 2006). Secondly, urban-rural 
differences emerged as a clear feature of poverty in the Lao context, urban 
areas having benefitted from greater access to services and linkages with 
sources of economic growth in the region. These differences were signifi-
cant, the percentage of the rural population below the rural poverty line 
actually increasing substantially in the mid-2000s (see Chapter 2).
In 2003, the GoL presented its strategy to tackle these problems – the 
National Poverty Eradication Program (NPEP) – to international co-oper-
ation partners at the 8th Round Table Meeting. This was the culmination 
of an extended process that first began in 1996, when the 6th Party Con-
gress endorsed the long-term goal of “freeing the country from the status 
of least-developed country (LDC) by 2020” (Committee for Planning and 
Investment, 2003, p. 4). The NPEP explicitly recognised the uneven 
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nature of poverty reduction and placed considerable emphasis on tar-
geting resources at the poorest districts across the country. This was 
the first time that the GoL had a comprehensive and long-term strat-
egy to addressing poverty. The NPEP had been refined since it was 
first introduced and was renamed the ‘National Growth and Poverty 
Eradication Strategy’ (NGPES) in February 2004.
Politically, this period witnessed little formal change to the politi-
cal architecture of Laos. Nevertheless the re-emergence of decentrali-
sation as a policy priority in the late 1990s was a notable develop-
ment. Alongside this, a program of administrative reform continued, 
with the stated objective of “achieving a stable and open people’s 
democracy where the rights of people are guaranteed by an efficient 
administration of the law and with the broad and active participation 
in all national and international activities” (Sida, 2003). The 1991 
constitution was amended in 2003, to enable the creation of ‘munici-
palities’, a new level of administration that was envisaged to provide 
a vehicle for decentralisation. Broadly speaking, the focus of the GoL 
during this period shifted to improving administration of the law, 
within the parameters established by the existing legal framework, 
rather than on further major reform of this framework. 
5.2 A Summary of Swedish Aid During this Period
Swedish development co-operation with Laos totalled $310 million 
over the period between 1996 and 2009.30 This amount represents 5.5 
percent of the total ODA flows to Laos in this period, continuing the 
decline in levels of Swedish aid relative to other donors. In absolute 
terms however, the Sida program budget for Laos remained stable, 
even increasing slightly over previous periods. The annual average 
level of disbursement stood at $24 million over the period.
Swedish development co-operation was guided by 4-year country 
strategies, a regular process that had commenced with the first strat-
egy in 1995. During consultations that preceded the 1999–2001 
strategy, the Swedish delegate emphasized the importance of pro-
gressing human rights and democracy, continuing a theme that had 
first appeared in discussions between the two sides in the late 1980s. 
No new sectors were introduced, largely continuing existing pro-
grams in roads, forestry, rule of law, drugs, and statistics. OECD 
DAC data suggest that year on year, the number of discrete Swedish 
30 US dollars at constant 2008 prices
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activities remained largely stable during this period, having declined 
from the highs of the early 1990s. 
The 2001–2003 country strategy retained the same sectoral focus 
as the previous strategy, allocating the largest proportion of funds to 
programs in the forestry and roads sectors – two long-running pillars 
of Swedish development co-operation in Laos. An evaluation of this 
strategy in 2002 – the first time this had been done in Laos – was 
critical of this continuity, especially in the forestry and natural 
resource management sector. While the sectoral profile of Swedish 
aid did not change, OECD DAC data are suggestive of a significant 
increase in both the number of activities and the number of donors. 
This was also noted in Chapter 2.
A change in the emphasis of the 2004–2008 country strategy 
reflected two important policy developments on both the Swedish 
and Lao side. Firstly, the explicit recognition of the inequalities in 
poverty reduction, and the emphasis on targeting the poorest areas 
reflected the Government’s NGPES, which had been presented to 
donors in 2003. Secondly, the strategy reflected the new Policy for 
Global Development (PGD) that had been adopted by Swedish Par-
liament in 2003. Sweden was the first member of the OECD DAC to 
adopt such a comprehensive government-wide approach to develop-
ment. The PGD committed the Swedish government to a consistent 
approach to development in areas such as trade, agriculture, envi-
ronment, security, migration, and economic policy. The policy intro-
duced a strong rights-based perspective and pro-poor approach to 
the Swedish aid program which influenced policy development and 
engagement in its partner countries. The PGD has eight themes: 
democracy and good governance; respect for human rights; gender 
equality; sustainable use of natural resources and protection of the 
environment; economic growth; social development and security; 
conflict prevention and resolution; and global public goods. The 
influence of the PGD on the 2004–2008 country strategy is reflected 
in the amplified focus on human rights. The promotion and 
strengthening human rights, democracy, and the rule of law forms 
one of the two major objectives of the strategy, the other being pov-
erty reduction on a long-term environmentally sound basis.
Not surprisingly, the focus on human rights sometimes sat awk-
wardly with GoL policies, creating occasional tensions in the bilat-
eral relationship. Prominent examples of such contentious issues 
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include GoL policies on shifting cultivation and ‘forced resettle-
ments’. The latter emerged in 2005 during discussions over a pro-
posed Sida-funded project focused on uplands development. As cor-
respondence from the time highlights, Sida officials were concerned 
about lending unwitting support to forced relocations through the 
proposed project and made their position clear to other donors as 
well as the GoL. 
Nevertheless the fact that Sweden and Laos were able to discuss 
human rights was indicative of the trust that had developed in the 
relationship over many years. A key mechanism was the informal 
bilateral working group on human rights, which involved officials 
from Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the GoL meeting 
on 14 occasions between 2001 and 2010.31 This was the first time 
that the GoL had had such an arrangement with any donor.
The proliferation of aid activities during this period received 
renewed focus in 2005 with the signing of the Paris Declaration, 
which signalled wide commitment from donors and their partner 
governments to, inter alia, harmonisation and alignment in the 
interests of greater aid effectiveness. As in Vietnam, Sweden played 
an active role in pushing for a local Lao-specific version of this inter-
national agreement. The Vientiane Declaration was signed by the 
GoL and representatives of 23 donors in November 2006.
In 2007, the Swedish Government took the decision to scale 
down and end development co-operation with Lao PDR by Decem-
ber 2011. The decision, which appeared to take the GoL by surprise, 
was made after a review of Swedish development co-operation had 
been conducted with a view to rationalising the number of program 
countries. The strategy for the phase out process (2008–2011) 
retained the objectives of the previous country strategy while also 
aiming to “consolidate results, achieve the sub-goals set for co-oper-
ation, and follow up and document more than thirty years of devel-
opment co-operation with Laos” (Sida, 2008).
Many of the issues outlined above – the changes in GoL policies, 
the introduction of the PGD, and the phase out process – are 
explored in further depth through three case studies. The Govern-
ance and Public Administration Reform in Luang Prabang project 
is an insightful example of Sida’s support to decentralisation, a major 
GoL priority during this period. The case study on the Lao-Swedish 
31 Key informant interviews with MoFA officials.
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Statistics Project illustrates Sida’s efforts to develop functional capac-
ity in an area that was central to the poverty reduction agenda. 
Finally, the case study on research co-operation highlights an area 
that began modestly but had grown into a significant activity by 
2010. This case also provides insight to the challenges of phasing out 
development co-operation.
5.3 Case Study 4: Governance and Public Administrative Reform 
in Luang Prabang
5.3.1 Context: The Re-emergence of Decentralisation
Decentralisation has been a prolonged process in Laos since the 
nation emerged from conflict in 1975. After a chaotic period 
between 1975 and 1981, a strongly centralised system of government 
emerged during the early 1980s. An early experiment with decen-
tralisation in the late 1980s led to a widespread breakdown in basic 
administrative functions as provinces struggled to raise revenue and 
pay civil servants. Chastened, the period between 1991 and 1998 
was characterised by a drive to re-centralise GoL fiscal and plan-
ning authority from the provinces. Then, in 2000, after two years of 
gradual steps, the Prime Minister launched Decree 01 on decentrali-
sation. Decree 01 granted provinces, districts and villages more 
authority to set strategies and plans, to raise revenues, and to imple-
ment public services. At the same time, decentralization became one 
of the eight national development priorities.
The national Governance and Public Administration Reform 
Program (GPAR) had its roots in the hesitant steps towards decen-
tralisation taken by the GoL between 1998 and 2000. The GPAR 
Programme began in 1997 as a vehicle for donors (initially UNDP) 
to support this process. The focus of the program at this early stage 
was on developing the central level capacity at the Department of 
Public Administration and Civil Service (DPACS), assembling civil 
service data, creating instructive resources, and assessing all levels 
of government. Following Decree 01 however, the immediate prior-
ity moved towards cautious piloting of decentralization at the pro-
vincial level.
5.3.2 What was Intended? The Objectives of GPAR in Luang Prabang
GPAR in Luang Prabang (GPAR-LP) was conceived as the first of 
four pilots to trial the implementation of Decree 01 in a provincial con-
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text. The overall objective of phase I (2002–2005) was to assist the local 
administration authorities in the design and implementation of a better 
governance system, featuring accountability, predictability, sound pub-
lic sector management, optimized service delivery, participation and 
transparency, in order to provide cost-effective services to the public. 
This evolved during phase II (2006–2010) to a more explicit focus on 
poverty reduction and economic growth through sustainable improve-
ments in policies, pro-poor services, transparency, and accountability.
Sida first received a request to support the project from GoL in 
May 2000. Initial assessments by the Swedish Embassy were favour-
able. The project was considered highly relevant to the GoL’s decen-
tralization agenda and consistent with Sida’s country strategy for 
Laos, although Sida also saw need for greater clarity in the descrip-
tion of the intended changes in governance. The country strategy for 
2002 highlights the importance of governance and public adminis-
tration reforms to GoL policy and reaffirms the need to respond to 
these imperatives. These priorities, it stated, were reflected in three 
new Sida projects, including GPAR-LP (Sida 2001). 
There were a range of compelling reasons for Sweden to support 
GPAR in Luang Prabang. Sida had been working in the province 
since 1997 when implementation of the first phase of the Lao-Swed-
ish Road Sector Programme (LSRP I) commenced. Institutional 
development and capacity building at the provincial level were core 
objectives of the LSRP I, which was similarly focused on poverty 
reduction. GPAR-LP’s emphasis on efficient administrative systems 
to support poverty eradication and economic growth aligned strong-
ly with Sida’s agenda in the province. 
During the second phase (2006–2010), Sida sought to influence 
the direction of GPAR-LP towards a rights-based approach.32 This 
push reflected, among other things, a new country strategy (2004–
2008) for development co-operation with Laos which stated that 
“Sida will apply a rights-based perspective in all its analyses, prepar-
atory work and interventions” (Braathen and Skold, 2005). The 
draft project design document developed by UNDP was revised by 
a Sida consultant to address concerns that it did not adequately 
reflect this agenda. The objectives of phase II introduce a stronger 
focus on these elements, including accountability and transparency 
32 Interview in Vientiane with a key informant (an international consultant) who 
had been closely involved in phase II of GPAR-LP
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and articulating the concept of government as duty bearer and citi-
zens as rights holders. The terminology of rights-based approaches 
also permeates the text of the revised project design document. 
5.3.3 What was Done? Implementation
The first phase of GPAR-LP began in 2002 with financial sup-
port from both Sida and UNDP. International support to GPAR 
nationally was coordinated through UNDP so funding from Sida for 
GPAR-LP was provided directly to that agency. A Project Support 
Team (PST) was constituted within the compound of the provincial 
Office of the Governor (OoG) to coordinate the implementation 
process. The PST drew mainly from national and international per-
sonnel contracted to the project. It was headed by a National Project 
Director, who played an important role as Project Manager and the 
key connection between the GPAR-LP and the various provincial 
government stakeholders. These management arrangements 
remained largely unchanged between phases I and II.
GPAR I and II sought to achieve their ambitious objectives by 
working with a range key line agencies on key decentralization 
reforms. From an operational perspective, the challenge for GPAR-
LP was to support any reform in provincial government agencies 
that would improve service delivery. The second phase was notable 
for working on reform in the departments of health and education – 
two areas of considerable relevance for the stated objectives of better 
service delivery and poverty reduction.
Implementation of phase I involved a wide range of activities at 
the provincial, district and village levels. These activities varied from 
providing basic office equipment to assist officials to carry out their 
duties, raising awareness at the village level of the rule of law, to 
embedding the National Accounting System in the Luang Prabang 
provincial administration. These various activities were chiefly 
directed towards two objectives: strengthened human resource man-
agement and organisational development; and improved financial 
management. A further three objectives – develop a model office 
environment, improve planning and coordination, and assessing ser-
vice delivery capacity – were only partially addressed or not 
addressed at all during phase I. An evaluation of phase I in 2004 rec-
ommended that phase II concentrate much more on improving ser-
vice delivery. Total Sida funding to phase I amounted to 10.2 MSEK.
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Building on this experience, phase II began in January 2006 with 
a total funding allocation of USD 3 million, comprising USD 2.5 
million from Sida and USD 0.5 million from UNDP. From the outset 
GPAR-LP II was charged with a stronger focus on improving service 
delivery in Luang Prabang, but struggled to establish a workable 
focus. Sida insisted that the project undertake intensive consultations 
during a six-month inception period to identify reform priorities and 
to narrow the broad mandate. As a result of this process, GPAR-LP 
II concentrated on the provincial departments of health and educa-
tion. Activities in this regard encompassed organizational reviews, 
the preparation of job descriptions for personnel at all levels, and 
training for officials and front line service providers at the village lev-
el in a range of subject areas. Beyond these, phase II also established 
a database to assist the provincial government to oversee service 
delivery (the Service Delivery Information System), conducted public 
financial management training associated with the National 
Accounting System, and sought to facilitate business activity through 
administrative efficiencies. A distinctive feature of GPAR-LP II was 
the use of a Service Delivery Fund (SDF) to implement targeted ini-
tiatives with the aim of demonstrating how improvements in public 
administration could affect real changes at the village level. The pro-
ject was completed in 2010, including a one-year no cost extension.
5.3.4 What was Achieved? Results 
Progress and completion reports combined with commentary in 
successive Sida country reports indicate that GPAR-LP was consist-
ently seen as a highly relevant initiative. Overall, phases I and II 
advanced the cause of decentralization in Luang Prabang and 
achieved a number of changes in policies, administrative practices, 
and systems. Chief among these has been greater clarity in the 
organisational structure and roles within the departments of health 
and education, the demonstration of village level initiatives through 
the SDF, and development of capacity in public financial manage-
ment. The latter has been a particularly important imperative as tax 
revenue accruing at the provincial level continues to grow. The pro-
ject also succeeded in reducing the time required for business regis-
tration from on average 217 days to on average 45 days. The final 
review of GPAR-LP II in 2010 is similarly positive, stating:
In terms of the intended outcome to strengthen provincial and district admin-
istrative practices and capacities resulting in more visible, reliable, responsive, 
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accountable, pro-poor services delivery occurring within the districts, Kumbans 
and villages where the project has been operating, the project has taken very 
major steps. 
Despite these achievements, the GPAR-LP II Final Report 
acknowledges that the impact at the village level remains limited 
since service delivery allocations have not changed. The report also 
highlights that some major planned results have not been achieved, 
particularly the creation of a new Luang Prabang municipality.  
The report also questioned the sustainability of important facets  
of the project, such as the SSID and the SDF.
Key informants interviewed for the present study pointed to shift-
ing political priorities as a key factor behind these issues. As one 
informant emphasized, GPAR-LP’s design assumed that the politi-
cal will for administrative reform and decentralization would both 
continue. While the former has persisted, the drive within the GoL 
to continue decentralization of government authority has flagged in 
recent years for a range of complex reasons. This has been advanced 
as a major reason why the proposed creation of a municipality cen-
tred on Luang Prabang urban area could not be pursued as intend-
ed. In retrospect it is remarkable that this risk was not more closely 
assessed when GPAR-LP was designed, considering the uneven his-
tory of decentralization in Laos.
The challenge of developing sustainable capacity was never fully 
overcome by GPAR-LP. The critical constraints in this regard 
appear to have been two-fold. Firstly, the project activities were scat-
tered over a wide range of fields and sectors, despite the decision 
during phase II to focus on the departments of health and educa-
tion. The sustainability of many of these activities was doubtful since 
the project did not possess the resources to follow up each activity to 
reinforce learning and application of training in the workplace. 
These difficulties were compounded by a second constraint – the 
regular rotation of government staff between roles. The capacity 
developed through training events was frequently lost when skilled 
individuals departed unexpectedly. 
The use of the Project Support Team external to the implemen-
tation to drive implementation of GPAR-LP contravened the tenets 
of the Paris Declaration and its local version, the Vientiane Declara-
tion. Nevertheless, key informants and project documentation put 
forward the view that the financial management requirements of 
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UNDP and Sida warrant project-specific systems. Further, the Final 
Report points out that some achievements, for example the SSID, 
would not have occurred without the ‘pushing’ by the PST. On the 
other hand, the report acknowledges that the sustainability of these 
achievements is now in question.
5.4 Case Study 5: Developing Statistics Capacity within the Govern-
ment of Laos
5.4.1 Development Context
As emphasised throughout this report, the NEM brought significant 
changes in policy direction and the gradual opening up of the economy 
along market-oriented lines. Alongside this donor activity increased, as 
did the demand – from the GoL and donors – for statistical data that 
gave some indication of poverty levels and the basic structure and func-
tion of the economy. In 1990 Laos had no GDP, Consumer Price Index 
or price data; there was no representative poverty data; and no reliable 
indicators of the level of educational achievement and other important 
development indicators. This lack of reliable knowledge of the most 
pressing problems made it very difficult for donors to strategically allo-
cate funding to development priorities. Lack of reliable data also 
caused difficulties with the basic management of the economy as there 
was no conception of the size of the economy or the rate of inflation. In 
the early 1990s, after repeated calls from donors, including the World 
Bank for better statistical information, the GoL asked Sweden for help 
to build the capacity of the State Statistical Centre (SSC), which at that 
time employed about 15 people, all of whom spoke no English. The 
SSC was acutely under resourced and collated and centralized data of 
quite variable quality provided to it by line ministries.
5.4.2 What was Intended? The Development Objective
From the outset Sweden adopted a long term capacity building 
perspective in working with the SSC/Department of Statistics (DoS). 
The overarching objective of the Project was to help the DoS become 
the centre of a well-functioning national statistical system with the 
capacity to produce, coordinate, and disseminate, relevant, accurate 
and timely statistics. Funding for initial activities was allocated in 1991 
and in February 1992 a project agreement between the GoL and Sida 
was signed and Statistics Sweden began what would become a 130 
MSEK, eighteen year capacity building partnership with the DoS. 
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5.4.3 Phases 1 to 4 of the Lao-Sweden Statistics Project
The first phase of the program (1991 – 1994) focussed on the 
strengthening of basic skills, particularly skills in English, elementa-
ry statistics and survey methods. Intensive English lessons were held 
every evening of the week for two hours. The first Lao Expenditure 
and Consumption Survey (LECs) was completed in 1992/93 with 
significant technical input and supervision from Statistics Sweden, 
this helped produce the first reliable data on household expenditure 
and consumption patterns which were necessary to better under-
stand poverty dynamics in the country. Some modern computing 
infrastructure was introduced, and DoS staff was trained in data 
processing and computer maintenance. The highlight of the second 
phase (1995–1997) of co-operation was the second Lao Population 
Census conducted in March 1995, which built on the first census 
funded by the UNDP in 1985. This census provided valuable data to 
donors and the government on hundreds of important development 
indicators. It was a highly resource intensive project that required 
significant support from Statistics Sweden for a period of two years 
in development, implementation and analysis. The census activity 
was afforded such importance that it constrained DoS resources and 
other planned activities were postponed, although some progress 
was made with the new Lao Consumer Price Index.
Statistical output and capacity increased significantly during the 
third phase of co-operation (1998–2001) as DoS staff became more 
experienced in organising, conducting and processing census and sur-
vey data. However reports from Swedish long term advisors suggested 
that capacity in survey development, sample design, and data analysis 
required significant further development. An important Agricultural 
Census was conducted in 1998/99, the second LECs was conducted 
during this phase, and consumer price indices were revised using new 
data from LECs II. Further progress was made with regard to nation-
al account data, which was informed by LECs II and the enterprise 
statistics which were collected and processed during this phase. The 
IT environment was upgraded significantly, a Local Area Network 
was installed and connected to SQL servers and an intranet was estab-
lished. This allowed the provincial offices to access national data. Pro-
vincial offices were also provided with IT equipment and extensive 
training on database management was carried out.
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Phase four (2001–2005) focussed on improving the management 
skills of the DoS. Planning and monitoring systems were introduced 
and work practices and administrative capacity were improved. The 
DoS had grown in size over the years and as the technical capacity of 
staff demonstrably improved the focus shifted to building a sustain-
able, well-functioning institution with efficient systems and a strategic 
vision. In this vein a statistics plan to 2010 was drafted and used as 
a tool for future planning. On the data side the third LECs was car-
ried out in 2002/3, and this was augmented by the first Annual 
Household Survey (AHS) which was conducted in late 2003. Prepa-
ration for the 2005 Population Census also began during this phase. 
5.4.4 The 5th and Final Phase of the Lao-Sweden Statistics Project
The fifth and final phase of Swedish co-operation with DoS 
began in July 2005 and ended (after two extensions) in June 2009. 
During this time the regular statistics program increased substan-
tially, further advancements where made in organisational develop-
ment, planning and strategy and a significant number of training 
activities were undertaken. With regard to the statistics program, an 
economic census was undertaken in 2006 which surveyed 140,000 
establishments in Laos, generating 850,000 pages of data. This was 
the last important missing piece of informational infrastructure to be 
put in place by the DoS and provided further insight into the struc-
ture of the Lao economy. The results of the 2005 Population census 
were prepared and published, the fourth LECs was launched in 
April 2007, and the data for the national accounts was revised using 
newly emerging data. For the first time, the data processing for the 
fourth LECs survey was undertaken without substantial technical 
assistance from Swedish colleagues, as the capacity within DoS now 
existed for this to be undertaken with local resources. 
On the organisational side advancements were made in building 
regional collaborations with statistical counterparts in Cambodia and 
within ASEAN. The DoS became the main coordinator of the Nation-
al Statistics System as designated by the Lao Government’s new Statis-
tics Decree (140/PM), and the training of statistics officers at provincial 
and district levels scaled up, as did the training of officers within line 
ministries. A total of 104 staff from district offices were trained at the 
Statistical College in Bac Ninh, Vietnam, and DoS staff undertook 
a number of study tours to Sweden, Indonesia and Thailand. 
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In July 2007 the Swedish government announced the phasing out 
of aid to Laos and Sida notified the DoS that support for the project 
would end in a period of six months. After such a significant and 
highly dependent relationship over such a long period of time this 
abrupt ending to the Project was quite challenging for the DoS, who 
had to swiftly reorient priorities and focus on ensuring the long term 
sustainability of the institution. With the help of Sida and ADB staff, 
work on the development of a Statistics Masterplan to 2020 was fast 
tracked, the aim being to provide guidance for the further develop-
ment of statistics in Laos and to provide a framework for support 
that potential donors could align to. With the help of Sida, other 
donors were found for important aspects of the statistical program 
including the World Bank and UNDP for economic statistics and 
UNICEF and UNFPA for the population census. There is still some 
doubt over the funding for the 5th LECs which at approximately 
US$ 500,000 is one of the more expensive surveys. However the 
Vice Minister of MPI Dr Bounsavthy (himself the former Director 
General of the DoS) informed the Evaluation Team and the DoS 
that funds will be found within the Ministry of Planning and Invest-
ment budget for the next LECs survey, planned for 2011/12. 
5.4.5 The Results of Sweden’s Support
On 30th June 2010 the GoL approved the Lao PDR Statistics Law 
which established a new national statistical system with vertical and hori-
zontal structures designed to improve the collection, analysis and dissem-
ination of statistics. It includes increased interaction between the DoS, 
now called the Lao Statistics Bureau (LSB), and line agencies horizontal-
ly and vertically between the LSB and provincial, district and even vil-
lage level statistics officers. The LSB is now guided by this Law and the 
Strategy for the Development of the National Statistics System 2010–
2020, which Sweden played an instrumental role in developing. The 
LSB is now a sub-ministry within the MPI and is currently undergoing 
significant restructuring. While, the LSB has the capacity to design, col-
lect and disseminate important household and census data there is recog-
nition within the Bureau that high level analytical capacity is lacking, 
particularly with regard to sophisticated poverty analysis, something that 
was noted by Swedish advisors over 15 years ago. Further there are issues 
with the quality of data provided to the new LSB by line agencies where 
the statistics capacity is much less than in the central bureau which has 
benefitted from 18 years of Swedish support. The capacity of statistics 
91
PArT Two – SweDISh DeveLoPmenT Co‑oPerATIon wITh LAoS 
operations within the provinces is also quite variable and much work 
needs to be done at this and lower levels to build a robust, truly national 
statistics system. The LSB now has the capacity to train and statistics 
officers in in these other agencies and an ambitious training strategy has 
been outlined; however there are concerns about the capacity of the LSB, 
which is understaffed, to deliver training and continue collecting the 
multitude of census and survey data that is its core business. 
Statistics capacity has grown considerably over the years. Pover-
ty, household, census, CPI and all types of sectoral data are collected 
systematically and disseminated to government and donors through 
the LSB website. There is a national archive of statistical data the 
Lao PDR National Data Archive (LNADA) which houses data from 
the 17 large surveys and 4 censuses (most of which have been under-
taken with Swedish support). The LSB also participates in the Lao 
DECIDE project (with funding from the Swiss Development Agen-
cy – SDC) which promotes the use of statistical information in socio-
economic planning and decision making in all sectors and at all lev-
els of administration in Laos. This is clearly a significant change to 
1991 when basic GDP, price and poverty statistics did not exist.
5.5 Case Study 6: Sida support to the National University of Laos
5.5.1 Development Context
During the revolution in 1975 the higher education sector in 
Laos, which was already quite weak, was further enervated as many 
French trained academics fled to other countries ahead of the Com-
munist takeover (Can, 1991). The main university in Vientiane, Sisa-
vangvong, was dissolved as a result of this exodus and carved up into 
separate institutions. There was no tertiary degree awarding institu-
tion in Laos and many Lao travelled to Eastern Europe to take 
degrees in a wide variety of universities behind the iron curtain. 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in early 1991, Soviet aid ceased 
and the higher education partnership between the two countries also 
expired, this forced up the cost of higher education significantly 
(Weidman, 1996). Facing pressures to reform the sector, the Lao 
Government established the National University of Laos (NUOL) by 
Prime Ministerial decree in 1995 with the amalgamation of ten 
higher education institutions. The ADB and JICA provided signifi-
cant funding (more than USD 25 million) for the infrastructure of 
the new campus at Dongdok (ADB, 2009) , and NUOL began pro-
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viding higher degree education in a large number of fields including 
science, education, social science, medical sciences, law, architecture, 
agriculture and forestry.
5.5.2 Sweden’s Development Objective
In 2003 Sida established what would become an eight year pro-
gram of capacity building with NUOL. The original objective was 
to “promote research and the development of institutional capacity 
in the effort to strengthen higher education and university develop-
ment in the framework of national policies and plans”33. This and 
subsequent agreements included support for PhD training in co-
operation with Swedish universities, masters training to be carried 
out in co-operation with universities based in South East Asia, cur-
riculum development, training in administration and financial man-
agement and the provision of ICT infrastructure and related train-
ing. As key informants from NUOL recounted, Sida provided the 
much needed ‘software’ to complement ADB and JICA’s ‘hardware’. 
5.5.3 Implementation
Between 2003 and December 2010 Sida provided 86.2 MSEK for 
a variety of activities that aimed to build the human resource capacity 
of ICT, administrative and academic staff at NUOL. From the outset 
Sida realised that a quality research program could not be built with-
out the support of a solid ICT infrastructure. The ICT support was 
particularly crucial as there were significant deficits in the ‘soft side’ of 
the ICT system: including networking, security, software etc. In the 
early years of co-operation, a number of ICT staff from NUOL trav-
elled to KTH in Sweden to undergo training in various aspects of ICT 
management. At KTH NUOL staff developed and worked on the 
design of numerous projects that they hoped to implement back at 
NUOL. These included projects on establishing the NUOL intranet, 
creating an internet backbone, improving network security, video-
conferencing and VOIP technology. Sida also invested significant 
funds in establishing a fibre optic and wireless network between cam-
puses, installing new computers in labs in each of the 11 faculties, pro-
viding scholarships for IT training in Southeast Asia, paying for soft-
ware licenses and providing IT application training for NUOL staff. 
33 Agreement between the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
and the National University of Laos.
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At the outset Sida also placed significant emphasis on building the 
administrative, financial and strategic capacity of the NUOL staff 
responsible for handling Sida funds. Many of the NUOL staff had 
limited experience in the administrative processes required to acquit 
donor funds and these skills needed to be acquired both for this pro-
ject and for the many other donor funded projects coming on stream. 
Sida insisted on the external auditing of the program and after the 
first phase this uncovered some anomalies that required some rectifi-
cation before further funding could be dispersed. Sida demonstrated 
a great deal of patience and support during this time and also helped 
build the capacity of independent Lao auditors. Equally as important 
was the strategic assistance provided to the office of the Director of 
Academic Affairs, which was tasked with managing and harmonising 
donor funded projects within NUOL. These projects grew extensively 
over time as support flowed in from the World Bank, ADB, KOICA, 
JICA, BTC, AfD, and the IDRC for a myriad of projects. In compari-
son to Sida the majority of donors focussed on specific projects, with 
discrete, reasonably short term objectives. This provided important 
and desperately needed funds but also increased the administrative 
burden of NUOL, and pointed to the need for a higher level strategic 
approach to the further development of NUOL as an institution.
On the academic side, funding was provided to train 22 PhD stu-
dents in Swedish universities, particularly Umea and Uppsala. As of 
March 2011 only three of these students had finalised their training 
and Sida has agreed to extend funding to December 2011 to provide 
time for submissions. One has to seriously doubt whether all of these 
students will submit before Sida funding ceases in December 2011, 
and this funding may have to be extended further into 2012. Lao 
PhD students face numerous difficulties when studying abroad par-
ticularly as they rarely complete their period of study in full time 
mode and often travel between Laos and Sweden to teach back at 
NUOL and earn much needed income. This leads to somewhat 
extended submission times when compared to full time Western stu-
dents. Fifty four students have completed Masters training in South-
east Asian universities and over 100 staff have participated in Eng-
lish proficiency training. Sida has also funded curriculum develop-
ment activities in energy, forestry, agriculture and science.
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5.5.4 The Results of Swedish Support
With regard to ICT the exit of Sida has created funding shortfall 
problems and the IT department now has serious problems maintain-
ing networks, supplying software and providing security and authen-
tication services. As a result cost cutting strategies have been intro-
duced which are jeopardising the effectiveness of IT at NUOL. 
There is some suggestion that the ADB may be providing further 
support for the IT network, which may help solve some of these prob-
lems. New equipment and access to software licences are urgently 
needed if the benefits of Sida’s investments are to be maintained. 
With regard to the academic program, there is clearly a disjunction 
between the necessity to phase out Sida’s aid to Laos and the reality of 
life as a Lao PhD student in a Swedish university. All attempts should 
be made to support Lao students still studying in Swedish universities 
to finish their degrees to ensure that the resources spent to date are 
optimised and the strategic goals of NUOL realised. 
Sida’s focus on working at the strategic level has been quite effec-
tive and NUOL now has the capacity to strategically manage donor 
support and channel this into the strategic plan of the University. 
Sida’s focus on supporting strategic development in the higher educa-
tion sector more generally was well received, and as Laos’ national 
university, NUOL should adopt more of a leadership role in moving 
the higher education sector forward. Sida’s exit from the country and 
its support for these strategic exercises has left a gap that other donors 
with an interest in strengthening higher education in Laos might fill. 
The post revolution university sector in Laos started from a very 
weak base and Swedish support was very important in strengthening 
the human resource capacity required to effectively manage a Laos’ 
national university. This funding was catalytic in nature but much 
more donor funding and capacity building over longer periods of 
time are required for NUOL to achieve its potential.
5.6 Significance for this Evaluation
GPAR-LP is significant for several reasons. Firstly, the project 
represents an example of Sweden’s support to decentralisation – 
a pivotal and long-running issue in the continued political and 
administrative development of Laos. The project was highly rele-
vant, emerging during a period of Government enthusiasm for 
decentralisation. However, from the perspective of the GoL, the rel-
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evance of some aspects of GPAR declined when the political envi-
ronment shifted away from decentralization. 
GPAR-LP is also an instructive example of Swedish development 
co-operation delivered through a channel – UNDP in this case. As 
the proliferation of activities increased, such approaches became 
increasingly important to avoiding duplication. In this respect, 
GPAR-LP is illustrative of Sida’s attempts to avoid duplication and 
ensure efficient aid delivery.
However, the experience of GPAR-LP highlights the importance of 
considering aid channels that are appropriate to the objectives. If rights-
based approaches were a central aspect of development co-operation, 
Sida may have considered other channels for support to decentralisa-
tion. Sweden’s objectives were strongly aligned to those of GPAR, but 
the amplification of the rights-based agenda created some divergence 
between the two agencies. From Sida’s perspective, GPAR-LP was an 
opportunity to explicitly articulate the rights-based perspective that 
emerged through the PGD and was reflected in the country strategy. 
UNDP, perhaps mindful of the political sensitivities involved, appeared 
much less prepared to amplify this agenda. This tension was never 
entirely resolved. It appears that concerns expressed by Sida during the 
preparation of Phase I and repeated during the appraisal of phase II 
were never fully addressed. The Sida appraisal of the draft design for 
Phase II criticised the ambiguity of the objectives stating that more clar-
ity was needed with respect to anticipated attitudinal and behaviour 
changes. These outcomes, it observed, should be represented in a well-
developed logical framework incorporating clear performance indica-
tors. No such outcomes or indicators are evident in the Final Report.
The Lao-Swedish Statistics Project illustrates Sweden’s role in the 
development of nascent statistics capacity in the GoL – an important 
foundation for effective poverty targeting. The contribution a robust, 
national statistics program can make to poverty reduction in a devel-
oping country is significant. Statistical information helps improve 
the efficiency with which government and donor resources are spent, 
it helps identify social and economic issues that impede develop-
ment, it helps guide the design and choice of policy and it helps 
increase the accountability of government, which is vitally impor-
tant in a one party state such as Laos. 
Both the case study of Sida support to NUOL, and the Lao-Swe-
den Statics Project point to the risks of abrupt withdrawal of long 
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running donor assistance. While important gains have been made, 
both cases show how funding shortfalls can undermine the capacity 
and systems that have been slowly and steadily developed over pre-
ceding years. The case of Sida support to NUOL is also a further 
reminder of the dangers of donors overwhelming the absorptive 
capacity of a partner organisation.
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6. ThE ChArACTEriSTiCS OF SWEDiSh 
DEvELOPMEnT CO-OPErATiOn WiTh LAOS
6.1 Introduction
The following chapter provides a synthesis of the material pre-
sented in Chapters 2 through 5. The chapter outlines what are seen 
as the important characteristics of Swedish aid to Laos over the 40 
year of co-operation, namely: 
1. a long-term approach;
2. a search for balance between principles and pragmatism; and
3. flexibility in implementation.
There is a symbiotic relationship between these three characteristics. 
A long-term approach is related to the fact that Sweden’s develop-
ment co-operation in Laos was driven by adherence to the ‘solidarity 
principle’ rather than the shifting realpolitik of international rela-
tions. Although its influence has waned in recent years, the ‘solidar-
ity principle’ has been a lasting motivator of Swedish development 
co-operation. A long-term approach is more possible when accom-
panied by flexibility and pragmatism in the approaches employed to 
pursue them. These characteristics are emblematic of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation with Laos. 
After looking at each the above characteristics, the chapter then 
uses the AQEF to discuss some important insights into the effective-
ness of Sweden’s development co-operation with Laos arising from 
the material presented in the previous chapters. This synthesis pro-
vides some important context for the concluding chapter which 
answers the evaluation questions and presents lessons learned.
6.2 A Long-term Approach
A long-term approach stands out as a defining characteristic of 
Swedish development co-operation with Laos. Case studies of the 
30-year support to the transport and communication sector and 20 
years of assistance to develop statistics capacity provide insightful 
Part Three – Synthesis
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examples of how such an approach resulted in the emergence of 
important cumulative impacts over time. While these cases have 
been selected for exploration in this study, other examples are read-
ily identifiable across the development co-operation program, such 
as the forestry and natural resource management sector, in which 
Sweden was involved for 38 years.
In the transport and communication sector, Sida’s approach to deci-
sion-making clearly reflected a long-term commitment. By the early 
1990s it was becoming clearer that road maintenance was a complex 
organisational and institutional issue. This implied a relationship based 
on high levels of mutual trust developed over the long term. But Swe-
den did not shrink from this challenge, instead committing to further 
assistance that attempted to address the issues that had arisen. A con-
sistent focus on this issue led Sida steadily towards a deeper engage-
ment with organisational and institutional dynamics underlying road 
administration. There is no evidence that Sweden contemplated with-
drawing when maintenance problems threatened the sustainability of 
road construction. Such an approach is associated with a long-term 
commitment to achieving a positive and lasting development result.
Why did Sweden take such an approach? It is difficult to answer 
this question with certainty but part of the answer must lie in the 
desire to protect the high levels of investment. Sweden’s early develop-
ment of National Road 13 South had involved a major capital com-
mitment. Withdrawing or phasing out at an earlier stage would have 
placed this investment in jeopardy. Such an incentive also helped 
direct attention towards maintenance, which in turn led Sida towards 
a deeper engagement with organisational and institutional issues.
It is apparent that without long-running Swedish support the 
national statistics infrastructure would not be as sophisticated as it is 
today. Sweden generously supported this important area for a consid-
erable period of time – 112 Swedish short term and long term con-
sultants worked within the Bureau and over 130 MSEK was spent on 
capacity building and IT and informational infrastructure over 18 
years. As the Vice-Minister of MPI and former Director General of 
the SSC said, ‘Sida pushed the train and the train is now moving’. 
The base statistics produced by the LSB, particularly the LECs 
and population census data are having an impact across Laos in pol-
icy development and program planning. For example until recently 
the GoL and donors focussed on providing vaccinations to reduce 
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infant mortality until recent data from LECS suggested that infant 
death was frequent very soon after birth. This led to changes in pri-
orities and a focus on providing skilled birth attendance in an effort 
to reduce both infant and maternal mortality. Statistics generated by 
the LSB is also helping map poverty across Laos and is identifying 
select groups whom donors and the government can target by rea-
ligning national poverty reduction strategies.
In other areas, such as human rights, Sweden’s contribution began 
at a later date. This process appears to have occurred in parallel with 
the deepening and maturing of the bilateral relationship. Even so, 
Sweden was the first donor to begin co-operation in this area. Inter-
viewees within the ministries involved stressed Sweden’s record as 
a ‘trusted partner’ with a long history in Laos. Indeed, it is often men-
tioned that Sweden and Laos have enjoyed a ‘special relationship’. 
This highlights the role that Sweden’s long-term approach in sectors 
such as transport and forestry played in creating the trust that enabled 
Sweden to work in politically sensitive areas such as human rights. 
The long-term approach taken by Sida is an important factor in 
the positive impacts that have accrued, for example, in the roads sec-
tor. Such an approach is, however, also vulnerable to a critical assess-
ment such as that “rollover” and “repackage” projects and programs, 
particularly in the forestry and natural resource management sec-
tor.34 Such assessments tend to ignore or downplay the importance of 
balancing the tactical dimensions of donor practice, especially build-
ing and maintaining the relationships that enable a donor to have 
influence within a particular sector and more broadly.
6.3 A Difficult Balance between Principles and Pragmatism 
A set of core principles remained at the heart of Sweden’s 
approach from the commencement of development co-operation in 
1977 to the phase out process in 2010. These stem from the ‘solidar-
ity’ that underpinned the commencement of development co-opera-
tion, to the enduring focus on poverty reduction, and the emergence 
of human rights in the late 1990s and 2000s. Interviews with other 
donors as well as GoL personnel from central ministries such as 
34 This particular critique is voiced in Vadnjal D. et al (2003), Implementation of the 
Implementation of the 1999–2003 Country Strateg y for Swedish Development Cooperation 
with Laos, Sida Evaluation 02/36 
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MoFA, confirm that Sweden was by and large viewed as a “progres-
sive” donor, prepared to take a stand on issues such as human rights.
While Sweden was cognisant of these principles, the 38 years of 
development co-operation between Laos and Sweden is littered with 
examples of the various challenges associated with giving them 
operational force. The case study of GPAR-LP highlights the diffi-
culties of applying such an approach while working through another 
more cautious donor agency. As noted in Chapter 5, the issue of land 
reform and shifting cultivation, which had been a sensitive issue 
throughout much of the bilateral relationship, bubbled to the surface 
in 2005. The dilemma was this: should Sweden adopt a strong 
stance – ‘shout from the sidelines’ as one interviewee put it – or be 
more pragmatic with a view to maintaining a degree of influence. 
While pragmatism prevailed in this instance, interviewees also 
described earlier incidents where attempts by Swedish delegates to 
raise difficult issues had elicited stern responses from the GoL.
Striking a balance was not always easy. On one hand, Sweden 
occupied a unique position among donors and was able to raise politi-
cally sensitive issues. On the other however, Sweden had arguably 
more to lose from pushing the limits of the ‘special relationship’. Much 
of the history of development co-operation between Sweden and Laos 
involved the search for a careful balance between these imperatives. 
6.4 Flexibility and Learning
‘Flexibility’ and ‘flexible’ were terms used the most frequently to 
describe the approach that Sweden took towards implementation. This 
characteristic is closely linked with another – close attention to learning 
from evaluations and studies. It is a perspective that emerges strongly 
from the case study of Sweden’s involvement in the roads sector. Regu-
lar evaluations appear to have played a key role in maintaining the 
focus on institutional development and driving refinement of basic 
access component. The latter has been a particularly important ele-
ment in sharpening the poverty impact of the roads constructed. 
A range of analytical inputs commissioned by Sida at various stages has 
facilitated increasing sophistication of the institutional development 
efforts. While not always successfully incorporated into practice, these 
efforts are indicative of a donor attempting to come to grips with recog-
nised challenges. In short, the evolution of Swedish assistance to the 
transport sector highlights the role of regular systematic evaluation.
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6.5 Poverty Reduction and the Aid Quality Evaluation Framework
As mentioned in Chapter 1 an important part of the methodology 
used for this evaluation is the application of the Aid Quality Evaluation 
Framework (AQEF). This Framework is a heuristic device that focuses 
on the drivers of aid effectiveness; it can be deployed when assessing the 
impact of aid programs over a long period of time when quantitative 
causal attribution is impossible, due to either the small size of an aid 
program or the difficulties in disentangling endogenous factors. The 
following sections discuss four of the five components of the AQEF with 
reference to the information presented in Chapters 2 through 5 and 
provide some important insights into the effectiveness of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation with Laos, insights which are discussed further in 
Chapter 7. Component 5 of the AQEF is addressed when answering 
the overall evaluation questions in Chapter 7. 
6.5.1 Absorptive Capacity and the Quality of Public Sector Financial 
Management
Absorptive Capacity (AC) refers to the capacity of the partner 
country to use aid efficiently for development purposes. It is based on 
the simple recognition that there are limits to the amounts of aid 
that can be efficiently absorbed, with higher and higher levels of aid 
not necessarily associated with bigger and better development 
impacts. As discussed in Chapter 2 AC is an important part of the 
ODA enabling environment, alongside the quality of public sector 
financial management. If that enabling environment is weak then 
aid will be less efficient in achieving good development outcomes 
than it otherwise would be. This provides important context within 
which to evaluate the overall effectiveness of Swedish aid to Laos.
Overall, our analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that absorptive capac-
ity in Laos has increased after starting from a low base in the mid-
1970s, albeit dipping during the early 2000s. Case studies in Chap-
ters 3, 4, and 5 tell a story of increasing recognition of capacity con-
straints within the GoL, and Sweden’s efforts to address these within 
the development co-operation program. The effect of this issue on aid 
effectiveness is illustrated through the case study on transport and 
communication sector between 1977 and 1985. After these early dif-
ficulties, Sida, in concert with a growing number of donors, devoted 
considerable attention to this issue. The increase in donors and in the 
number of development activities in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
contributed to a decrease in absorptive capacity during this time, 
102
PArT Three – SynTheSIS
with the implication that aid was less likely to have been used effec-
tively. There is much evidence to indicate that Sweden was acutely 
aware of this challenge at an early stage and played an important role 
in championing greater donor coordination – long before such prac-
tices were enshrined in the Paris Declaration of 2005. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, the quality of PFM – another key driver of absorptive 
capacity – has followed an upward trajectory, similarly declining 
briefly during the early 2000s. These observations suggest that not 
only did AC increase over the period of co-operation, but that Swe-
den’s aid actively contributed to this improvement.
6.5.2 Consistency with Paris Declaration Principles
The case studies introduced above highlight a number of aid 
effectiveness issues that can be fruitfully discussed with reference to 
the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness. Clearly, it is beyond the 
scope of this evaluation to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
the Paris principles as they relate to Sweden’s aid to Laos, however 
some important insights can be provided with respect to ownership 
and alignment in particular, which have much to say about the 
potential sustainability of Sweden’s interventions in Laos. As dis-
cussed in Appendix C assessments based on these elements are not 
used to criticise the aid delivery decisions made in the early years of 
Sweden’s co-operation as much of the knowledge of what contributes 
to effective aid was not known at that time. However it is relevant to 
assess programs against these principles because it is suggested that 
aid that exhibited characteristics like those enshrined in the Paris 
Principles would be more effective than aid that did not exhibit 
those characteristics, regardless of the period of time under review.
With respect to the principle of ownership, the Evaluation Team 
finds that Sweden has consistently sought to encourage GoL owner-
ship. This was particularly evident in the 1990s, as increasing num-
bers of donors began to work with the GoL. Sweden emerged as 
a strong advocate of the GoL taking a more active role in donor coor-
dination. In the transport sector, Sweden’s major investment in 
National Road 13 South had been a direct response to a request from 
the GoL, a pattern reflected in other major investments in this sector. 
Similarly, Sweden’s support to statistics responded to a GoL request, 
although to some degree pushed. Encouraging strong ownership 
became a more delicate enterprise as rights-based themes gained 
prominence across Swedish aid in the early 2000s. For example, Sida 
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support to public administrative reform and the rule of law – poten-
tially sensitive areas – tended to work within the parameters of reform 
established by the GoL, while also attempting to ensure that such co-
operation reflected the Swedish emphasis on rights-based perspectives. 
This approach sought to strike a pragmatic balance between these 
imperatives and the aid effectiveness principle of GoL ownership.
Sweden has also been supportive of ownership at different levels 
of GoL and among diverse stakeholders within Laos. A key demon-
stration of this has been in the transport sector, where the shift from 
national roads to provincial, district, and community roads was 
accompanied by attempts to foster greater ownership at these levels. 
For example, Sida’s approach to community roads has been distin-
guished by its strong emphasis on participatory planning, involving 
broad consultation and the establishment of village-level institutions.
The objectives and sectoral distribution of Sweden’s aid over time 
suggests that development co-operation has been aligned with the 
priorities of the GoL. Sweden’s emphasis in this regard was evident 
from early stages in the bilateral relationship, when Sida focused 
a considerable proportion of development co-operation on the trans-
port and communication sector and the forestry sector. As noted in 
Chapter 3, these were expressed priorities of the GoL during the 
1970s and 1980s. The mechanisms that had been established for reg-
ular dialogue between Sweden and GoL have played an important 
role in ensuring that programming continued to reflect these priori-
ties. There appear to have been very few instances where major aid 
allocation decisions were made without having been discussed in 
annual consultations and reviews. The development of the NGPES 
and its presentation to donors in 2004 has further encouraged inter-
national co-operation partners to align with GoL priorities. As the 
2004–2008 Laos strategy illustrates, Sweden was responsive in 
adjusting its country focus towards the priorities in that strategy. 
A number of mainly positive observations can be made with respect 
to the predictability of aid flows from Sweden and the degree to which 
these have been untied. Levels of Swedish development co-operation, 
as noted in Chapter 2, have been statistically more stable than aid from 
all other donors to Laos. This pattern reinforces the view that Swedish 
aid was more effective than it otherwise would have been. 
Swedish aid has been officially untied since 2006, opening up 
procurement to international and local firms. Nevertheless, it 
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remains the case that Swedish aid was tied to the procurement of 
Swedish goods and services for the major portion of development co-
operation. Case study 1 demonstrated how such an approach con-
tributed to the lack of coordination and cohesion in the transport 
and communication sector in the early years of development co-
operation. As recent empirical research in the Lao context has con-
firmed, untied procurement is strongly associated with a shift 
towards GoL priorities and therefore greater development effective-
ness.35 As such, Swedish development co-operation was not as effec-
tive prior to 2006 as it otherwise would have been.
6.5.3 Consistency with Partner Country Sectoral Priorities
Donor aid allocation should be consistent with development 
needs in recipient countries if they are to contribute to poverty 
reduction. Furthermore, aid should be sufficiently flexible to respond 
to changing development needs or priorities. These needs may or 
may not be recognised in partner development plans or priorities. 
As Chapter 2 has highlighted, broadly speaking, the sectoral dis-
tribution of Swedish development co-operation appears to be consist-
ent with the pressing needs facing Laos. The case studies illustrate 
how this support has played out in particular instances. The two case 
studies of support to the transport and communication sector over 
two successive periods of development co-operation highlight how 
this assistance corresponded to an important need but was also flex-
ible to adapt to evolving conditions. Indeed, an evaluation of Swedish 
support to roads in Laos referred to Sida as a “pathbreaker” in recog-
nition of the pioneering support that they provided at a time when 
few other donors worked in the sector (SHER Consultants, 2010).
Overall, the synthesis above suggests a positive assessment of 
Sweden’s assistance to Laos over the 38 years of development co-
operation. Sweden maintained a long-term focus in certain sectors 
that was pursued with considerable operational flexibility. This strat-
egy, particularly evident in the transport sector, allowed room for 
response to evaluative and analytical work. Sweden was serious 
about fostering partner government ownership, but faced the chal-
lenge of balancing this principle with Swedish priorities that had 
35 McCarty A. and A. Julian (2009), Thematic study, The developmental effective-
ness of untied aid: Evaluation of the evaluation of the Paris Declaration and of 
the 2001 DAC recommendation on untying ODA to LDCs – Lao PDR Country 
Study, Paris: OECD DAC
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gained prominence in the early 2000s. Importantly, Swedish devel-
opment co-operation was responsive to partner government priori-
ties and remained free from severe fluctuations over time. For these 
reasons, the Evaluation Team assesses the contribution of Swedish 
aid to Laos’ development achievements, specifically poverty reduc-
tion, to be significant. Chapter 7 expands upon these points.
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7. COnCLuSiOnS AnD LESSOnS LEArnED
7.1 Introduction
This chapter returns to the four evaluation questions outlined in 
Chapter 1, recalling that the primary question concerns the contri-
bution of Swedish development co-operation to multidimensional 
poverty reduction in Laos. It attempts to answer these questions, to 
the extent possible, drawing on the evidence presented in Chapters 2 
to 6 and some subsequent reflection. Responses to the 4 sub-ques-
tions are provided first. Building on these responses, the primary 
evaluation question is then addressed.
Each question is succinctly answered, drawing on but not repli-
cating in any depth the analysis of the preceding chapters. They are 
answers that logically emerge from this analysis and cannot be read 
in isolation to the previous chapters, Chapter 6 in particular.
7.2 Evaluation Sub-questions
Sub-question 1: To what extent did Sida’s aid respond to pressing multi-
dimensional development needs in Laos?
There appears to be clear evidence that Sida responded to press-
ing multidimensional development needs in Laos. 
Laos faced many significant development challenges in 1975, 
with one of the most pressing being the need to rebuild infrastruc-
ture owing to the damage done during the Second Indo-Chinese 
War. The Sida focus on building transport and communications 
infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s was a response to this need.
Given that Laos is predominantly a rural society, that poverty is 
more widespread in rural areas compared to urban areas and that 
roads provide access to markets and health services, Sida’s shift in 
the 1990s and beyond from the national road network towards pro-
vincial roads was also an appropriate response to a pressing need. It 
is one that seems to have had positive impacts on achievements in 
income and health, and lifted many Lao people out of income pov-
erty, as suggested by the Warr (2005) study discussed in Chapter 4.
Throughout the 1990s and beyond it became increasingly clear 
that a lack of capacity in management and governance were not only 
major constraints to growth and development in general but also to 
aid effectiveness in Laos. In short, these constraints were increasing-
ly recognised as a pressing development need, one that had to be 
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addressed by donors operating in Laos. The support for the better 
management of forestry resources from the mid-1980s and for gov-
ernance and public administration reform and greater statistics 
capacity from the mid-1990s is clearly consistent with this need. 
The extent of poverty is higher in Laos than in the developing coun-
try group as a whole. Income levels and achievements in health and 
education are lower, despite the impressive achievements of Laos since 
the early 1990s. Sida’s adoption in 1995 of poverty reduction as the 
overarching objective of its development co-operation program in Laos 
is consistent with these facts. So too was its ongoing support for forestry 
(given the importance of this sector for the livelihood of Lao people and 
as an important driver of economic growth) and roads (for the reasons 
mentioned above), general support of the Government of Laos’ NGPES 
and emphasis on human rights (given the link between the promotion 
of these rights and poverty reduction) from the mid-2000s onwards. 
It can of course be argued that there were other pressing multidi-
mensional development needs that Sida should have given priority to. 
For example, Sida should have provided more direct support to the 
economic reforms introduced in the early 1990s, adding to the efforts 
of the World Bank and IMF. Such support could have been broadly 
similar to that provided to Vietnam during the Doi Moi period, 
which has been particularly important to that country’s economic 
development36. Whether the other needs were more pressing, remains 
a matter for speculation, as does whether a Sida response to them 
would have been effective. What is clear, however, is that the needs to 
which Sida responded were of national significance and crucial to 
progress in multiple dimensions of poverty and development and con-
sistent with the flexibility and learning characterisation, noted in 
Chapter 6 of Swedish development co-operation with Laos. 
Sub-question 2: To what extent has Sida’s development co-operation 
 program in Laos been effectively and efficiently delivered?
The evidence of effective and efficient delivery of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation in Laos is mixed.
Evidence of effective and efficient aid delivery is scarcest during 
the first phase of development co-operation, between 1974 and 1985. 
The AQEF has not been used to assign numerical scores against any 
of the periods considered, but if it had been used in this way the low-
36 See ‘Study of Long Term Development Co-operation between Sweden and Viet-
nam’, which was conducted alongside this present study. 
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est scores would have been recorded during this period. While it 
seems that Sida’s priorities were aligned with those of the Lao gov-
ernment, there is evidence of significant tying, of a lack of harmoni-
sation among donors and, in particular, of very limited capacity to 
efficiently absorb aid inflows for development purposes. 
Had Sweden ended its development co-operation with Laos in 
1985, then the inescapable conclusion would have been that on balance 
this co-operation would have been a failure on development effective-
ness criteria. But of course it did not end in 1985, and it is in this con-
text that co-operation during this first phase needs to be viewed. Recall 
that during 1980–89 Sweden was the largest aid donor to Laos. From 
1975 to 1993 it provided more aid to Laos than any other OECD coun-
try, and during the early years after the Pathet Lao’s overthrow of the 
royalist government in 1975 Sweden was one of a handful of Western 
donors operating in Laos. Consistent with the long-term approach and 
solidarity principle noted in Chapter 6, it is reasonable to argue that 
had Sweden not been as active a donor as it was in the first phase, it 
would not have established an important prerequisite for effective 
development co-operation in Laos. That prerequisite is to be seen as 
a trusted, long-term development co-operation partner.
Evidence suggests that the second and third phases of develop-
ment co-operation between Sweden and Laos, between the years 
1986 and 1996 and 1996 and 2010, respectively, saw much more 
effectiveness and efficiency in aid delivery. Aid tying was phased out; 
there was strong alignment with Government of Laos priorities, clear 
and seemingly effective attempts at harmonisation of donor activities 
and consistency between activities on the ground and the Swedish 
country program. While there are valid questions about the appro-
priateness of the design of the Forest Inventory Project (noted above 
in Chapter 5), the overall conclusion is that Swedish aid to Laos was 
delivered most effectively and efficiently from the mid-1980s onward.
Sub-question 3: How and to what extent did Sida’s development co-opera-
tion nurture an enabling environment for poverty reduction Laos?
There is clear evidence that Sida’s development co-operation nur-
tured such an environment in Laos, or put differently provided the 
pre-conditions for sustained poverty reduction.
Key elements in nurturing an enabling environment are local gov-
ernment capacity and removing impediments to poor people acting 
in a way that improves their living standards. As noted in Chapters 5, 
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Swedish support for governance and improved public administration 
has been successful, as has support for the National University of 
Laos and the State Statistical Centre. (Recall also the evidence, pre-
sented in Chapter 2, of improved PFM and overall absorptive capac-
ity in Laos from the early 1990s onward). The benefits of this support 
are many and include better pro-poor service delivery, greater mobi-
lisation of domestic revenues and a better evidence base for policy 
development and implementation. All of these benefits are conducive 
to greater poverty reduction and sustained development outcomes 
into the future. Support for provincial road construction has been 
important in enabling poor people to have better market and health 
services access, which is vital to improve their living conditions.
Sub-question 4: What lessons can be learned from Sweden’s development 
co-operation with Laos to improve development effectiveness in the future?
A response to this question emanates directly from Chapter 6 and 
as such can be stated very succinctly. 
The three lessons learned, which if acted upon can improve 
future development effectiveness are: 
1. Adopt a long-term approach, developing a sound relationship 
with the partner government that facilitates frank and open 
dialogue; 
2. Pursue an effective balance between principles and pragma-
tism; and 
3. Be flexible and learn while doing. 
These are generic lessons for aid delivery, applying to both bilateral 
and multilateral co-operation.
Primary Evaluation Question: How, and to what extent, did Sida’s 
 development assistance contribute to poverty reduction in Laos?
This is rarely an easy question to answer. Reflect on the evidence 
presented throughout this report prior to providing an answer to it. 
This evidence includes the big picture of development in Laos over the 
last 38 years, as presented in Chapter 2, and includes what Sweden has 
achieved as highlighted in the case studies and elsewhere in this report. 
In Chapter 2 a number of stylised facts were presented. While 
there appears to be little relationship between aid and economic 
growth in Laos, it is a stylised fact that aid is positively associated 
with levels of achievement in health, education and, more broadly, 
human development. That is, in Laos, high aid levels are associated 
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with higher achievement in each of these dimensions of development 
and vice versa. 
While we cannot attribute causality between these variables on 
the basis of simple associations, there are, however, a number of rea-
sons for positing that causality might exist based on the evidence 
presented not only in Chapter 2 but elsewhere in this report. 
Aid levels to Laos are relatively high by international standards, 
and certainly large enough relative to its population and the size of 
its economy to expect some relationship between these inflows and 
development achievements. Donors have, it seems, responded to 
important national development needs within Laos and have provid-
ed relatively steady year-on-year aid levels. There also appears to 
have been co-ordination between donors, to the extent that a num-
ber of donors have harmonised their activities with those of Sweden. 
In addition, and fundamentally, there is clear evidence of solid gains 
in income poverty reduction, in health and education and in human 
development generally. 
There is, however, evidence of poor donor practice in this aspect 
of Swedish aid delivery and there is no reason to believe that this has 
not also occurred with other donors. There is also evidence of a lack 
of local capacity to use aid efficiently, aid levels in excess of that 
which might be efficiently absorbed, and increasing proliferation of 
aid activities in Laos.
On balance, however, it is reasonable to posit that the overall 
development co-operation effort in Laos has contributed to poverty 
reduction in Laos: at very least poverty levels would be higher in 
Laos in the absence of such co-operation. Sweden’s effort needs to be 
judged in this context, but also against the evidence that on balance 
its aid has been delivered effectively and efficiently and has 
addressed important development needs. 
On these grounds it is entirely reasonable to conclude that Swed-
ish development co-operation has made a substantive contribution 
to poverty reduction in Laos. The extent of this contribution 
remains, however, a matter of speculation.
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Appendix A:  research 
Methodology
inTrODuCTiOn
The analytical framework and evaluation questions addressed in this 
study are outlined in Section 1.3 of the report. In this Appendix, fur-
ther details are provided on case selection and data collection and 
analysis. 
The evaluation study deploys a mixed-methods approach, using 
qualitative and quantitative methods in a complementary way (Sale 
et al., 2002) to interrogate different types of evidence about the con-
text, evolution and outcomes of Swedish development assistance in 
Laos (and similar studies covering Vietnam and Sri Lanka). This 
approach has enabled robust and credible historical analysis of Sida’s 
programs, while providing the necessary flexibility to overcome spe-
cific data limitations. 
At the macro-level both quantitative and qualitative data were 
used to prepare Country Development Profiles, which outline the 
context for Swedish development co-operation. These profiles out-
line the major development trends (including progress in poverty 
reduction) and trends in aid delivery over the period of the evalua-
tion, and the international political and economic circumstances 
that influenced development and aid in Laos. Qualitative data from 
key informant interviews with experts and document analysis 
(including political-economic theories of aid delivery) augmented the 
quantitative data and shed light on why these patterns of aid delivery 
arose. 
Similarly, quantitative and qualitative data were used in tandem 
at the meso-level to provide empirical and contextual information on 
issues such as the sectoral and geographical distribution of aid. At 
the micro-level, quantitative and qualitative data were used to pro-
vide descriptive and contextual information on particular projects 
and programs. 
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QuAnTiTATivE AnALySiS
Quantitative analysis drew on available sources of data, such as 
Sida’s own databases, data provided by the government of Laos, the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the UNDP’s Human Devel-
opment Report and the OECD DAC’s International Development Statistics. 
Such data informed the macro analysis of development and aid 
trends in the Country Development Profile. The data enabled 
assessment of changes in various dimensions of the quality of life , 
income poverty in particular. Chapter 2 analyses change in indica-
tors such as per capita income and its annual rates of growth, on life 
expectancy, adult literacy, child and infant mortality, maternal mor-
tality and the percentage of people living below the income poverty 
line. Key multidimensional indicators as also presented, such as the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). Comprehensive infor-
mation on this index has been published by the UNDP since 1990, 
with HDI scores being available from 1970 onwards. Recognising 
that economic performance is an important driver of poverty reduc-
tion, GDP growth rates are also examined and key economic 
reforms and structural changes identified. 
The Country Development Profile also charts aid to Laos. Annu-
al levels of Swedish and total official development assistance are 
shown, both in gross amounts, relative to GDP or GNI and the pop-
ulation size. These figures are also presented by sector. Data on aid 
proliferation and volatility (or predictability) were also assessed.
The quantitative analysis, while rigorous, did not involve econo-
metric modelling. This was ruled out in the TOR, but was difficult 
in any case owing to data availability and quality problems particu-
larly for the early years of Swedish development co-operation to the 
three focal countries. Qualitative data were used to gain a picture of 
trends and their causes during the early periods of Swedish aid. 
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QuALiTATivE AnALySiS
The qualitative component of this evaluation involved thematic and 
longitudinal case studies, with flexible exploration of the evaluation 
questions through the use of semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups and analysis of existing documentation. 
Case studies – specific units of analysis with clearly defined 
boundaries – were used to explore the evaluation questions in a con-
text specific way. Case studies were used for their potential to pro-
vide an in-depth understanding of events and trends in Sweden’s aid 
in the three countries through the perspective of key actors. 
Qualitative approaches usually work with small samples that are 
selected purposively rather than randomly (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). Purposive sampling, i.e. selecting cases for their richness of 
information in relation to key time periods, people, events and 
impacts, is relevant here for two reasons. First, such sampling is con-
sistent with the adaptive theory approach, where cases are selected 
for their value in exploring predefined questions and concepts (Den-
zin and Lincoln, 2000). Cases are therefore selected for their likely 
contribution to understanding the impacts of Sida’s changing devel-
opment strategies over time. Second, purposive sampling enables the 
richest access to data given the available time and resources. 
The historical nature of this evaluation, which must evaluate the 
cumulative impact of many activities over several decades, distin-
guishes it from a typical project or program evaluation. Initial analy-
sis of Sida documentation and meetings during the inception visit 
helped the evaluation team to develop a working understanding of 
key historical phases in Sweden’s aid delivery and its relationship to 
changes in the broader development context. Based on this analysis, 
it became clear that two different categories of case studies would be 
relevant:
Longitudinal case studies were used to illustrate the changing 
nature and impact of Sida’s involvement in a particular sector. Lon-
gitudinal cases exposed the drivers behind, and outcomes of changes 
in, Sweden’s development co-operation within a selected sector. 
Analysing one connected set of interventions in this way spoke to 
questions of responsiveness, relevance and effectiveness. Longitudi-
nal cases were identified based on sectors where Sida has had a very 
long-standing engagement; in each country, only a very limited 
number of sectors or areas of operation met this requirement. 
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In short, longitudinal case studies assessed long term involvement 
in a sector, to understanding why and how Sida changed its 
approach to development co-operation over time, and the impacts of 
such change.
Thematic case studies were used to assess the nature and impact 
of a package of interventions during different historical phases. 
Drawing on the provisional historical phases of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation defined in the inception phase (see Table A.1), 
a set of 2 to 3 case studies were selected in each major phase to gain 
a deeper understanding of critical impacts and themes during each 
period. There was a large number of potential thematic cases to 
select from. An initial set was selected during the inception phase, 
based on the information gained from initial interviews and data 
analysis about Sida’s thematic foci in Laos. This initial set was first 
expanded through discussion with Sida, and then adjusted slightly 
during fieldwork if logistical constraints were faced in accessing par-
ticular field sites or informants. The final cases addressed in the 
study are outlined in Table A.1. 
The combination of longitudinal and thematic analysis is an inno-
vative approach to longitudinal evaluation; it has enabled a compre-
hensive understanding of how Sida’s aid effort evolved, as well as an 
understanding of impacts and lessons in key thematic areas. 
Key data sources for the longitudinal and thematic cases include 
existing Sida documentation (provided to the team by Sida), other 
secondary research, and interviews and focus groups with inform-
ants. The Sida documentation was analysed for information on: (i) 
case studies; (ii) inter-country relationships and planning/decision-
making processes; and (iii) existing knowledge on lessons and 
impact. In addition, existing research publications were used in the 
analysis of the development context, the political economy of each 
country, and the international political economic context and its 
influence on donor practice.
Field visits were made to gain a more detailed understanding of 
relationships with provincial and local government, and the sus-
tainability and impacts of previous Sida-funded interventions. 
These field visits built upon previous evaluative work commissioned 
by Sida.
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KEy inFOrMAnT inTErviEWS  
AnD grOuP DiSCuSSiOnS
Interviews were conducted with key informants that were associated 
in various ways with Sida’s programs. Some were identified during 
the inception phase for their historical and institutional memory. 
Further informants were then identified through a ‘snowball’ 
approach (i.e. through referrals and following up names that 
recurred in other interviews), as well as targeting specific categories 
of stakeholders including:
• Government policy makers at central and sector levels;
• Provincial and districts authorities;
• Sida HQ departments and teams;
• Swedish MFA;
• Other donors and international partners;
• Civil society, academia/research organisations, media, private 
sector;
• Implementing partners and project/technical assistance 
teams; and
• End beneficiaries at provincial and district level.
In summary, the selected cases and informants provided 
a detailed overview of Sida’s phases of operation and key sectoral ini-
tiatives. The sampling strategy was workable, while providing assur-
ance that key categories of informants were covered. A limitation 
with the approach was the limited scope to interview program ben-
eficiaries, due to resource and time constraints. To address this gap, 
the team have drawn on past program and project evaluations, 
which have addressed beneficiary views to varying extents. This was 
a necessary sacrifice to gain the breadth of coverage required in the 
TOR, but meant that the study was constrained in gaining in-depth, 
longitudinal insights to local level project and program impacts.
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Appendix B: Key informants
Aberg, AnnLis., Former Charge D’affaires, Embassy of Sweden in 
Lao PDR
Alounsavath, Oupakone., Deputy Director, Dept of Forestry
Alton, Charles., Socio-economist/Consultant
Anousone, Sing., Head, Administration Office, DPWT Luang 
 Prabang
Birgegaard, Lars-Erik., Consultant
Bostrand, Lisbet., Former First Secretary, Development Co-opera-
tion, Embassy of Sweden in Lao PDR
Boun, Village Elder, Kuay Village, Phontong District, Champassak
Boupha, Vatlana., Project Analyst, UNDP Vientiane, former Project 
Officer, Governance and Public Administration Reform, Luang 
Prabang
Boyreau, Genevieve., Senior Country Economist, World Bank
Chamberlain, Jim., Anthropologist/Consultant
Chanthamaly, Phonekeo (Dr)., Director, IT Center, National Uni-
versity of Laos
Chanthavongsa, Thipphakone., Director General, External Finance 
Department, Ministry of Finance
Davading, Somneuk., Senior Economist, World Bank
Evans, Grant., Anthropologist/Consultant
Fogde, Peter., Chief Operating Officer, Stora Enso, Vientiane 
 (former consultant Lao Swedish Forestry Programme)
Holtzberg, Christer., Former Charge D’affaires, Embassy of Sweden 
in Lao PDR
Inphitack, Asween., Deputy Director, DPWT Luang Prabang
Inthamith, Somchith., Director General, Department of Interna-
tional Co-operation, Ministry of Planning and Investment
Kattignassack, Sengdarith., (by telephone), Former Director of 
Rural Roads, Ministry of Public Works Transport and Commu-
nications
Khamsaly Sisavath.,, Deputy Director General Dept of Europe and 
America’s, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Kone and Chanh (husband and wife), Farmers, Nong Sano, Cham-
pasak District, Champasak Province
Lattanathichanh, Phimpha., Vice Village Chief, Xang Hai village, 
Luang Prabang
Lindahl, Claes., Consultant
Lock, Stephan., First Secretary, European Union, Laos
Ly, Somphone., DPWT Oudomxay
Mahalath, Donesavanh.,Rural Roads Unit, District Office of Public 
Works and Transport, Houn District, Oudomxay
Manivong, Khamphay., Deputy Director General, Department of 
Forestry
Meng, Shui., Former Gender Officer, UNDP
Mossberg, Carl., Chief Technical Adviser, Upland Research and 
Capacity Development Programme (former Team Leader 
 Lao-Swedish Forestry Programme)
Mutlu, Petra (Dr)., Country Director, GIZ, Laos
Nammavongmixay, Khampong (Dr)., Director of Academic Affairs, 
National University of Laos
Ngonphachanh, Pothong., Deputy Director General, Department of 
Roads, Ministry of Public Works and Transport
Nguyen Van Minh., Senior Public Finance Specialist, World Bank
O’Driscoll, Gerry., UNCDF, Vientiane, former Program Manager, 
Governance and Public Administration Reform, Luang Prabang
Pakdimanivong, Soukkhaseum., Director Department of Public 
Works and Transport, Champasak Province (ex-MPWT Project 
Manager of Sida roads project in Vientiane), Pakse, Champassak
Phameung, Boualy., Director of Shifting Cultivation and Stabili-
zation Division, National Agriculture and Forestry Extension 
Service
Phandoluck, Chandhy., Vice Village Chief, Xang Hai village, 
Luang Prabang
Phantasouk, Somboun., Deputy Head, Roads and Bridges Office, 
DPWT Luang Prabang
Phathavong, Buali., Pak Ou village, Luang Prabang
Phommachack, Vanhkham., Xang Hai village, Luang Prabang
Phoummahaxai, Saysamone., President, Lao Font Construction, 
Pak Ou village, Luang Prabang
Phouxay, Kabmanivanh (Dr)., Professor, Economic Geography, 
National University of Laos
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Rattana, Phaknakhone., Chief of Environmental section, PWI, 
MPWT, Vientiane
Rex, William., Lead Specialist, World Bank
Saythavy, Bounthong., Vice-District Governor, Champassak 
 District, Champassak
Sengaloun, Khamphuang., Head of Public Works and Transport 
Office, Wat Phu, Champasak District, Champassak
Sengchanthala, Bounmay., Head of Road Administration Section, 
Oudomxay Province
Sengchanthala, Bounmay., Head of Road Administration Service, 
DPWT Oudomxay
Senmanysay, Bounvilay., Vice Head of Land and Water Transport 
Division, Public Works and Transport, Pakse, Champassak
Seuphanyha, Kisone., Chief of District Office of Public Works and 
Transport, Houn District Oudomxay
Sisoulath, Phoukhong., Project Director, International Law Project, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sisouphanthong, Bounthavy (Dr)., Vice Minister, Ministry of Plan-
ning and Investment
Sithavong, Khamphanh., Deputy Director IT Center, National 
 University of Laos
Somlod, Former Village Chief, Kuay Village, Phontong District, 
Champassak
Souksavath, Phonesaly., Deputy Director General, Department of 
Statistics
Southivong, Sombath., Senior Infrastructure Specialist, World Bank 
Vientiane
Souvannavong, Pho Ngeun., Director of Environmental and Social 
Division, Public Works and Transport Institute (PWI), MPWT, 
Vientiane
Thammavong, Fasanane., Director, DPWT Luang Prabang
Thanongsack, Xeng., Deputy Director, DPWT, Luang Prabang
Thattavong, Boumxom., Chief of Planning section, Department of 
Planning and Investment, Luang Prabang
Thiengchanhxay, Viengvilay., Faculty of Law and Political Science
Thiphalangsy, Vongvillay., Director, Human Rights, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Thongphalith, Buachanh., Pak Ou village, Luang Prabang 
Thoran, Wolfgang., First Secretary, German Embassy
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Tsipsavanh, Head Survey Unit, Department of Statistics
Viravouth, Sengsomphone., Director General Dept of Planning and 
Co-operation, Ministry of Education
Vongsalasinh, Kayakeo., Deputy Director, Department of Public 
Works and Transport (DPWT), Oudomxay
Vongsay, Daovong., Former Sida National Programme Officer
Vongsengchanh, Bounpone., Head of Public Works and Transport 
Office, Phonthong District, Champassak
Wangchiaxa, Blongvang., Head, Roads and Waterways Division, 
DPWT Luang Prabang
Xaiyhabouth, Syvanh., Village Chief, Pak Ou village, Luang Prabang
Xomsihapannga, Bounluane., Former Officer, Ministry of Planning 
and Investment
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Appendix C:  The Aid Quality 
Evaluation 
Framework 
inTrODuCTiOn
The AQEF is comprised of five components; each of these compo-
nents contains various sub-components. Assessments of aid quality 
can be made against each of the AQEF components, using a mix of 
qualitative and qualitative data. The collection of these data is guid-
ed by a purposive sampling framework that emphasises the triangu-
lation of data sources. The interpretation of AQEF assessments must 
be preceded and informed by rigorous political-economic analysis in 
order to understand the context of aid delivery over time. 
The five components of the AQEF for the purposes of this evalua-
tion are:
1. absorptive capacity; 
2. quality of public sector financial management; 
3. consistency with Paris Declaration principles; 
4. consistency with partner country national sectoral priorities; 
and 
5. consistency with donor country program strategies (or equiva-
lents). 
The first three components are indicators of what contributes to 
effective aid delivery and are chosen according to state of the art, 
widely accepted knowledge of aid effectiveness.37 Assessments based 
on these elements are not used to criticise the aid delivery decisions 
made in the early years of Sweden’s co-operation with Laos as much 
of the knowledge of what contributes to effective aid was not known at 
that time. These assessments however indicate much about how effec-
tive aid might have been delivered based on contemporary thinking, 
37 The Paris Declaration principles and their background are well known in donor 
agencies circles, being a product of lessons learned from decades of official aid 
delivery. Absorptive capacity and the quality of fiscal management are issues that 
have become prominent in aid policies more recently, owing largely to concerns 
over scaled up aid in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals. It has 
been recognized, however, that these issues are relevant at all aid levels, large and 
small. A large literature has emerged on these topics and includes Guillaumont 
and Guillaumont (2006), Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006), Heller and Gupta 
(2002), Heller et al. (2006) and McGillivray and Morrissey (2001). 
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and they provide good departure points to discuss changes in Sweden’s 
aid delivery over time and the various factors that shaped that deliv-
ery. Assessments for these early years are primarily assigned on the 
basis of qualitative information given the lack of quantitative data. 
AQEF COMPOnEnTS
Absorptive capacity (AC) refers to the capacity of the partner 
country to use aid efficiently for development purposes. It is based on 
the simple recognition that there are limits to the amounts of aid that 
can be efficiently absorbed, with higher and higher levels of aid not 
necessarily associated with bigger and better development impacts. 
This recognition is based on observations from the field, but also on 
international research that shows that the incremental impact of aid 
falls as aid levels increase (see, for example, McGillivray and Feeny, 
2009 and Feeny and McGillivray, 2010).38 This occurs at all aid levels, 
large and small. Absorptive capacity is a critical determinant of the 
sustainability of aid impacts. There are many reasons why absorptive 
capacity constraints emerge within a partner country. They include 
the efficiency of partner government systems, the capacity of other 
agencies dealing with aid delivery, and the policy stance of partner 
governments. The absorptive capacity component captures these con-
ditions and includes policy quality and institutional performance, vari-
ous governance measures such as voice and accountability, rule of law 
and control of corruption, basic measures of the efficiency of public fis-
cal management such as the predictability and control of budget exe-
cution, and measures of the quality of donor practices such as the 
extent of proliferation of aid-funded activities and the predictability of 
support. Recognising that Swedish development co-operation has 
often been delivered through, or in partnership with NGOs, these 
measures can be augmented with indicators of the capacity of these 
organisations to absorb Swedish aid. These indicators are obtained by 
qualitative investigation, seeking to establish whether, on development 
effectiveness criteria, more aid could have been delivered efficiently 
through NGOs, whether the amount of aid allocated through them 
was appropriate to their absorptive capacities, or whether too much 
aid was allocated in partnership with them.
38  Note that the McGillivray and Feeny (2009) paper is primarily concerned with 
fragile states, but it also provides evidence that absorptive capacity constraints ap-
ply in all aid recipient countries.
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The public sector financial management component has 
profound consequences for the impact of donor aid and therefore 
warrants more thorough and additional investigation. While this 
component is also included under absorptive capacity (very generally 
and in the context of other key AC indicators), this framework 
acknowledges its crucial importance by applying more weighting to 
it as a standalone criteria. There is also overlap between this compo-
nent and the use of country system indicators under the Paris Decla-
ration. However these indicators are quite limited and do not suffi-
ciently encompass many important PFM issues, such as those 
addressed by the sub-components discussed below. An important 
point to make with regard to the use of country systems is that while 
a donor may use them, if they are of a poor quality, aid impact will 
be less than if those systems where of a higher quality. As such this 
component of the AQEF attempts to measure the quality of PFM in 
the partner country; the Paris principles are used to assess the extent 
to which Sida used partner systems. The sub-components include 
internationally agreed measures of the orderliness of and participa-
tion in annual budget processes, the presence of a multi-year per-
spective in fiscal planning and the effectiveness of tax payment col-
lection. The overall rationale for the inclusion of this component in 
the AQEF is that the absence of good quality public sector financial 
management constrains the extent to which a donor country pro-
gram can achieve intended development outcomes and ultimately 
affects the sustainability of development co-operation activities. 
The consistency with Paris Declaration principles compo-
nent is based the donor community agreed measures of progress in 
each of the following five principles:
1. Ownership: Developing countries must lead their own develop-
ment policies and strategies, and manage their own develop-
ment work on the ground; 
2. Alignment: Donors must line up their aid firmly behind the pri-
orities outlined in developing countries’ national development 
strategies, they should use partner country systems, their aid 
must be untied and be predictable;
3. Harmonisation: Donors must coordinate their development 
work better amongst themselves to avoid duplication and high 
transaction costs for poor countries; 
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4. Managing for results: All parties in the aid relationship must 
place more focus on the result of aid, the tangible difference it 
makes in poor people’s lives; and 
2. Mutual accountability: Donors and developing countries must 
account more transparently to each other for their use of aid 
funds, and to their citizens and parliaments for the impact of 
their aid. 
Ownership, alignment and mutual accountability are acknowl-
edged to be important drivers of the sustainability of aid impacts and, 
therefore, of quality aid delivery. The incorporation of these princi-
ples in AQEF assessments serves to increase the framework’s focus on 
sustainability. The application of these principles are nuanced to take 
into account the political evolution of a country over time, its fragility, 
and conflict and post-conflict situations, all of which are important 
aspects of the present evaluation. To reiterate a point made above, 
particular care needs to be taken in the retrospective application of 
these principles, keeping in mind that they are based on thinking on 
aid effectiveness that has evolved over time and much of which was 
not known or accepted until well into the 1990s or later. 
The partner country national sectoral priorities compo-
nent is concerned with the focus of a donor program within the part-
ner country under consideration. The basic idea behind including 
this component in the AQEF is that donor country programs should 
be consistent with development needs in countries, and they should 
be sufficiently flexible to respond to changing development needs or 
priorities. These needs may or may not be recognised in partner 
development plans or priorities. As such the issue being addressed by 
this component is not necessarily one of alignment, in the context of 
the Paris principles. One approach is to adapt indices used to assess 
the consistency of global inter-country aid allocation to the relative 
needs of recipient countries to country level analysis. This would 
result in an index that would measure the extent to which the alloca-
tion of country program funds, across sectors, is consistent with part-
ner country achievement in these sectors. If, for example, a country 
was doing particularly poorly in health compared to all other sec-
tors, the percentage share of total country funds to this sector should 
be larger than that to other sectors. The index would provide 
a quantitative assessment based on such consistency. Similar investi-
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gation can be undertaken for the geographic allocation of donor sup-
port within a partner country.
The donor country program strategy component has been 
added to the AQEF for the specific purpose of this evaluation. The 
AQEF focuses on the prerequisites for effective, poverty-reducing 
aid. As such it does not focus directly on outcomes consistent with 
a focus on multidimensional poverty reduction or with other broadly 
developmental outcomes that donors might pursue. The inclusion of 
the donor country program strategy component is intended to throw 
specific light on this issue. It is based on various assessments of what 
the country program has achieved, assessed against the principal 
objective of these programs, that being poverty reduction. Whether 
other objectives identified in country program strategies have been 
achieved can also be considered.
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Figure D.1 Life Expectancy, Laos, 1960 to 2008
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Figure D.2 Adult Literacy, Laos, 1970 to 2008
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Figure D.3 School Enrolment, Laos, 1970 to 2008
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Figure D.5 Income per capita, Laos, 1984 to 2008
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Appendix E: Development  
 Co-operation Programs  
and Projects Between  
Sweden and Laos
Specific Program Sector Period Activity  
expenditure
Agriculture
Water/ Mekong Project 
(Dams and Fields)
Water 1978–1980 20,500,000 SEK
Energy Generation and Supply 
Xeset Hydropower Project 
(with ADB and UNDP)
Electri-
city
1987–1992 145,000,000 SEK
Gazification Project Electri-
city
1986–1991 Not known
Transport and Roads
Import Support (mainly for 
infrastructure)
Transport 1977–? 25,000,000 SEK
KM-14 Workshop  
(Volvo Garage)
Transport 1980–1990 36,000,000 SEK
Roads, Muong Mai Roads 1982–1985 59,000,000 SEK 
(not confirmed)
Support to transport sector Transport 1985–1986 10,000,000 SEK
Road sector, Phase I Roads 1987–1990 76,000,000 SEK
Road sector, Phase II & III Roads 1991–1997 330,000,000 SEK
285,000,000 SEK
Road sector, Phase IV Roads 1997–2001 177,100,000 SEK
Lao-Swedish Road Sector 
Programme II (LSRSP 2)
Roads 2001–2005 151,000,000 SEK
Lao-Swedish Road Sector 
Programme III
Roads 2005–2009 140,000,000 SEK
Rehabilitation of Road no 8 Roads 2001–2005 30,350,000 SEK
Soft Credit Road 8 Roads 2001–2005 100,000,000 SEK
Employment Intensive Rural 
Roads Construction and 
Maintenance 1996–1997 
(With ILO)
Transport 1996–1997 4,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity  
expenditure
Rural Access Planning and 
Infrastructure for Basic 
Needs (with UNDP)
Transport 1997–1999 2,205,000 SEK
Forestry and Natural Resource Management
State Forestry Enterprise, 
SFE 3 (Tha Bok)
Forestry 1977–1985 45,000,000 SEK
State Forestry Enterprise, 
SFE 1 (Muong Mai)
Forestry 1979–1987 90,000,000 SEK
Muong Mai Training Center Forestry 1980–1984 10,000,000 SEK
Ministry of Industries,  
Handicraft and Forestry
Forestry 1984–1986 28,500,000 SEK
Muong Paksane Regional 
Project
Forestry 1984–1986 1,600,000 SEK
Lao-Swedish Forestry  
Programme, LSFP, Phase I
Forestry 1984–1988 10,000,000 SEK
Lao-Swedish Forestry  
Programme, (LSFP, Phase II)
Forestry 1988–1989 40,000,000 SEK
Lao-Swedish Forestry  
Programme, LSFP, Phase III
Forestry 1991–1996 120,000,000 SEK
Lao-Swedish Forestry  
Programme, LSFP, Phase IV
Forestry 1996–2002 152,900,000 SEK
Programme Support to  
National Coordination of  
Development Assistance 
and Investment in the  
Ministry of Agriculture  
and Forestry (with UNDP)
Forestry 1997–1999 Not known
Lao Swedish Upland  
Agriculture and Forestry  
Research Programme 
(LSUAFRP) (Through NAFRI: 
National Agriculture and 
Forestry Research Institute)
Forestry/
Research
2004–2007 77,000,000 SEK
Upland Research and  
Capacity Development  
Programme (URDP) 
Forestry/
Research
2007–2012 88,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity  
expenditure
Lao Swedish Upland  
Agriculture and Forestry  
Research Programme 
(LSUAFRP) (Through NAFRI: 
National Agriculture and 
Forestry Research Institute)
Forestry/
Research
2001–2005 61,000,000 SEK
Forest Strategy 2020 
(FS2020)
Forestry 2001–2002 1,500,000 SEK
National Forest Sect  
Strategy
Forestry 2002–2004 4,200,000 SEK
Forestry Strategy 2020  
Implementation Promotion 
Project (FSIP)
Forestry 2006–2010 9,000,000 SEK
Conservation for Sustainable 
Livelihoods IUCN
Environ-
ment 
2003–2010 5,000m,000 SEK
Environment Support (title?) 
to STENO through UNDP
Environ-
ment
1998 1,100,000 SEK
Strengthening Environment 
Management through STEA
Environ-
ment
1999–2003 20,000,000 SEK
Strengthening Environment 
Management through  
STEA-SEM
Environ-
ment
2001–2006 48,760,000 SEK
STEA-SEM II Environ-
ment
2006–2010 64,000,000 SEK
Health 
Management and Planning 
Support to the Lao PDR 
Health Sector 
Health 1992–1995 Contribution in-
cluded in below 
programme 
Support to the National Drug 
Programme (NDP), Phase I
Health 1993–1995 9,000,000 SEK
Support to the National Drug 
Programme (NDP), Phase II 
(Health II)
Health 1996–1999 15,000,000 SEK
Support to UNDP’s Drug 
Control Capacity Building 
Project
Health 1998–2001 5,200,000 SEK 
el.
3,200,000 SEK
National Drug Policy  
Programme (NDP), Phase III
Health 2001–2003 16,200,000 SEK
132
APPenDIx e: LIST oF DeveLoPmenT Co‑oPerATIon ProgrAmS AnD ProjeCTS...
Specific Program Sector Period Activity  
expenditure
National Drug Policy  
Programme (NDP)
Health 2006–2009 7,634,000 SEK
Mother – and Child Health 
(MCH I), through UNICEF 
(same as other UNICEF 
above?)
Health 1989–1991 Not known
Mother – and Child Health 
(MCH II), through UNICEF
Health 1995–1999 6,000,000 SEK
water Supply and Sanitation
Rural Water and Sanitation / 
Drinking Water, Phase I 
(UNICEF) 
Water 
and Sani-
tation
1993–1998 34,000,000 SEK
Rural Water and Sanitation / 
Drinking Water II and III / 
National Water Supply and 
Environmental Health  
Programme (UNICEF) 
Water 
and Sani-
tation
1998–2003 55,000,000 SEK /
75,300,000 SEK
Public Administration, Governance and Civil Society 
Statistical Project, National 
Statistics Centre, NSC, 
Phase I
Public 
Admin
1982–1993 5,000,000 SEK
Statistical Project, National 
Statistics Centre, NSC, 
Phase II
Public 
Admin
1994–1998 25,300,000 SEK
Statistical Project, National 
Statistics Centre, NSC, 
Phase III
Public 
Admin
1998–2001 25,000,000 SEK
Statistical Project, National 
Statistics Centre, NSC, 
Phase IV
Public 
Admin
2001–2005 26,000,000 SEK
Statistical Project, National 
Statistics Centre, NSC, 
Phase V
Public 
Admin
2005–2008 25,400,000 SEK
Strengthen the Rule of  
Law in Laos, I
Govern-
ance
1992–1995 9,500,000 SEK
Support to the Legal Sector 
(Phase II of Strengthen the 
Rule of Law in Laos)
Govern-
ance
1996 – 
2002
14,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity  
expenditure
Legal Sector Reform Govern-
ance
2004–2006 5,700,000 SEK
Administration Reform in 
Luang Prabang Province
Govern-
ance
2001–2005 11,700,000 SEK
GPAR Luang Prabang  
Decentralisation
Govern-
ance
2005–2010 20,000,000 SEK
Strengthening the Judiciary 
in Lao PDR (People’s  
Supreme Court) With UNDP
Govern-
ance
2000–2004 1,200,000 SEK
Strengthening the Office  
of the Public Prosecutor
Govern-
ance
2000–2004 2,400,000 SEK
Strengthening the Judiciary 
in the Lao PDR (Through 
UNDP)
Govern-
ance
2000–2001 1,000,000 SEK
Strengthening the Office  
of the Public Prosecutor in 
LAO PDR (Through UNDP)
Govern-
ance
2000–2002 2,000,000 SEK
Provincial Radio Govern-
ance
2001–2002 3,000,000 SEK
Provincial Radio, Phase II Govern-
ance
2005–2008 12,000,000 SEK
Tax project preparation & 
Tax Project Bridging Period
Govern-
ance
2002–2003 5,700,000 SEK
Support to Tax Authority Govern-
ance
2003–2007 25,000,000 SEK
Strengthening of the Legal 
Education and Training in 
Lao PDR / Faculty of Law
Govern-
ance
2000–2003 12,000,000 SEK
Strengthening of the Legal 
Education and Training in 
Lao PDR / Faculty of Law, 
Phase II
Govern-
ance
2003–2009 35,000,000 SEK
Public Finance Management 
Support Project (PFMSP) 
Through World Bank
Public 
Admin
? 4,000,000 SEK
Dissemination of CRC (Con-
vention of the Right of the 
Child)
Human 
Rights 
2002–2005 5,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity  
expenditure
Juvenile Justice and CRC 
(UNICEF)
Human 
Rights 
2006–2009 9,000,000 SEK
Demo/HR fund 02 & 03 Human 
Rights
2002–2003 4,000,000 SEK
Demo/HR fund Human 
Rights
2005–2006 4,000,000 SEK
Demo/HR fund Human 
Rights
2007–2008 Not known
Education
Support to the Asian  
Institute of Technology (AIT)
Education 1989–1993 4,000,000 SEK
Support to the Asian  
Institute of Technology (AIT)
Education 1993–? Not known
Inclusive Education Project I Education 2000–2002 1,000,000 SEK
Inclusive Education  
Project II
Education 2002–2005 6,000,000 SEK
Inclusive Education  
Project III
Education 2005–2008 4,700,000 SEK
Participatory Action  
Research Project
Education 2000–2001 1,500,000 SEK
Advisor to Department of 
Planning and Co-operation 
Education 2001–2004 6,300,000 SEK
The Research Cooperation 
for Livestock Based  
Sustainable Farming  
Systems in the Lower  
Mekong Basin (MEKARN)
Research 
/ Educa-
tion 
2001–2003 19,500,000 SEK
The Research Cooperation 
for Livestock Based  
Sustainable Farming  
Systems in the Lower  
Mekong Basin (MEKARN)
Research 
/ Educa-
tion 
2004–2007 32,500,000 SEK
EQIP II (the Teacher Training 
Enhancement and Status  
of Teachers Component) 
(With ADB)
Education 2002–2007 123,000,000 SEK
“Quality School” Education 2004 800,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity  
expenditure
Demand Driven Basic  
Education Project
Education 2003–2005 2,000,000 SEK
Demand Driven Approach II Education 2005–2007 7,096,952 SEK
Support to Research and  
capacity building at NUOL 
(National University of Laos)
Education 2003–2007 30,700,000 SEK
ICT Project Education 2005–2008 9,500,000 SEK
SAREC Research  
Cooperation
Education ?–2011 Not known
Humanitarian
Humanitarian Support  
to ICRC
Humani-
tarian
1971–1972 1,400,000 SEK
Bomb Clearing, UNDP Humani-
tarian
1996–1997 2,700,000 SEK
Support to Mines Advisory 
Group, MAG
Humani-
tarian
1996–1997 3,500,000 SEK
Support to Mines Advisory 
Group, MAG
Humani-
tarian
1997–1998 2,000,000 SEK
Other
Import Support Other 1974–1975 10,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1986–1988 7,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1991–1999 18,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1999–2001 12,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 2001–2005 9,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 2006–2008 4,000,000 SEK
Cultural Cooperation Other 1991–1996 5,300,000 SEK
Gender Officers Gender 1992–1994 5,000,000 SEK
Support to Women Gender 1995–1997 1,200,000 SEK
Source:  Annex B, Country Report: Laos, Long Term Development Coopera-
tion between Laos/ Sri Lanka/ Vietnam and Sweden, Part One: 
Documentation, 9 July 2010.
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